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ABSTRACT
My dissertation consists of three chapters that evaluate the social welfare effect of
either antitrust policy or industrial transition, all using discrete choice model estima-
tion as the front end for counterfactual analysis. In the first chapter, I investigate
the economic impact of the merger that created the world’s largest hotel chain, Mar-
riott’s acquisition of Starwood, thereby shedding light on the antitrust authorities’
performance in protecting competitive markets for the benefit of consumers.
Different from traditional merger analysis that focuses on the tradeoff between
the upward pricing pressure and the cost synergy among the merging parties while
fixing the market structure, I endogenize firms’ entry decisions into an oligopoly price
competition model. To tackle the associated multiple equilibria issue, I use moment
inequality estimation and propose a novel lower probability bound that reduces the
computational burden from being exponential to being linear in the number of players.
It also adds to the scant empirical evidence on post-merger cost synergy by showing
that every one more affiliated hotel in the local market reduces a hotel’s marginal cost
by up to 2.3%. Then a comparison between the simulated with-merger and without-
vi
merger equilibria indicates that this merger enhances social welfare. In particular, for
those markets that are previously not profitable for any firm to enter, because of the
post-merger cost saving, Marriott or Starwood would enter 6% - 24% of them, which
provides a new perspective for merger reviews.
The second chapter, joint with Mingli Chen, Marc Rysman and Krzysztof Woz-
niak, studies the determinants of the US payment system’s shift from paper payment
instruments, namely cash and check, to digital instruments, such as debit cards and
credit cards. With a 5-year transaction-level panel data, for the first time in the liter-
ature, we can distinguish the short-term effects of transaction size from the long-term
changes in households’ preferences. To do so, we incorporate a household-product-
quarter fixed effect into a multinomial logit model. We develop a new method based
on the Minorization-Maximization (MM) algorithm to address the prohibitive com-
putational challenge of estimating over one million fixed effects in such a nonlinear
model. Results show that over a short horizon (within a quarter), the probability of
using card increases with transaction sizes in general but exhibits substantial house-
hold heterogeneity. While over long horizon (five-year period of the data), with the
estimated household-product-quarter fixed effects, we decompose the increase in card
usage into different channels and find that only a third of it is due to the changes in
household preferences. Another significant driver is the households’ entry and exit
into the sample.
In the third chapter, my coauthors Jacob LaRiviere, Aadharsh Kannan, and I
explore the “death of distance” hypothesis with a novel anonymized customer-level
dataset on demand for cloud computing, accounting for both spatial and price com-
petition among public cloud providers. We introduce a mixed logit demand model of
spatial competition estimable with detailed data of a single firm but only aggregate
sales data of a second. We leverage the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
vii
to tackle the customer-level missing data problem of the second firm. Estimation
results and counterfactuals show that standard spatial competition economics hold
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Price Competition with Endogenous
Entry: The Effects of Marriott &
Starwood’s Merger in Texas
1.1 Introduction
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities usually bring anti-competitive concerns, and
protecting competitive markets for the benefit of consumers is a central challenge
for antitrust authorities. For enforcement success, product price and cost are two
key metrics. Specifically, a merger is usually considered anticompetitive if the price
is expected to increase even when cost savings are taken into account; however, if
such a profit margin lift induces entry of rival firms, the upward pricing pressure
(UPP) may be eventually offset. Therefore the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
emphasizes that the agencies consider entry into the relevant markets as part of their
full assessment of competitive effects. However, rigorous and quantitative analysis on
entry is rarely found in practice (Li et al., 2018).
This work contributes to filling this inadequacy in merger evaluations that incor-
porate entry by providing empirical evidence and useful tools. I study a canonical
“mega-merger”, Marriott International’s $13 billion acquisition of Starwood Hotels
& Resorts Worldwide in 2016. It turned the united Marriott into the worlds’ largest
hotel chain which owns over 5,800 properties and 1.1 million rooms in more than 110
countries. Since Marriott announced its plan of acquisition, many consumer groups,
2
such as Travelers United, had urged the competition agencies to block the deal; 1
however, neither the Department of Justice (DOJ) nor the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) pursued any challenges against Marriott’s filing. One explanation can the
agencies’ expectation for a significant cost synergy, another one is the counter-UPP
effect of with-merger new entry. And the latter one seems consistent with the ex post
facto that over 23.5% of the local markets in Texas have new hotel openings after the
merger by Dec, 2018. Therefore, this paper explores the role of entry in compensating
for the lost competition caused by the Marriott and Starwood merger.
In particular, there are two ways in which entry of new properties could remedy
a merger’s market power effect. First, entry of rival firms into the markets where
the merging parties are currently in, if timely and sufficient, can offset the increase
in market concentration (see Bougette, Hüschelrath and Müller, 2014; Hosken, Olson
and Smith, 2016). Such entry effect has been seen addressed in DOJ and FTC’s
previous merger evaluations. However, the second influence channel, entry from the
merging parties into the markets that would have been unprofitable but for their with-
merger cost synergy, has not been well-studied in either the 2010 Merger Guidelines
or in academic literature. For instance, the merging firms can achieve a reduction in
marginal cost from economies of scale. Conventional merger evaluations often take
entry as exogenous, therefore overlooking the potential social welfare improvement
in the new markets (see Williamson, 1968; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003; Gugler and
Siebert, 2007).
To fully capture the effect of this merger, I take the firms’ entry decisions as en-
dogenous when estimating the price competition in the industry. I model the hotel
chains’ competition as a two-stage oligopoly game. In the first stage, firms simultane-
1The president of United Travellers, Charles Leocha, said that “there is nothing positive for
consumers. Less competition not only means higher prices but also allows companies to do things
that are less visible and would hurt buyers”. For more details, see https://www.mlexwatch.com/
articles/2185/print?section=ftcwatch
3
ously make entry decisions based on future profitability with full information, meaning
that all the firms’ profit determinants, even if unobservable to the econometricians,
are common knowledge among the firms. In the second stage, profit-maximizing en-
trants play a Nash-Bertrand pricing game. Therefore, the market structure, including
the entrants’ number and identities, affects the price competition outcomes and vice
versa.
The full information assumption allows selection based on the exact price com-
petition outcomes, which involves the unobserved demand and marginal cost shocks.
This could cause self-selection bias in the estimates. Resembling the Heckman correc-
tion in single-agent problems, I address this bias in a multi-agent setting by including
the shocks in the price competition stage into the firm’s entry function and allowing
the unobservables across the two stages to be correlated.
Estimating full-information multi-agent entry game can be challenging. One com-
plexity is the multiple equilibria problem rooted in its discrete choice nature. Consider
a two-firm example, it may be an equilibrium for only one firm to enter, but a Nash
equilibrium concept does not determine which one. Therefore, the probability of the
observed outcome is unspecified without arbitrary assumptions on the equilibrium
selection mechanism. Regular estimation methods such as maximum likelihood es-
timation (MLE) or method of moments are therefore infeasible. Following Ciliberto
and Tamer (CT, 2009) and Ciliberto, Murry and Tamer (CMT, 2018), I use moment
inequalities for estimation, which is based on the insight that the empirical probabil-
ity of an equilibrium should be greater than the probability of it being unique and
less than that of it being one of the multiple equilibria.
Under the CMT framework, the computational burden of simulating the lower
probability bound increases exponentially with the number of players. Correspond-
ingly, in CMT’s airline industry application, the number of potential entrants is in
4
each market at most six. To make this framework applicable to the Texas lodging in-
dustry, where there are as many as 11 important players, I propose a computationally
less costly lower bound. Specifically, rather than using the probability that a Nash
equilibrium is unique, I use the probability of an outcome being a strictly dominant
strategy (DS) equilibrium. The conditions for being a DS equilibrium are sufficient
for uniqueness therefore it is a legitimate lower bound; however, a DS equilibrium, by
definition, is the best strategy regardless of what the opponents may play, therefore
circumventing the complex interaction among agents. As a result, the computational
time is reduced from being exponential to being linear in the number of players. I be-
lieve my solution is applicable to a wide variety of settings where a researcher wishes
to estimate a multi-agent discrete choice model but is impeded by the computational
burden due to the multiple equilibria issue.
In theory, such a less binding bound should produce a less sharp identified set;
however, a simulation exercise shows that the DS bounds can give a confidence set
with a width comparable to CT bounds, while consuming only about 1% of the com-
putational time needed by CT. This comparability in confidence set is likely because
we use the same upper bounds and the DS bounds rely less heavily on simulation
therefore have less simulation error. More details can be found in Appendix A.4.
I use data on hotel revenues from the Texas Hotel Occupancy Tax (HOT) Receipts.
Texas is the only U.S. State that publishes each hotel’s monthly revenue to reference
the HOT. Due to confidentiality issues, historical price data with hotel identities are
usually unavailable to researchers. From Smith Travel Research (STR), I have hotel-
level historical price ranges and sub-city level monthly average prices. I leverage both
to interpolate hotel-specific monthly prices based on a seasonality assumption. I focus
on the period from January 2015 until March 2016 when the merger was finalized to
mimic the data structure in real merger analysis and avoid any systematic differences
5
between the without- and with-merger scenarios. Besides data availability, Texas is
an ideal starting point to understand the U.S. lodging industry for its market size.
In 2019, the revenue from the lodging industry in Texas reached $12.8 billion, which
is a substantial portion of the total $183 billion across the country.
The endogenous entry model estimation implies a fairly competitive market: a
1% price increase will, on average, lead to a 9.20% - 10.35% drop in market share.
Additionally, I find that hotel chains having more affiliated properties within a local
market not only win consumers presumably by offering an extensive loyalty program,
but also enjoy a lower marginal cost from economies of scale. By comparing these
to the results from an exogenous entry model, we see that overlooking the firms’
entry decisions causes a downward bias in the price coefficient, and even overturns
the efficiency gain from having an extensive affiliation network. Mathematically, the
directions of the biases indicate that conditional on entry, price is negatively correlated
with the demand shock, and the scale of a firm’s affiliation network is positively
correlated with the marginal cost shock; intuitively, that means an entrant’s positive
net profit relies on the co-occurrence of a low price and a high demand shock, and
to facilitate a low price, firms with a high marginal cost shock lean more on the cost
synergy among their affiliated hotels.
I then evaluate the merger’s economic impact with simulation. I construct hy-
pothetical markets with the values of the exogenous variables widespread over their
empirical distributions, and then solve for the equilibrium prices, market shares and
market structures in both the without- and with-merger scenarios, using the endoge-
nous entry model estimates. In particular, I let the merging parties share their affil-
iation network; thus the increased number of affiliated hotels affects the equilibrium
through both the quality improvement (an expanded loyalty program) and the cost
synergy (economies of scale) channels, in addition to the market power gains from
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the ownership structure change.
Simulation results suggest a welfare-enhancing merger. In markets that are cur-
rently being served, I see that Marriott’s and Starwood’s prices would generally de-
crease, which indicates that the upward pricing pressure from market power gains
and quality improvement is trumped by cost synergy. That could further impel other
firms to lower their price via competition; however, the occasions that the rivals are
consequently driven out of the market are lower than 2%. Overall, consumer sur-
plus would increase by 17.14% - 24.03%. Additionally, for markets that have not
been served yet, Marriott or Starwood would enter 7.2% - 23.7% of them after the
merger. The associated consumer surplus gains in these new markets are compara-
ble to those in the served markets in value but are usually overlooked in traditional
merger evaluation. This finding suggests that the antitrust agencies should incorpo-
rate the potential entry of the merging parties into new markets into their assessment
of competitive effects.
Finally, I conduct the same simulation exercise with the exogenous entry model.
Specifically, I fix the market structure to be the same as the one simulated with the
endogenous entry model in the without-merger scenario. Then I solve for the equilib-
rium prices and market shares using the exogenous entry model estimates. Because
of the estimation biases and firms’ sub-optimal entry decisions, results imply the op-
posite conclusion: the average price would increase, and consumers would suffer from
a 23.96% surplus loss after the merger. This divergence emphasizes the importance
of endogenizing firms’ entry decisions into any merger evaluation framework.
Overall, this paper makes three contributions. First, I propose a computationally
attractive way to estimate a multi-agent discrete choice model with many players
with moment inequalities. Second, I am able to identify the with-merger cost synergy
in a particular form of network expansion, therefore adding to the scant empirical
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evidence for this phenomenon. Third, I find that this merger enhances social welfare.
Particularly, because of the with-merger cost synergy, the merging parties are likely to
enter the new markets that are currently not being served yet, which provides a new
perspective for merger reviews, since previously without an applicable endogenous
entry model the agencies could only focus on the markets where the merging parties
are already in.
Related work This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, the esti-
mation framework builds on papers that endogenize entry decisions or product types
into oligopoly demand estimation. When such a discrete choice is endogenized into a
multi-agent game, the potential multiple equilibria issue puts point identification in
jeopardy unless researchers assume one of the following: (1) an equilibrium selection
mechanism (e.g. Bjorn and Vuong, 1984; Kooreman, 1994; Bajari, Hong and Ryan,
2010); (2) that firms are homogeneous or heterogeneous up to types (e.g. Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1990, 1991); (3) that multiple outcomes are considered as one event with
a well-defined probability (e.g. Berry, 1992); (4) a limited information structure (e.g.
Seim, 2006; Sweeting, 2009; Aradillas-Lopez, 2010); (5) a predetermined entry order
(e.g. Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007). When researchers are unwilling to impose those as-
sumptions that in some cases lack economic foundations, the model is incomplete. It
describes the situation where the model prediction is a correspondence rather than
a function from the exogenous variables (Tamer, 2003). In that case, one can use
inequality restrictions derived from the model for estimation, which is more robust
but usually associated with partial identification and computational challenges.
My approach is closest in spirit to Ciliberto, Murry and Tamer (2018). They use
inequalities to restrict the empirical probabilities in between the probabilities of being
the unique equilibrium and the probabilities of being one of the multiple equilibria.
CMT, as well as my model, inherits the full information, heterogeneous firms and
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simultaneous entry decision settings in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and advances it
by letting a structural price competition model determine profit.
The full information assumption implies that the exact price competition outcome
affects firms’ entry decisions. Therefore, researchers have to solve for the equilibrium
price and market share for each possible market structure to find the equilibrium
ones. That can be computationally burdensome, as the number of possible market
structures increases exponentially with the number of players, and in the course of
parameter searching this might have to be repeated thousands of times. In CMT’s
airline industry application, the number of potential entrants per market, defined as
airlines that are serving at least one market out of both of the endpoint airports, is at
most six. Without further restrictions, the Texas lodging industry has 11 major chains
that could potentially enter any local market. My DS lower probability bound not
only makes the CMT framework feasible in applications with more players, but also
reduces the computational burden of any potential application in real-world antitrust
practice.
It is also possible to derive inequalities directly from revealed preference theory,
as in Pakes et al. (2015) (PPHI). 2 It is established on the behavioral assumption that
each agent’s choice must be weakly most profitable given other agents’ choices.
A critical difference between my model and the applications of PPHI (e.g. Ishii,
2005; Ho, 2009; Ho and Pakes, 2014a; Eizenberg, 2014) is that they assume limited
information. When firms make entry or product decisions, demand and marginal
cost shocks are unknown and thus mean independent to the instruments in firms’
information sets, therefore the parameters in the price competition stage can be esti-
mated in advance as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and point identification is
guaranteed. For parameters in the entry stage, they either directly assume the fixed
2See Pakes (2010) for a comparison between PPHI and the probability-based inequality method,
i.e. generalized discrete choice model, such as Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
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cost (FC) shocks are mean-independence, or restrict their level of variation based
on industrial facts so that differencing or a uniform bound can be applied. Accord-
ingly, one does not have to recover their distribution and repetitively solve for the
equilibrium when the values of these shocks change in estimation. This makes PPHI
computationally more appealing, but limiting the selection on unobservables.
Papers that take on the computational burden of estimating full information en-
dogenous entry models are scant. Li et al. (2018) use importance sampling tech-
niques to avoid solving for equilibrium outcome repetitively. However, they leverage
a known, sequential order of flight service choice to get around the multiple equilibria
issue and assume that demand, marginal cost and fixed cost unobservables are inde-
pendent. Fan and Yang (2020) also ease the computational burden of estimating a
multi-product choice model using a DS equilibrium inspired method, therefore it can
be considered as a cocurrent work of mine. They allow selection on fixed cost shocks
but not on demand and marginal cost shocks by assuming limited information. Addi-
tionally, their inequalities are constructed based on unilateral choice probabilities, so
the information carried by the variation in the rivals’ choices is not fully utilized. To
my knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate an endogenous entry model assuming
full information on fully-correlated unobservables, while computationally handling as
many as 11 potential entrants.
In addition, this paper adds to the empirical studies on the lodging market in
the U.S. and elsewhere. Several papers investigate how market structure affects equi-
librium prices and profits in this industry. Nevertheless, almost all of them employ
a reduced-form profit function for tractability. Kalnins, Froeb and Tschantz (2017)
uses a difference-in-difference design to check the price and occupancy effects of 898
lodging mergers in the United States, with the goal of testing the hypotheses from
different models of competition. Mazzeo (2002a) and Mazzeo (2002b) check whether
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competition-induced price drops are lower when motels are more differentiated. En-
dogenous product choices are addressed by instruments and estimated separately from
price competition. In contrast, I have a detailed model where entry decisions are di-
rectly determined by the price competition outcome, and perform a simultaneous
estimation which is led by the full information assumption.
Finally, I borrow industrial setting ideas such as the outside option and market
size definitions from papers that cover other topics in the lodging industry. Examples
includes but are not limited to Fernandez and Marin (1998), Kalnins and Chung
(2004), Kalnins (2006), Suzuki (2013), Lewis and Zervas (2016), Leisten (2020).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I introduce the
Texas lodging market and describe the data that I use. I introduce my model in
section 3. In section 4, I illustrate my estimation strategy and then explain how
using the probability of being a DS equilibrium as the lower bound can reduce the
computational burden. I show parameter estimates from my endogenous entry model
and compare them to the ones from the exogenous entry model in section 5. In section
6, I evaluate the price and social welfare effects of Marriott’s acquisition of Starwood
with simulation and show that ignoring firms’ entry decisions could lead to severe
bias. I then conclude in section 7.
1.2 The Texas Lodging Industry and Data
I use two main data sources for this study. One is the hotel census database from
Smith Travel Research (STRCD),3 an independent consulting firm specializing in
the lodging industry. It offers key information on every hotel in the Texas market,
including the hotel’s name, location, number of rooms, class, affiliation history, and
3See https://str.com/training/academic-resources/share-center-details
11
price range (the historically lowest and highest prices).4
The other main data source is the Texas Hotel Occupancy Tax (HOT) Receipts,
provided by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. HOT is a nationwide tax
collected by hotel owners, operators, or managers from their guests who rent a room
or space. Among all the U.S. states, only Texas publishes HOT receipts with each
hotel’ monthly revenue as a reference for determining the tax.5,6 The data is available
for decades, but this paper focuses on the period from January 2015 to March 2016
when the merger was granted clearance, so that the complications rooted in the
systematic differences between the without- and with-merger scenarios are avoided.7
I merge the two data sets by hotel address, so I have a panel data on hotel
revenue at monthly level. In the lodging industry, property owners sometimes change
their affiliations. For instance, the DoubleTree by Hilton Hotel at Dallas Richardson
opened on Sep 1, 2009, but the same property used to be a Radisson from March
1, 2003 and before that a Clarion. To be consistent at the level of observation, I
recover each hotel’s historical affiliation also to the monthly level based on the dates
of ex-affiliations in STRCD. In the section below, I explain the definitions of market
and other variables in the industrial context, along with their construction procedure
when they are not directly available in my data sources. Other auxiliary data sources
are also introduced when necessary.
4In the data, I observe a distinct price range for three types of rooms, single, double and suite.
For all-suite hotels, I use the price range of suite; for hotels having multiple types of rooms, I use the
price range of double room. A better way of doing this is probably calculating the quantity weighted
average across different types. However, since that quantity data, i.e. the number of rooms sold for
each type, is not available, I use the price range of double room as an approximate average, given
that it usually lies between those of single room and suite.
5In the data, the majority of hotels (97.2%) file their HOT monthly, the rest 2.8% file quarterly
at least for a period of time. In the latter case, I evenly distribute their quarterly revenues into the
three months in that quarter.
6The HOT tax rate in Texas is 6% of the cost of a room.
7Other papers that also focus on the without-merger period in estimation includes Nevo (2000),
Peters (2006) and Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016).
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1.2.1 The set of players, market definition and market size
The set of players I consider each parent hotel company as a player and investi-
gate their decisions of entering any local market and setting prices if enter. In the
lodging industry, a parent company may hold multiple brands, for example, Marriott
International, as a parent company, holds Ritz-Carlton, Marriott, Sheraton, etc. We
also see that these brands have hotels at multiple locations. One feature in the U.S.
lodging industry is that parent companies are seldom the hotel owners. Instead, they
proliferate by franchising.
Here I define franchisee as an owner company operating under a parent company’s
brand name, and despite of a little ambiguity refer the hotel following such an opera-
tion model as a franchisee or a chain-affiliated hotel interchangeably. In reality, these
franchisees can be further categorized by their management companies. Specifically,
the hotel owners can choose among managing the hotel by themselves, hiring a third-
party management company, or letting the parent company manage it directly. In a
narrow sense, only the first two cases are considered as franchisees and the last one
is distinguished as chain-management hotels. Given that chain-management hotels
account for less than 10% of the data and the differences from the perspective of
modeling is nuanced, I broadly consider all of them as franchisees.
Also, this paper abstracts from the role that the franchisees play in setting the
daily price. It can be justified by the industrial fact that the franchisees usually
adjust the price closely following the parent companies’ guidance through a centralized
revenue management system. Although there are other studies that discuss the pricing
behavior in the lodging industry from the franchisee’s perspective (e.g. Leisten, 2020),
my paper focuses on the competition among parent companies and thus takes a
different angle.
The role of the franchisees in determining entry is discussed around the definition
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of entry later in this section.
Market definition In this paper, a market is vertically restricted within the
upscale segment and spatially outlined by neighborhoods, which is roughly equivalent
to a census tract in terms of area.
First, industry sources vertically categorize hotels into classes by their Average
Daily Rate (ADR), broadly labeled by economy, midscale, upscale and luxury. Rig-
orous analysis should explicitly distinguish among these price-based segments, given
that budget-constrained consumers would substitute much more within a scale in-
stead of across them, Technically, for a multi-brand chain hotel, class is associated
with the brand, and for each brand, the class is determined by its worldwide rather
than local year-end ADR. Therefore, even though hotels in the same class have com-
parable prices, there is still significant variation within and across local markets to
identify the price effect in the estimation.
Table 1.1: A summary of lodging market in Texas by scale
Upper Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale Luxury
Marriott
Fairfield Inn (70) Courtyard (91) Autograph Collection (2) JW Marriott (4)
TownePlace Suites (38) Residence Inn (67) Gaylord (1)
Springhill Suites (48) Marriott (25)
Marriott Conference Center (1)
Renaissance (5)
Starwood
Four Points by Sheraton (8) Sheraton Hotel (15) W Hotel (2)
aloft Hotel (8) Westin (12) Luxury Collection (1)
component (2) Le Meridien (2) St Regis (1)
ADR($)
120 151 215 298
Remark: ADR is calculated by averaging the price ranges of single room, double room and suite, with the data
from STRCD, and then report the middle point within the range.
Here I focus on the upscale segment, out of the consideration that the products
in this class are more heterogeneous than those in cheaper classes, thereby market
concentration increase is more of a threat to the economy. Also, Marriott & Starwood
has a substantial overlap in market presence in this class, which is the precondition for
exercising any market power. Table 1.1 gives the numbers of their properties in Texas
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by class in the parentheses behind each brand. Marriott and Starwood altogether own
296 hotels of upscale class, more than the total of all the other three classes.
The bottom panel of Table 1.1 demonstrates the sizeable differences in ADR across
scales. The numbers are scale-wise averages in Texas, covering the other 9 hotel chains
that compete with Marriott and Starwood in the upscale market, i.e. Hilton, Inter-
continental Hotel Group (IHG), Hyatt, Best Western Hotels & Resorts, Wyndham
Worldwide, Choice Hotels International, Radisson Hotel Group, Great Wolf Lodge
and Sonesta International Hotels Corporation. Table 1.2 summarizes the numbers of
neighborhoods served and rooms owned by the top hotel chains. The numbers in the
brackets indicate percentages. As shown, before the merger, Marriott had already
been the largest player in this market. Hilton is its largest competitor, followed by
IHG and Hyatt.
Table 1.2: Top Hotel Chains in Texas (Pre-merger)
Total Marriott+Starwood Hilton IHG Hyatt ... 0-entry
No. of Neighborhoods 499 114+16 = 121 97 49 29 ... 297
(24.2%) (19.4%) (9.8%) (5.8%) ... (59.5%)
No. of Rooms 59217 22722+2223 = 24945 17383 7860 4373 ...
(42.2%) (29.4%) (13.3%) (7.4%) ...
Second, the choice of neighborhood as local market border follows the Hotel Invest-
ment Handbook (Rushmore, Ciraldo and Tarras, 2000), which refers to neighborhood
as the primary geographic territory that a hotel investor should consider when judging
whether another lodging facility represents competition for the subject property. The
reason is that a neighborhood consisting of a grouping of complementary land uses
”usually has an observable uniformity and exhibit a greater degree of commonality
than the larger market area”. I retrieve neighborhood information using the Google
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Figure 1·1: Austin, TX Neighborhood Map
(a) Neighborhoods in Austin, TX (b) Upscale Hotels in Downtown Austin
Map Geocoding API based on the hotels’ coordinates. 8,9 There are 202 neighbor-
hoods in Texas that are currently being served by at least one upscale chain hotel. I
further define potential market for future entry as neighborhoods that have at least
one chain hotel of a class adjacent to upscale, i.e., upper midscale and upper upscale.
That gives extra 297 neighborhoods and makes the total 499. The rationale is from
their similarity in economic trends.
As an example, Figure 1·1(a) gives the neighborhood layout of Austin, TX. Each
neighborhood is shaded by the number of upscale hotels within it. Figure 1·1(b)
zooms in the neighborhood Downtown, Austin, labeled by a red balloon in Figure
1·1(a). There are five upscale hotels in this neighborhood, labeled by the yellow bal-
8The reader is referred to Kahle and Wickham (2013) on how this can be done with an R-
package. For those hotels that fall out of the neighborhood boundaries defined by Google Map, I
first try to relate them to those hotels with neighborhood information by 5-digit zip code; when such
relating is not possible, I group hotels in the same zip code area as a separate local market.
9I recognize that compared to city/town/village neighborhood is a relative subjective geographic
definition which may fuzzy or even overlapping boundaries; however, according to a Google maps
product expert, Google commonly uses the neighborhoods defined by the local government which
normally have no overlap. And in practice, I do not see any hotel properties get associated to
multiple neighborhoods by Google Maps. More details regarding Google’s rule can be found at
https://support.google.com/maps/thread/31414182?hl=en
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loons. On one hand, given their physical proximity, it is reasonable to believe that
they are each other’s direct competitor; on the other hand, I realize that neighbor-
hood is a relatively narrow definition for local market in the sense that substitution
across neighborhoods is not impossible in real world. However, it is certainly less
substantial than the within-neighborhood substitution, because neighborhoods are
often naturally separated by main streets. In the case of Downtown, Austin, there
are two other upscale hotels in the nearby neighborhoods, but they are split by W.
Cesar Chavez St and Interstate 35.
Market size I construct the measure of market size as the number of rooms avail-
able in each neighborhood-month, using the insight in Lewis and Zervas (2016). For
those neighborhoods that are temporarily not being served, I first establish a linear
relationship between market size and demographics using the data from the served
markets, and then predict the market sizes of those potential markets by plugging
their observed demographics into the fitted linear relationship. The demographic
indicators are from the American Community Survey (ACS) conducted by Census
Bureau, including population/m2, number of employees in hospitality industry, and
median income levels. Since ACS data is at census-tract level, I relate each neigh-
borhood to the census tract with the least distance between their inner points. More
details about the fitted linear relationship are in Appendix A.1.
Table 1.3 shows that a served market on average has 1.627 upscale chain hotels,
and the market size of a served market is on average higher than that of a market
that has not been served yet, which implies selection on the observables.
1.2.2 Endogenous Variables: Entry, Price and Market Share
Entry I consider entry as a parent company granting the right to use its brand
name to a property owner, thereby the property starts to be operated under the
brand, and the parent company will do so only if the future profit from operating
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics
Markets Served All
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
Market-level Variables
No. of entrants 1.627 0.980
Market size 10,707 11,460 10,114 7,584
Fixed cost shifter
Median monthly gross rent ($) 988.3 322.0 983.9 331.9
N = 2,723 N =6,986
Entrants All
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
Market-Chain-level Variables











Affiliated upscale hotels in sub-city 3.071 1.854 0.797 1.495
(abbrev. Nuc)
Marriott 4.553 1.850 3.843 1.988
Hilton 3.160 1.238 2.641 1.486
IHG 1.888 0.835 0.972 0.960
Starwood 1.444 0.498 0.282 0.549
Marignal cost shifter
Affiliated all hotels in sub-city 6.594 3.186 4.315 5.107
(abbrev. Nall)
Marriott 7.699 2.864 6.735 3.127
Hilton 7.106 2.235 6.799 2.333
IHG 7.316 2.851 7.156 2.844
Starwood 2.750 1.464 0.798 1.282
N = 4,430 N = 76,846
the hotel is positive. Two complications in real world are avoided in the definition.
First, strictly speaking, entry, a new hotel opening, should be a joint decision of the
parent company and the owner company, i.e., franchisee and the franchiser. However,
since my counterfactual analysis focuses on a merger between franchisers, I suppress
the franchisees’ role by assuming an excessive supply of them. In other words, I
assume that there is always a property owner willing to build a franchiser-franchisee
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relationship with the chain as long as operating the hotel is profitable.10 This is in line
with the observed much intenser competition among the owner companies compared
to that among the parent companies. In my data, for those hotels that have owner
company information (51.9% of all the 555 upscale hotels), I see 83 different owner
companies, and the average market share by property is only 1.2%, therefore it is
reasonable to assume a parent company’s market.
Furthermore, I take the parent company as a profit-maximizer and abstract from
the complex revenue sharing scheme between the franchiser and the franchisee. This
simplification is motivated by tractability. According to a form of Hyatt Place’s fran-
chise agreement published by the U.S. securities and exchange commission, franchisees
need to pay various fees to their franchisers, including a one-time application fee, a
monthly royalty fee and a monthly contribution to the marketing, central reservations
and technology fund that are proportional to the hotel’s gross room revenue, etc.11
After all these trivialities, franchisers eventually benefit from franchisees’ profit, there-
fore their guidance on price setting and capacity management should aim at profit
maximization, otherwise the franchisees would also be less incentivized to follow.
Price (ADR) Price is probably the most important demand shifter in this mar-
ket. Given the room-night price may vary by room type and consumer, I use the
average daily rate (ADR) as the price, following industry standards. There is no good
resource for historical proprietary-level price data, and previous empirical works that
do not need to identify different parent companies often use the STR anonymized
self-reported performance data (ASPD), e.g. Suzuki (2013), Lewis and Zervas (2016)
and Leisten (2020). However, for my purpose, the hotel-specific ADR is a crucial out-
come of the competition among heterogeneous firms and a criterion to distinguish the
10Suzuki (2013) relies on the same assumption to investigate the impact of land use regulation




merger’s impact on the merging parties vs. their rivals. Leveraging on an assumption
on local seasonality, I fill the gap between the anonymized hotel-level ADR and the
hotel identities using (1) the hotel-level price range information in STRCD and (2)
the sub-city-level monthly ADR provided also by STR. The detailed interpolation
procedure is as follows.
First, motivated by the well-known seasonality in hotel prices, I assume that for
any hotels j and k in market m, their monthly ADR’s, pjmt and pkmt, are linearly
correlated. Therefore, they are each linearly correlated with the sub-city average,
Avgpmt. Sub-city is equivalent to the concept sub-market constructed by STR.
12 It
refers to a subset of a geographic area that is typically made up of a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MA), a group of MA’s or a group of postal codes, e.g. Austin
CBD, TX. In my data, there are 51 sub-cities in total, and each sub-city contains
9.78 neighborhoods on average. As an informal test of the seasonality, I take an
anonymized sub-city in ASPD, and then plot the monthly ADR of every upscale
hotel in this sub-city as a separate line in Figure 1·2. We see that the common time
trend among these prices is prominent.
12Given that markets are defined at neighborhood level in this paper, I rename sub-market as
sub-city to emphasize that it is actually a geography that usually covers multiple neighborhoods
instead of being a subset of it, as the prefix “sub-” indicates.
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Figure 1·2: Anonymized hotel prices in the same sub-city
Implied by the linearity assumption, the lowest/highest historical prices of firm
j, p̄jm /pjm, during its life span Tjm, should coincide with the lowest/highest sub-
city average , Avgpmt̄j/Avgpmtj . Here, tj = argmin
t∈Tjm
pjmt and t̄j = argmax
t∈Tjm
pjmt are
the months in which p̄jm and pjm occur. These two number of pairs (p̄jm, Avgpmt̄j)
and (p
jm




. Then, the hotel-specific ADR’s in other months
can be interpolated based on its deviation from the lowest point, i.e.,
pjmt = pjm +
p̄jm − pjm
Avgpmt̄j − Avgpmtj
× (Avgpmt − Avgpmtj) (1.1)
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(a) Before calibration (b) After calibration
Figure 1·3: Interpolated price vs. ASPD price
I prove the concept plausible by showing that the interpolated prices roughly
follow a normal distribution, same as the anonymized prices in ASPD, see Figure
1·3(a). As the last step, I calibrate the interpolated prices towards the distribution
of prices in ASPD by mean and standard deviation, and then the two distributions
overlap almost perfectly, as shown in Figure 1·3(b).
Market share and consolidation Following the market size definition, I define
market share in terms of the number of rooms sold per month, calculated as the hotel’s
monthly revenue from HOT receipts divided by its calibrated monthly ADR. Then,
I can use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to summarize the concentration
level of the Texas lodging industry. Conventional ex ante merger evaluation focuses
on the incumbents and consider the HHI increment caused by two merging firms
operating as one. In that way, the merger led to an HHI increase of 358.34 in Texas
from its without-merger level, 2715.64. According to the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, markets with an HHI above 2,500 are considered as highly concentrated,
and “Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the
HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.
The presumption may be rebutted by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is
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unlikely to enhance market power”.13
However, as mentioned earlier, we observe a substantial amount of with-merger
new entry. Table 1.4 breaks down the probability that a neighborhood has a new
hotel by firm. We see that Marriott has the highest probability of entry. Notably,
the rivals are also likely to enter. And Starwood, which used to be the 5th in Texas,
now has the second highest probability of entry.
Table 1.4: Post-merger new entry
Firms Marriott Starwood Hilton IHG Hyatt Others
% of markets 6.19% 3.98% 3.98% 3.10% 1.77% 2.21%
Consider the potential significant impact of new entry on equilibrium prices, it
is necessary to endogenize firms’ entry decisions into the demand estimation so that
with-merger optimal entry or exit is allowed in merger simulating.
1.2.3 Exogenous variables: demand, marginal cost and fixed cost shifters
Endogenous entry analysis requires the explanatory variables to be observable for
both entrants and non-entrants and to vary across markets to account for firms’ dif-
ferentiated entry decisions. Counterexamples can be room amenities or conference
room space, since they are unobservable if a parent company has not served a cer-
tain neighborhood yet. To address such needs, I connect each neighborhood to the
higher level geography, sub-city, and then use sub-city-chain specific characteristics
as demand and marginal cost shifters.
In the demand equation, I use the number of affiliated upscale hotels in the same
sub-city. It serves as a proxy for the chain’s loyalty program quality: the more affili-
13The HHI reported here is at state level, meaning that market shares are state-wise. The average
increase in neighborhood-level HHI, weighted by market size, is 146.62 based on a 5996.75 without-
merger level. Although the magnitude is smaller than it at the state level, per 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, such an increase in the “HHI of between 100 points and 200 points potentially
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny”.
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ated hotels the firm has in a local area, the more attractive it is to its members since
it would be easier to accumulate points or to redeem free nights. Additionally, lo-
cally affiliated hotels can share the cost of administration or advertising, have higher
bargaining power when outsourcing their linen to local services and negotiating com-
mission rate paid to travel agents, etc. Since such network effects do not have to
be restricted within hotels of the same class, I use the number of affiliated hotels of
all classes in a sub-city as a covariate explaining marginal cost variation. Regarding
fixed cost, rent is definitely a substantial part. Since the tract-level median rent data
in ACS does not have variation across parent companies within a market, I further
include a fixed effect for each of the top 3 chains in Texas, i.e. Marriott, Hilton, and
IHG.
Table 1.3 shows apparent differences in these variables between markets served
versus all markets and between entrants versus all firms, which again justifies their
influences on firms’ profitability and selection on the observables. Specifically, a
served market on average has 1.627 hotels, and firms tend to enter markets with
higher social economics level, indicated by higher market size and a higher gross rent.
Each entrant has 3.071 affiliated upscale hotels in the same sub-city, more than three
times higher than the average level of all firms, and a similar pattern can be found
in affiliated hotels of all classes. Additionally, they both vary across firms as well as
across markets for the same firm, which makes them qualified demand and marginal
cost shifters as described at the beginning of this subsection.
1.3 Model
I now present a 2-stage static oligopoly model of the Texas lodging industry. In the
first stage, firms simultaneously make entry decisions based on future profitability.
In the second stage, entrants play a Bertrand pricing game, where market shares
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are generated by utility-maximizing consumers making a discrete choice among the
entrants. Figure 1·4 is a timeline that clarifies the information structure and the
order in which firms and consumers take action.
Figure 1·4: Model timeline
In particular, I assume full information in the sense that the fixed cost shocks,
along with the demand and marginal cost shocks in the pricing competition stage, are
common knowledge when firms consider entry. As a result, firms are self-selected into
local markets based on both the observables and the unobservables in both stages, and
the associated selection bias is tackled by using the exact profit in the entry decision
function. Another source of selection bias is the correlation among the shocks, I
explicitly address it by assuming a joint normal distribution and then including the
distributional parameters into the estimation. Furthermore, the simultaneous move
setting makes it a multi-agent discrete choice model which potentially involves the
multiple equilibria issue and thus requires a specialized estimation framework.
In the remainder of this section, I first explain modeling details in a backward or-
der, following the logic of solving a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and
then discuss the complications associated with the full information and the simulta-
neous move assumptions, with a focus on how they affect the estimation strategy.
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1.3.1 Demand
I model the lodging demand by a multinomial discrete choice. Consumer i chooses





jm − αpjm + εijm, εijm ∼ Type I extreme value, i.i.d (1.2)
dijm = 1[uijm ≥ uikm,∀k ∈ Fm]
I use superscript o and u to distinguish the observed and unobserved shifters.
pjm is the price. The idiosyncratic demand shock εijm is assumed to follow a Type I
extreme value distribution, which makes this a multinomial logit model. dijm indicates
whether consumer i chooses hotel j in market m. In particular, consumers can only
choose among the available choice set Fm. Specifically, let ykm be a binary indicator for
firm k’s entry decision into market m, Fm includes the set of entrants, {k : ykm = 1},
and the outside option of staying in non-hotel rooms. I normalize the deterministic
utility of the outside option to 0, then given the multinomial logit setting, the market















Notably, the equilibrium market shares rely on the demand shifters, prices of
all entrants and the entry decisions of all potential entrants. To ease notation for
future discussion, I collect the firm-level variables into vectors, e.g. xom = {xojm}j and
denote the union of the observables and the unobservables by the notation without




m). Then the equilibrium market share sjm can be
written as function of the choice variable in the same stage pm, and the predetermined
14I suppress time subscript t to ease notation.
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variables xm, ym, i.e. sjm = sjm(pm|xm,ym).15
1.3.2 Supply




πjm = (pjm −mcjm)Mmsjm(pm|xm,ym)
where mcjm is firm j’s marginal cost of providing one room in market m, and Mm
is the market size. Similar to utility, I allow marginal cost to vary with both observed






The first-order condition of the profit maximization problem implies the pricing
rule




The pricing rules of all entrants in each market m consist a system of equations
with the price vector as unknowns. Solving this equation system gives the equilibrium
price pjm(xm,wm,ym). Plugging it into the equilibrium market share function, we
have sjm = sjm(xm,wm,ym)
Entry stage The full information assumption indicates that firms’ entry decisions
depend on the realized value of variable profit πjm. Then as long as it offsets the fixed
cost fcjm, firms will choose to join price competition.
16 Therefore
15There is a slight abuse of notation: pm is not a J-dimension vector as xm and ym. Since only
entrants have a well-defined price, its dimension should be the same as the cardinality of the entrant
set Fm.
16At the estimation stage, I use panel data and the hotels are assumed to make the entry decisions
independently in each period. For the incumbents, the decision can be think of as whether to stay
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yjm = 1[(pjm(xm,wm,ym)−mcjm)Mmsjm(xm,wm,ym)− fcjm ≥ 0]. (1.5)







The entry function Eq.(1.5) highlights that when making their entry decisions,
firms consider its impact on the price competition outcome, which makes Eq.(1.3)-
(1.5) a system of simultaneous equations. Accordingly, (pm, sm,ym) is an equilibrium
if it satisfies Eq.(1.3)-(1.5).
1.3.3 Selection and multi-agent discrete choice model
Models with endogenous entry are subject to the canonical selection issue, i.e. en-
trants may have unobservable advantages in the price competition which might be
correlated with other observable product characteristics, mathematically, it means
E[xujm|xojm, pjm, yjm = 1] 6= 0 and E[wujm|xojm, pjm, yjm = 1] 6= 0. As mentioned
earlier, there are two sources of selection. First, firms are assumed to know the re-
alization of the demand and marginal cost shocks at the entry stage. Second, the
unobserved shocks in the three equations are correlated, thus even without the full
information assumption, xujm and w
u
jm should be correlated with yjm = 1 through z
u
jm.
or not. It is reasonable to concern about the stickiness of the decision across periods, i.e., it is
unlikely for a new entrant to exit right in the next period. In that regard, I first assume that most
of the dependence has been captured by the explanatory variables. In other words, we would see an
entrant stay in the market for a while as long as there is no significant change in those variables,
which resembles the reality. Then I abstract from any additional cost related to exit. One may also
worry about whether it is possible for a parent company to respond to a negative profit by quitting
in any period. Although a franchise agreement usually has a decade-long horizon, the franchiser
(namely the parent company has the right to terminate the agreement, effective on the date stated
in their written notice, for reason such as the frachisee fails to pay them any fees. )
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Consequently, it is wrongful to estimate the price competition stage first and then
plug the estimates into the entry inequality for a second-stage estimation, because
the estimates from the price competition model should have selection bias as a wage
regression only considering the employed labor force. Furthermore, estimating the
entry stage first and then addressing the selection problem in the pricing stage using
control function method (e.g. Heckman correction in the single-agent setting) is also
infeasible, because using a structural demand model to determine the profits makes
the impact two-ways. Therefore, regardless of estimation tools, researchers should
estimate the two stages simultaneously and consider the vector of the endogenous
variables in both stages as the dependent variable, i.e. (pjm, sjm, yjm). Accordingly, I










jm) ∼ N(0,Ω), i.i.d ∀j,m
Also, since all firms make entry decisions at the same time, for any firm j, its entry
decision yjm depends on the choices of all its rivals, y−jm, through its effect on the
price competition outcome, as shown in Eq.(1.5). Therefore, I estimate this model as a
multi-agent game. Specifically, instead of focusing on each firm, I construct moments
based on collections of the endogenous variables across all firms, i.e. (pm, sm,ym).
More details are presented in Section 1.4.
Finally, the observations are constructed at the monthly level, which is essentially
assuming that the two-stage game is played in every month. This frequency is not
unrealistic. By my definition, entry can be fulfilled by an owner company switching
to be another brand’s franchisee, which has a much lower cost than constructing a
new building. 17 Correspondingly, for incumbents, “enter” means stay in the market,
17In my data sample, there are 21 new entrants in Texas, 14 of them were from changes of
affiliation and the rest 7 were new properties.
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while “not enter” could be the termination of a franchise agreement. According to
the form of Hyatt Place’s franchise agreement,
The franchiser has the right to terminate the franchise agreement,
effective on the date stated in their written notice, for reason such as the
franchisee fails to pay them or any of their affiliates any fees.
Therefore, in theory, the franchise agreement can be terminated at any point
during its term, for which having a negative profit seems to be a plausible trigger.
That said, if the market conditions, as represented by the exogenous variables, have
no significant changes, we would rarely see an incumbent exit the market, which is
consistent with what a long-term agreement would entail in the real world.
1.4 Estimation strategy
I use moment inequality estimation to accommodate any potential multiple equilibria
at the entry stage. Intuitively, suppose there are two heterogeneous hotel chains,
either one can make positive profits as a monopolist but not as a duopolist. Therefore,
a Nash equilibrium concept would give two equilibria. We observe one of chains
enter, but the probability of each entering is unspecified by a model without an
assumption on the equilibrium selection mechanism. To circumvent any arbitrary
assumptions on such a mechanism, I use moment inequality estimation. Its idea is
to restrict the empirical probability within a range generated by the probability of a
sufficient condition and the probability of a necessary condition, and then constructing
the identified set by collecting all the parameter values that yield these inequality
relationships.
Although moment inequality estimation is robust to any equilibrium selection
mechanism, it is not widely applied by researchers. One of the main reasons is
the computational challenges arising from using numerical method to approximate
30
the probability bounds that have no closed forms. In particular, under the CMT
framework, the computational burden increases exponentially with the number of
players. To allow all the 11 important hotel chains in the estimation, I propose an
innovative lower bound that significantly reduces the computation time. The section
below explains the origin of the computational challenge, the construction of the
moment inequalities along with the estimation procedure in more details.
1.4.1 Moment inequalities and the dominant strategy equilibrium lower
bound
The parameters to be estimated are θ = (β′, α, γ′, δ′, ω′)′, where ω is the upper-
triangle components of Ω’s Choleski factor L, i.e. LL′ = Ω. The market subscript
m is omitted throughout this section when there is no ambiguity. Given θ and the
observed variables O = (xo,wo, zo), there is a correspondence from any unobserved
variables U = (xu,wu, zu) to the set of market structures y that can be supported
as an equilibrium, which I denote as Y = C(U|O, θ). Notably, although the outcome
variables include equilibrium prices p, market shares s and market structure y, I
focus the discussion on y because with any given (y,U), the equilibrium (s,p) are
determined by Eq.(1.3) and Eq.(1.4).
I define the region of U where y is the unique equilibrium as Ruy(O, θ) = {U :
C(U|O, θ) = y} and the region where it is one of multiple equilibria as Rmy (O, θ) =
{U : y ∈ C(U|O, θ), C(U|O, θ)/y 6= ∅}. Then the probability that y is the observed
equilibrium is
Pr(y|O, θ) = Pr(U ∈ Ruy(O, θ)) +
∫
Pr(y|U ∈ Rmy (O, θ))1[U ∈ Rmy (O, θ)]dFU.
where Pr(y|U ∈ Rmy (O, θ)) is the selection rule. Regardless of what the rule is,
the fact that it is a proper probability hence lies in [0, 1] implies
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Pr(U ∈ Ruy(O, θ)) ≤ Pr(y|O, θ) ≤ Pr(U ∈ Ruy(O, θ) ∪Rmy (O, θ)). (1.6)
where the right inequality holds because Ruy(O, θ) and R
m
y (O, θ) are disjoint by
definition.
Because neither the lower probability bound LB(y|O, θ) = Pr(U ∈ Ruy(O, θ))
nor the upper probability bound UB(y|O, θ) = Pr(U ∈ Ruy(O, θ) ∪ Rmy (O, θ)) has
a closed-form expression, CMT use Monte Carlo approximation. Specifically, for a
given parameter vector θ, one need to take many random draws from N(0,Ω) and
for each draw solve the equilibrium (p, s) for each possible market structure y. If
no firm has the incentive to deviate from its entry decision given the net profit, y is
a Nash equilibrium. Then LB(y|O, θ) and UB(y|O, θ) can be obtained by counting
the occurrence of equilibrium y being the unique vs. among the multiple. Recall
that y is a J-dimension vector of binary indicators, so the number of possible market
structures to check is 2J , therefore the computational burden increases exponentially
with the number of potential entrants.
That said, look at LB(y|O, θ) and UB(y|O, θ) separately, the upper probability
bound is relatively easy to simulate because most of the possible market structures
are irrelevant. In particular, it requires only the observed market structure to be an
equilibrium regardless of other possible market structures, which can be guarantee by
letting the entry condition in Eq.(1.5) hold for the observed y, i.e.,
Ruy(O, θ) ∪Rmy (O, θ) = {U : yj = 1[πj(Yj = 1,Y −j = y−j)− fcj ≥ 0], ∀j}. (1.7)
Here, I use upper case Y to distinguish the variable from its specific value y,
and suppress the dependence on (O,U, θ) in the entry condition for simplification of
notation. Specifically, for any entrant j, (Yj = 1,Y −j = y−j) is exactly the observed
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y; while for any non-entrant k, it indicates the counterfactual market structure with k
as an entrant in addition to the current ones, which can be rewritten as y+1k, where
1k is a vector of the same length as y with k
th entry equal to 1 and all other entries
equal to 0. Therefore, to calculate this upper bound, the number of equilibria (p, s)
to solve equals the one observed equilibrium plus a counterfactual market structure
for each non-entrant, i.e. 1 + |{k : yk = 0}|, which is at most J .
However, constructing the lower probability bound requires solving the equilibrium
(p, s) for every possible market structure. Intuitively, for a random draw U, to make
sure that y is the unique equilibrium, one needs to confirm that no other market
structure can also be supported an equilibrium, which could induce intimidating
computational burden when the number of possible market structures is huge. Since
the Texas lodging industry has 11 chain firms therefore there are 211 = 2048 possible
market structures, to keep this estimation framework computationally tractable, I
propose to use the probability that y is the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium as
the lower probability bound.
Dominant strategy equilibrium probability as lower bound By Definition
8.B.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), an entry strategy is strictly dominant for firm j if
the entry condition holds as a strict inequality regardless of the strategies that its
rivals might play. It is obvious that a strategy profile consisting of strictly dominant
strategies of each firm is a Nash equilibrium, and such a strategy profile is what is
called a dominant strategy (DS) equilibrium.
Let Rdsy (O, θ) denote the region of U where y is a DS equilibrium, i.e.,
Rdsy (O, θ) = {U : yj = 1[πj(Yj = 1,Y −j)− fcj ≥ 0],∀j,∀Y −j}.
Since strictly dominant strategy is unique for each firm if existing, DS equilibrium
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is sufficient for being unique. 18,19 Accordingly,
Pr(U ∈ Rdsy (O, θ)) ≤ Pr(U ∈ Ruy(O, θ)),
therefore we can use Pr(U ∈ Rdsy (O, θ)) to replace the lower bound in Eq.(1.6).
The reason Pr(U ∈ Rdsy (O, θ)) is more convenient to calculate is because it by
definition does not involve the complicated inter-player interaction. In particular, in
the context of an entry game with multinomial logit demand, since all products are
assumed to be each other’s substitute, a firm’s profit is always reduced by having extra
entrants. Therefore, entry is dominant if and only if the firm finds it is profitable to
enter even if all its rivals also decide to enter; on the contrary, opting out is dominant
if a firm cannot survive even with monopoly profit. Formally, the condition in the
definition of Rdsy (O, θ) can be rewritten as
yj = 1[πj(Yj = 1,Y −j = yj)− fcj ≥ 0]. (1.8)
As a result, similar to the upper bound, the number of equilibrium (p, s) to solve
now is at most J : for any entrant j, (Yj = 1,Y −j = yj) indicates Y j = 1, i.e.,
all firms decide to enter; while for any non-entrant k, (Yk = 1,Y −k = 0) = 1
k, a
monopoly market with firm k as the only entrant. Eventually, in this case where
J = 11, the number of (p, s) to solve for each market m and each θ decreases from
2J = 2, 048 to at most 2× J = 22.
Although the numerical gap between the two lower bounds may cause the loss of
sharpness in identification, i.e., the identified set in theory could be wider if using
the less restrictive DS lower bound. However, a simulation exercise in Appendix A.4
18See https://homepages.cwi.nl/~apt/stra/ch3.pdf for a proof.
19The existence of a strictly dominant strategy is guaranteed by the infinite domain of U. Intu-
itively, given any (O, θ), there should be some very high demand shock xuj , and very low marginal
and fixed cost shocks wuj , z
u
j that make entry always profitable for firm j no matter what the rivals’
strategies are.
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shows that it is not necessarily true in practice.
A two-player example Now I use an abstract 2-player entry game to fix the
implications of the key concepts in moment inequality estimation such as the multiple
equilibria issue and probability bounds. To do that, let us ignore price competition
for a moment and consider that the two firms decide whether to enter a market based
on a reduced-form linear profit function,

y1 = 1[α− β2y2 − c1 ≥ 0]
y2 = 1[α− β1y1 − c2 ≥ 0],
(1.9)
where α is a constant, β1 and β2 are assumed negative to mimic the competition
effect in multinomial discrete choice model.
Figure 1·5: 2× 2 market structure correspondence
Furthermore, I assume that the cost shock cj ∈ [0, 1] and follows some distribution
G, i.i.d for j = 1, 2. Then the equilibrium market structure is a correspondence from
[0, 1]× [0, 1], as shown in Figure 1·5.
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(a) Lower bound: DS Eq. (b) Lower bound: Unique (c) Upper bound
Figure 1·6: Probability bounds in a two-player example
A market structure y = (y1, y2) is a Nash equilibrium if Eq.(1.9) holds. When
c = (c1, c2) ∈ [α− β2, α]× [α− β1, α], both (1, 0) and (0, 1) are Nash equilibria, and
Pr(1, 0) is unspecified in a model without equilibrium selection assumption. As a
result, MLE is infeasible, for which moment inequality estimation can be remedial.
Figure 1·6 depicts the probability bounds for moment inequality estimation. Specif-
ically, In Figure 1·6(c) the upper bound region is highlighted in blue, formally it is
Ru(1,0) ∪ Rm(1,0) = [0, α] × [α − β1, 1]. The upper bound only requires that (1, 0) is an
equilibrium, therefore it can be easily obtained by checking whether (1, 0) satisfies
Eq.(1.9). However, for Ru(1,0), the yellow region in Figure 1·6(b), a researcher has to
check Eq.(1.9) for each of (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1), then carefully take out the
region where other equilibria are involved. In practice, this region usually does not
have a closed form, for which Monte Carlo simulation can be helpful. The procedure
usually consists of the following steps: (1) take RS random draws from the assumed
distribution of c; (2) for each draw cr, check Eq.(1.9) for all possible outcomes and
count the number of draws that support only (1, 0) as an equilibrium, denoted as
RSu(1,0); (4) use RS
u
(1,0)/RS to approximate Pr(c ∈ Ru(1,0)). It is not hard to imagine
that this procedure will get more complicated when there are more players and the
price competition stage is structural therefore numerically solving for the equilibrium
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prices and market shares is involved.
To tackle the computational challenge, I propose the DS lower probability in
Figure 1·6(a). Given β1, β2 ≤ 0, y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 are strictly dominant strategy
indicates that firm 1 wants to enter even if firm 2 also enters, and firm 2 does not want
to enter even if it would be the monopoly in the market. By Eq.(1.9), that indicates
α− β2 − c1 ≥ 0, α− c2 ≤ 0; then, Rds(1,0) can be easily solved as [0, α− β2]× [α, 1].
1.4.2 Objective function in practice
With a little abuse of notation, I let Pr(O, θ), LB(O, θ) and UB(O, θ) to each denote
a vector that collects the empirical probability Pr(y|O, θ) and probability bounds
LB(y|O, θ), UB(y|O, θ) across all observed y respectively, i.e. Pr(O, θ) = {Pr(y|O, θ)}y.
Then any parameter values that confine Pr(O, θ) within LB(O, θ) and UB(O, θ) there-
fore make the following deviation function Q(θ) equal to 0 should be included into










UB(O, θ)− Pr(O, θ)
)
−||dFO, (1.10)
where (a1, a2, ..., ai, ...)+ = (a11[a1 ≥ 0], a21[a2 ≥ 0], ..., ai1[ai ≥ 0], ...), (a1, a2, ...,
ai, ...)− = (a11[a1 ≤ 0], a21[a2 ≤ 0], ..., ai1[ai ≤ 0], ...) and || · || is the Euclidean norm.
Since the probabilities are determined by unobservables, I rewrite Eq.(1.10) with
a focus on (xu,wu, zu) in order to outline the procedure of evaluating the objective
function at a given θ, detailed estimation steps are discussed in Appendix A.2.
First, I rewrite the empirical probability Pr(y|O, θ) as
Pr(xu ≤ tx,wu ≤ tw, zu(y)|O, θ). (1.11)
The idea again is mapping the observed quantities (p, s,y) to the unobservables U.
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Conditional on (O, θ), I recover xu and wu by inverting Eq.(1.3) and Eq.(1.4) based
on the observed equilibrium (p, s), and then consider the their cumulative densities at
some carefully selected thresholds tx and tw. zu(y) is a simplified way of writing {zu :
y is the observed equilibrium|(xu,wu)}. Then the empirical probability in Eq.(1.11)
can be obtained by counting the occurrence of observing {xu ≤ tx,wu ≤ tw,y}. 20
As analogies to Eq.(1.11), the theoretical probability bounds LB(y|O, θ) and
UB(y|O, θ) are constructed by replacing zu(y) with {zu ∈ Rdsy |(xu,wu)} and {zu ∈
Ruy ∪ Rmy |(xu,wu)} correspondingly. In particular, since Pr(zu ∈ Rdsy |xu,wu) and
Pr(zu ∈ Ruy ∪ Rmy |xu,wu) have a closed form under the joint normality assump-
tion, I consider the joint probability of (xu,wu) and the conditional probability of
zu|(xu,wu) separately to reduce the dimension of simulation. Specifically, by the
i.i.d assumption on zuj ,∀j, the market-level conditional probability can be written as
the product of the firm-level ones. Take the lower bound as an example, by Eq.(1.8),
Pr(zu ∈ Rdsy |xu,wu) =
∏
j
Pr(zuj ∈ Rdsyj |x
u,wu).
where Rdsyj is the one-dimension range of z
u
j where yj is a dominant strategy equi-
librium. Specifically, in terms of the firm-level conditional probability, for an entrant
j, s.t. yj = 1, entry is a dominant strategy indicates that firm j makes positive profits
even if all its rivals are in the market, i.e.,
Pr(zuj ∈ Rdsyj |x
u,wu) = Pr(πj(1)− exp(zo
′
j δ + z
u




where Φ̃ is the CDF of zuj |(xu,wu). On the contrary, for a non-entrant k, s.t. yk =
0, staying out of the market is a dominant strategy if even the monopoly profit is not
positive, i.e.,
20Similar to (p, s), the dimension of xu, wu, tx, tw equals the number of entrants in each market.
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Pr(zuk ∈ Rdsyk |x
u,wu) = Pr(πk(1
k)− exp(zo′k δ + zuk ) ≤ 0|xu,wu)
= 1− Φ̃(log(πk(1k))− zo
′
k δ)
In summary, the market-level lower bound probability can be rewritten as










Similarly, the market-level upper bound probability has the following form,










Finally, the theoretical probability bounds can be obtained by integrating (xu,wu)
over up to (tx, tw), i.e.,
LB(xu ≤ tx,wu ≤ tw, zu(y)|O, θ)
=
(tx,tw)∫
Pr(zu ∈ Rdsy |xu,wu)dF (xu,wu) (1.12)
UB(xu ≤ tx,wu ≤ tw, zu(y)|O, θ)
=
(tx,tw)∫
Pr(zu ∈ Ruy ∪Rmy |xu,wu)dF (xu,wu) (1.13)
In practice, I take random draws from the joint distribution of (xu,wu), average
Pr(zu ∈ Rdsy |xu,wu) and Pr(zu ∈ Ruy ∪ Rmy |xu,wu) over those draws below (tx, tw),
and then multiply this average by Pr(xu ≤ tx,wu ≤ tw).
The rest of the estimation procedure closely follows Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)














UB(Om, θ)− Pr(Om, θ)
)
−||,
where M is the total number of markets. I search for the minimums of QM(θ) by
evaluating it at many points, following the MCMC approach in Chernozhukov and
Hong (2003).
Second, I construct the 95% confidence sets using the inference method that is
robust to partial identification, following Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007).
Specifically, the identified set is defined in a level set fashion, Ŝθ = {θ : MQM(θ) ≤
vM}, where M → ∞ and vM → 0. The idea of inference is to find a cutoff c such
that the associated level set CS(c) = {θ : M(QM(θ) −minθQM(θ)) ≤ c} covers the
identified set Ŝθ with the desired significance level.
21 I approximate the distribution
of MQM(θ) by bootstrap, let c be the 95% percentile of the simulated distribution,
then construct CS(c) by collecting all the θ’s evaluated in the first step that satisfy
M(QM(θ)−minθQM(θ)) ≤ c. More details regarding the MCMC searching procedure
and the inference method can be found in Appendix A.2.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Descriptive evidences
In this section, I provide reduced-form evidence for the impact of Marriott-Starwood
merger on the market equilibrium prices and quantities.
I extend the span of the data to Dec 2018 and employ a difference-in-difference
design to identify the merger effect. The regression equation is as follows,
21Even though in theory parameter values in the identified set should have Q(θ) = 0, it is not
necessarily true in practice due to potential misspecification. See Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer
(2007).
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-difference estimates
All No rivals entered Rival entered
pjm qjm pjm qjm pjm qjm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M&S hotels in M&S market × Post-merger 2.298∗∗∗ -15.258∗∗∗ 1.331 -13.673∗∗∗ 10.474∗∗∗ -17.153∗
(1.009) (3.590) (1.097) (3.732) (2.415) (9.164)
Year-month FE × × × × × ×
Neighborhood FE × × × × × ×
Sub.market-firm FE × × × × × ×
Observations 14,341 14,341 13,333 13,333 1,008 1,008
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Outcomejmt = ξj + ηm + τt + µ×Djmt + νjmt
Djmt = 1[j ∈ {M,S}, {M,S} ∈ Fmt]× Post-mergermt
Djmt is the treatment variable. ξj, ηm, τt are the firm, market (neighborhood) and
time (year-month) fixed effects correspondingly. Additionally, I let the firm effect ξj
to be sub-city specific. νjmt is a random shock that is exogenous to the covariates
and i.i.d across ∀j,m, t. I use M and S as abbreviations for Marriott and Starwood.
Specifically, I consider the treatment group as the Marriott and Starwood hotels, i.e.,
j ∈ {M,S}, in markets where they coexist, i.e., {M,S} ∈ Fmt, then the control
group would be any other hotel or Marriott and Starwood hotels in other types of
markets. In this way, I focus on the direct effects of market concentration increase
on the merging parties’ prices and quantities and take the potential spillover effects
in other markets as second order.
The first two columns of Table 1.5 show that overall, Marriott and Starwood
hotels increased their with-merger prices by $2.298, and the number of room-nights
sold decreased by −15.258 accordingly. When we separately look at the markets
with rivals entered after the merger vs. those without rivals entered, we see that
the observational increase in prices is mainly driven by the former type of markets.
Regarding the direction of causality, since extra competition, ceteris paribus, would
always lower every incumbent’s price in the market, it should be the price increase
that induces new rivals. Loosely speaking, if the merging parties increase their prices
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after the merger, a rival firm who previously finds entry unprofitable now can also
increase its price by some amount less than the merging parties do so that there
would not be much loss in market share, but the extra variable profit gained could
overturn its entry decision. Furthermore, the price increase in column (5) should be
interpreted as a lower bound for the price effects in these markets, because the new
entrants should already offset some of the increased market concentration.
Such differences in these two types of markets are important, because they mo-
tivate the endogenous entry setting in two ways. First, it proves that entry is not
random. Firms are self-selected into markets based on profitability; therefore, esti-
mation without an entry stage would be biased. Second, rivals can respond to the
merger by entry and exit. Specifically, if the extra rivals who would enter when the
merging parties increase their price are overlooked, the price increase and thereby the
economic damage of the merger would be overestimated.
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Table 1.6: Estimation results
Exogenous Entry Endogenous Entry
MLE Moment Equality Moment Inequality
(95% Confidence Set)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Demand Equation
Constant 25.670*** 25.806*** [8.933, 11.603]
(0.6126) (4.0166)
Price -0.224*** -0.231*** [-0.134, -0.119]
(0.0052) (0.0341)
No. of affiliated upscale hotels 0.196*** 0.195*** [0.127, 0.252]
(Nuc) (0.0404) (0.0563)
Panel B: Marginal Cost
Constant 4.665*** 4.664*** [4.822, 5.006]
(0.0040) (0.0659)
No. of all affiliated hotels 0.012*** 0.021*** [-0.023, -0.001]
(Nall) (0.0017) (0.0103)








Demand variance 5.072*** 4.236*** [1.188, 1.633]
(0.1282) (0.9740)
MC variance 0.090*** 0.072*** [0.224, 0.587]
(0.0023) (0.0256)
FC variance [0.194, 0.631]
Demand-MC covariance 0.190*** 0.179*** [0.147, 0.347]
(0.0024) (0.0361)
Demand-FC covariance [0.080, 0.100]
MC-FC covariance [-0.206, -0.043]
Panel E: Market Power
Median elasticity -17.37 -17.88 [-10.35, -9.20]
Median markup 6.33 6.15 [10.62, 11.95]
No. of obs. 4,430 4,430 6,986
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
1.5.2 Exogenous entry model estimation
As for structural model analysis, I first estimate an exogenous entry model as a
baseline. It consists of the pricing competition stage only, as specified by Eq.(1.3)
and Eq.(1.4). The differences between this baseline and the endogenous entry model
in estimates and counterfactual analysis would once again emphasize the importance
of endogenizing the entry stage. In particular, I assume that the unobserved demand
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and marginal cost shocks (xujm, w
u
jm) follows a bivariate normal distribution N(0,Ω
′),
so that the setting can resemble the endogenous entry model to the greatest extent.
I estimate the model with two different methods – MLE and method of moment,
which I refer to as “Moment Equality” to be an analog with the moment inequal-
ity estimation. In particular, because the multiple equilibria issue is eliminated by
the observed market structure, MLE is feasible for the exogenous entry model. In







where xujm = log(sjm)− log(s0m)− xo
′
jmβ + αpjm and w
u
jm = log(pjm − 1α(1−sjm))−
wo
′
jmγ, which are from inverting Eq.(1.3) to Eq.(1.4). Their empirical values at any
given parameter θ can be calculated by plugging in other observed quantities. f(·) is
the probability density function of the bivariate normal distribution N(0,Ω′)
I then estimate the same model using moment equalities as an informal examina-
tion for the idea of performing estimation with cumulative probabilities. Without the
multiple equilibria issue, the empirical probability now has an exact model prediction,
so the moment inequality estimation essentially degenerates to moment equality esti-
mation. Specifically, the probability in Eq.(1.11) becomes Pr(xu ≤ tx,wu ≤ tw|O, θ),




F (tx, tw; θ)− P̂ r(xujm ≤ tx, wujm ≤ tw; θ)
]2
where F (tx, tw; θ) is the cumulative density of N(0,Ω′) up to (tx, tw), P̂ r(xujm ≤
tx, wujm ≤ tw; θ) is the empirical cumulative probability, which is the sample analog
of Eq.(1.11).22








Column (1)-(2) in Table 1.6 present the estimation results using these two meth-
ods. Across the two columns, the estimates are very close in magnitude. And not
surprisingly, the least square estimates have higher standard errors than MLE, but
all parameters achieve the same significance levels, which should dispel any con-
cerns about identification and efficiency when using cumulative density for estimation.
Given the similarity in magnitude, the following discussion focuses on the results from
the moment equality estimation.
The most critical parameter is the price coefficient, which is -0.231. Combining
with the observed market share and price of each firm, I translate the price coefficient
into price elasticity and markup, and then report their medians across all firms and
markets in Panel E. They together demonstrate a pretty competitive market. In
particular, the median markup is $6.15, which is less than 5% of the average ADR
$116.69. The price elasticity is high at -17.88 – 1% price increase, which is about
$1.16 on average, leads almost 20% market share loss.
The parameter on Nuc captures the network effect among the affiliated hotels in
the same segment via the loyalty program. Within the upscale class segment, the
effect of having an additional affiliated hotel is 0.195. I then divide it by the price
coefficient to obtain the willingness to pay. The result shows that travelers are willing
to pay $1.18 more per room-night for one extra member in a firm’s loyalty program.
The estimation of the marginal cost equation, unexpectedly, gives a positive es-
timate for Nall, which contradicts the intuition that affiliated hotels, regardless of
classes, can share operational costs such as linen cleaning and guest supplies. How-
ever, this is likely to be a selection bias that can be corrected by endogenizing entry.
More details can be found when we get to the endogenous model results.
Panel D reports the estimated covariance matrix of the unobservables. xujm and
wujm are positively correlated, which is consistent with the intuition that a product
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with higher quality could be produced at a higher marginal cost.
1.5.3 Endogenous entry
Finally, I estimate the endogenous entry model using the strategy described in Section
1.4 and report the results in Column (3). For each parameter, I report the marginal
confidence interval covering the identified set with 95% probability.
The first difference from Column (1)-(2) in Column (3) is the significantly lower
constant term in the demand equation. Intuitively, the hotel rooms that could have
been provided by non-entrants are supposed to be less appealing in general; therefore ,
the average utility of staying in a hotel room is taken down when they are incorporated
into the framework.
Also, we see that neglecting firm’s self-selection induces a downward bias in the
price coefficient and an upward bias in the coefficient onNall. That means, conditional
on entry, the unobserved demand shock xujm is negatively correlated with price pjm,
and the unobserved marginal cost shock wujm is positively correlated with the number
of all affiliated hotels, i.e. cov(xujm, pjm|yjm = 1) < 0 and cov(wujm, Nalljm|yjm = 1) > 0.
Intuitively, given the high competition level indicated by the high price elasticity
and the low markup, we would expect the entrants to be those who have a pos-
itive unobserved demand shock meanwhile can price lower than their rivals. One
may find it counterintuitive, considering that firms with high demand tend to price
higher. However, price is determined by both markup and marginal cost. A low
marginal cost could dominate the upward pricing pressure from the positive demand
shock. In particular, given the negative coefficient on Nalljm, entrants with an ex-
tensive network, i.e. a large Nalljm, could have a lower marginal cost therefore price
lower even when facing a high marginal cost shock. That conforms to what the es-
timated positive correlation between the demand shock and the marginal cost shock
and cov(wujm, N
all
jm|yjm = 1) > 0 implies, i.e., cov(xujm, Nalljm|yjm = 1) > 0. And the fact
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that entrants have more affiliated hotels than an average firm can also be considered
as supporting evidence, as Table 1.3 shows.
I also calculate the ranges of the median price elasticity and markup based on the
confidence intervals. Specifically, for all parameters that are needed for calculating the
elasticity and markup, i.e. demand constant, price and Nuc, I generate an arithmetic
sequence of length ten from the lower bound to the upper bound and then construct
a grid by letting these sequences cross with each other. For instance, letting the
sequence a = {a1, a2} cross with b = {b1, b2}, I get a grid with all their possible
combinations, i.e. {(a1, b1), (a2, b1), (a1, b2), (a2, b2)}. Next, for each point on the
grid, I calculate the price elasticity and the markup for each j, m, take the median
over j’s and m’s, and then report the range of these medians across all evaluated
points. As shown in Panel E, Column (3), they are [-10.35, -9.20] and [10.62, 11.95],
a lower price elasticity and a higher markup than those in Column (1)-(2). In other
words, overlooking the entry stage would underestimate firms’ market power.
The endogenous entry model also recovers the fixed cost equation, as shown in
Panel C. In general, a firm’s fixed entry cost increases with the local rent level. Since
all the exogenous variables are standardized in estimation (see Appendix A.2) and
the fixed cost is the exponential of a linear index. Combining the summary statistics
in Table 1.3, we should interpret the confidence interval of rent as one standard
deviation, i.e. $331.9, higher than the average median rent $983.9 makes the fixed
cost [e0.1809, e0.2897] = [1.20, 1.34] times of the average level. In addition to the rent
effect, I also allow a level difference in fixed cost for the top 3 firms. Specifically, with
other variables being constant, the fixed entry cost is higher for Hilton and Marriott
but lower for IHG. That coincides with the directions of their capacity differences. In
particular, we would expect a property with a higher fixed cost to be the one with
more rooms. That is consistent with what is in the data, the average capacity per
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property across all firms is 120.72 rooms, while that for Hilton, Marriott and IHG are
129.27, 135.9 and 86.84 rooms respectively.
1.6 Counterfactuals
To measure the welfare effects of Marriott’s acquisition of Starwood, I simulate hy-
pothetical markets and solve for the market equilibrium (pm, sm,ym) in both the
with- and without-merger scenarios. In particular, instead of comparing the observed
reality where Marriott and Starwood have merged with the simulated markets where
they operate separately, I simulate with-merger markets as well so that the merger
effects from comparing the with- and without-merger scenarios can be isolated from
the simulation errors from comparing the simulated without-merger scenario and the
observed with-merger scenario.
The markets in this section are hypothetical in the sense that the exogenous
variable values are constructed rather than taken directly from the observed markets.
Specifically, I consider all the 11 firms in the data as potential entrants to each
neighborhood. I introduce variation across these hypothetical markets by setting Nucjm
at difference values while fixing Nalljm for ∀j,m, motivated by the small magnitude of
the Nalljm coefficient. For the top 3 firms (i.e. Hilton, Marriott, IHG) and Starwood,
Nucjm can be at either the 25% percentile or the 75% percentile of each of these firms’
empirical distribution. For the other firms, it is set at their medians. Rent and
Market Size are set at the median of all the observed markets in the last period of
the data, Dec 2018. This gives 16 combinations of exogenous variable values in total.
Besides the ownership structure change, I also allow the merger to affect the
competition outcomes by altering the values of Nuc and Nall. I refer their effects as
quality improvement channel and cost synergy channel in the following discussion,
given that they affect the equilibrium via the demand equation and the marginal cost
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equation correspondingly. More specifically, recall that Nuc is a proxy for the scale
of a firm’s loyalty program. When Marriott and Starwood merged, the two original
loyalty programs of Marriott, Marriott Rewards, Ritz-Carlton Rewards and the one
of Starwood, Starwood Preferred Guest, formed a new joint program named Marriott
Bonvoy. Once travelers link their former accounts to the new one, points earned
from any old program can be used interchangeably to redeem free nights at all hotels
under the Marriott brands, including those previous Starwood properties. Therefore,
the with-merger Nuc of Marriott and Starwood hotels should naturally be their sum.
Similarly, I sum their Nall’s to reflect the fact that an enlarged hotel network could
further reduce each hotel’s marginal cost.
Furthermore, to investigate the relative importance of quality improvement and
cost synergy, for each statistic of interest, I simulate two scenarios where each one of
the two channels is muted.
Given partial identification, I report a range of each statistic based on the 95%
confidence intervals reported in Column (3), Table 1.6. Taking the mean equilibrium
price of firm j, p̄j as an example, I illustrate the procedure of constructing such a
range as follows.
1. Take R = 100 random draws from the parameter confidence region, each de-
noted as θr, r = 1, 2, ..., 100.
2. With the covariance parameters ωr, construct the Cholesky decomposition Lr
of the variance-covariance matrix Ωr.






jm), take S = 500 random draws from
a standard normal distribution, and then multiply each three of them with Lr,
which gives the Ursjm that has the desired variances and covariances.








m = {prsjm}j∈Frsm .
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Essentially, I consider each pair of (m, s) as a market, since they denote the vari-
ation in the observables and the unobservables respectively. Therefore, I summarize
the interested statistics across m and s at each parameter value θr and then report
the range over all r’s.
1.6.1 Equilibrium effects of the merger
Market structure change I start by investigating the probability that the equilib-
rium market structure changes with the merger. To summarize results, I group all
possible market structures into five categories, each denoted as YCatn, n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
they are (1) M&S – markets with both a Marriott and a Starwood as entrants; (2)
M only – Marriott enters, probably with other firms but not Starwood; (3) S only –
Starwood enters, probably with other firms but not Marriott; (4) Others – Neither
Marriott nor Starwood is an entrant, but there are other firms in the market; (5)
None – the market has been served by any hotel firm yet.
23For any fixed r, prsjmvary with both s and m, therefore I consider market to be at s-m level.
Then the number of observations is in general S ×M = 500 × 16 = 8000; However, in the case of
prices, this number could be less because the firm may choose not to enter some markets.
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Table 1.7: Equilibrium market structures with and without the merger
Panel A: Quality improvement & cost synergy
Post-merger






r M&S [0.95, 1.00] [0.00, 0.05] [131, 331]
M only [0.05, 0.11] [0.89, 0.95] [826, 1525]
S only [0.01, 0.02] [0.98, 0.99] [917, 1351]
Others [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.05] [0.06, 0.11] [0.83, 0.93] [4553, 4702]
None [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.09] [0.05, 0.15] [0.76, 0.93] [184, 1570]
No. of obs. [201, 532] [876, 1625] [1265, 1872] [3829, 4293] [142, 1445] 8000
Panel B: Quality improvement only
Post-merger






r M&S [0.92, 1.00] [0.00, 0.08] [131, 331]
M only [0.03, 0.06] [0.94, 0.97] [826,1525]
S only [0.00, 0.01] [0.99, 1.00] [917, 1351]
Others [0.00, 0.01] [0.04, 0.06] [0.93, 0.95] [4553, 4702]
None [0.00, 0.02] [0.03, 0.06] [0.93, 0.96] [184, 1570]
No. of obs. [171, 364] [839, 1515] [1163, 1580] [4235, 4441] [172, 1503] 8000
Panel C: Cost synergy only
Post-merger






r M&S [0.98, 1.00] [0.00, 0.02] [131, 331]
M only [0.01, 0.06] [0.94, 0.99] [826, 1525]
S only [0.00, 0.03] [0.97, 1.00] [917,1351]
Others [0.01, 0.05] [0.01, 0.07] [0.88, 0.98] [4553,4702]
None [0.00, 0.09] [0.01, 0.11] [0.81, 0.98] [184,1570]
No. of obs. [152, 464] [877, 1666] [986, 1658] [4062, 4564] [151, 1529] 8000
Table 1.7 reports the probabilities that the market structure changes across these
categories after the merger, each panel is distinguished by the channels through which
the merger may alter the equilibrium. Specifically, the probability that a YCatn









where the superscript 0-1 indicates the without- and with-merger scenarios re-
spectively.
For all the three panels, the diagonal numbers are close to one, meaning that
market structure stays the same in most cases. Even though, as long as the market
has Marriott or Starwood, it is likely to be affected via price changes, and entry and
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exit can be another layer on top of that. In particular, the last row of each panel of
Table 1.7 lists the number of markets of each type. In Panel A, the sum of the first
three types is [2342, 4029], which implies that [29.3%, 50.4%] of the markets would
be affected by this merger through either price changes or entry and exit.
Back to market structure changes, the upper triangle components in Table 1.7 are
almost all absent, which indicates that Marriott and Starwood seldom exit markets
where they are already in. The only exception is that Marriott may exit an M&S
market, and the reason is Marriott’s above-average fixed cost – in addition to the
benefit from the increased market power, the joint firm may find it more profitable to
operate an only Starwood hotel. 24 On the contrary, the lower triangle components
are usually positive, mainly driven by the entry of the merging parities, especially
Starwood. The last row of Panel A shows that the probability that a Starwood hotel
enters a “None” market can be high at 15%. By summing over the cells corresponding
to “M&S”, “M only” and “S only”, we see that the probability of Marriott and
Starwood expanding into a new market is between [0.06, 0.24], from which we would
expect substantial consumer welfare gains.
Next, I probe into the firm-level entry probability changes with a special focus on
whether other firms are likely to be driven out of the market after the merger. I then
investigate how Marriott and Starwood price differently without- and with-merger.
Entry and exit probability by firm In Table 1.8, I report the changes in entry
probability by market structure and firm. The numbers for Marriott and Starwood
are consistent with the implications in Table 1.7. Although the probability that
other firms enter decreases with the merger, but the magnitude is less than 2% across
all scenarios. In particular, it occurs not only in the markets where Marriott and
Starwood coexist and thereby executing the increased power is most likely, but also
in the markets with only one merging party. The latter case highlights the network
24One caveat is that the cost of exit is not considered in this model.
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Table 1.8: Entry & exit probability by firm
Panel A: Quality improvement and cost synergy
M&S M only S only Others None
Marriott [-0.05, 0.00] [0.01, 0.02] [0.02, 0.06] [0.01, 0.10]
Starwood [0.05, 0.11] [0.06, 0.12] [0.06, 0.16]
Others [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.02, 0.00]
Panel B: Quality improvement only
M&S M only S only Others None
Marriott [-0.08, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.02] [0.01, 0.02]
Starwood [0.03, 0.06] [0.04, 0.06] [0.03, 0.06]
Others [-0.01, 0.00]
Panel C: Cost synergy only
M&S M only S only Others None
Marriott [-0.02, 0.00] [0.00, 0.03] [0.01, 0.05] [0.00, 0.08]
Starwood [0.01, 0.06] [0.01, 0.07] [0.01, 0.10]
Others [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.01, 0.00]
effects among the affiliated hotels.
Table 1.9: Price changes of the merging party
Panel A: Quality improvement and cost synergy
Marriott Starwood
M&S M only M&S S only
M&S [-0.34, 0.06] M&S [-2.36, -0.16] [0.31, 5.39]
M only [-3.37, -0.43] [-2.79, -0.49] S only [-4.93, -0.63] [-2.87, -0.59]
Panel B: Quality improvement only
Marriott Starwood
M&S M only M&S S only
M&S [0.49, 2.71] M&S [0.36, 2.28] [0.85, 4.32]
M only [0.11, 0.28] [0.04, 0.37] S only [0.14, 0.63] [0.08, 1.19]
Panel C: Cost synergy only
Marriott Starwood
M&S M only M&S S only
M&S [-0.98, -0.16] M&S [-4.19, -0.57] [0.24, 0.45]
M only [-3.67, -0.52] [-3.25, -0.55] S only [-5.85, -0.66] [-5.01, -0.84]
Price changes of Marroiott and Starwood A key criterion for merger eval-
uation is price change. Table 1.9 shows that for each of the two merging parties by
with-merger market structure change. Across the three panels, we see that the price
change depends on the net effects of quality improvement and cost synergy. Panel
B demonstrates that Marriott properties tend to price higher, presumably leveraging
the incomparable scale of its loyalty program; while Panel A and C together show
that the upward pricing pressure is overturned by cost synergy in most cases. Star-
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wood’s price changes have a similar trend, except for those markets where Marriott
properties strategically stay out to maintain Starwood’s monopoly profit. In that
case, Starwood would be able to lift its price by [$0.31, $5.39]. However, Table 1.7
shows that such strategic exits rarely happen; therefore, we would expect the merger
in general benefit consumers by offering better products at lower prices. A more
detailed summary of consumer surplus follows later in this section.
Notably, the numbers in Panel B and C do not necessarily add up to their coun-
terparts in Panel A, because the model is highly nonlinear, and even with neither
quality improvement nor cost synergy, the changes in ownership structure could make
the equilibrium prices different. Also, I acknowledge that in reality, the network effect
among the affiliated hotels may have a decreasing margin, therefore the price effects
in Table 1.9 should be interpreted as upper bounds.
Table 1.10: Mean across markets served
Markets served before the merger New markets
Price Profit Consumer surplus Consumer surplus
Panel A: Quality improvement and cost synergy
Pre-merger [71.90, 135.95] [4568.90, 65886.51] [0.20, 9.61] 0
Post-merger [71.15, 135.77] [5440.44, 72489.59] [0.24, 11.35] [0.05, 0.88]
Difference [-0.78, -0.04] [831.42, 6653.34] [0.04, 1.74] [0.05, 0.88]
Panel B: Quality improvement only
Pre-merger [70.92, 136.12] [1927.70, 48766.16] [0.14, 8.46] 0
Post-merger [71.69, 136.32] [2235.82, 51453.10] [0.17, 9.14] [0.05, 0.61]
Difference [0.17, 0.77] [244.94, 3201.34] [0.02, 0.69] [0.05, 0.61]
Panel C: Cost synergy only
Pre-merger [71.84, 135.84] [4678.41, 65612,94] [0.20, 9.73] 0
Post-merger [70.44, 135.43] [4909.47, 68911.48] [0.22, 10.75] [0.04, 0.66]
Difference [-1.41, -0.33] [207.25, 3312.17] [0.01, 1.02] [0.04, 0.66]
Market-level average price, consumer surplus and firm profit To have a
more comprehensive understanding of the merger’s social welfare effects, I report three
market-level summary statistics in Table 1.10, including the market-level average
price, consumer surplus, and average firm profit.
































where vjm is the deterministic part of the utility, i.e. x
o′
jmβ−αpjm+xujm, and C is a
constant term which is normalized to zero in this exercise. The variation in c̄srsm roots
in the changes in equilibrium prices and the choice set Frsm , i.e. market structure.
Slightly different from the previous tables, I average these statistics only across the
m’s and s’s that have least one Marriott or Starwood hotel either before or after the
merger, which is a necessary condition for a market to be affected. Additionally, I
further break them down into markets that have been served without-merger and new
markets, since the without-merger price and profit are well-defined only in the former
case. I then report the range of the changes formed by r’s.
Column 1 of Table 1.10 shows that quality improvement and cost synergy shift
prices in opposite directions, but overall, the price drop caused by cost synergy dom-
inates. This is similar to what we observe in Table 1.9. The reason is that other
firms would adjust prices in the same direction as the merging parties, i.e. it is either
that the merging parties lift their prices, so the rivals would be able to price higher
without losing as many customers as previously, or the merging parities lower their
prices and thereby initiate a price war.
Across all panels, both consumer surplus and firm profit increase after the merger,
even when only quality improvement is accounted for. This indicates that for con-
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sumers the utility gain from a better loyalty program prevails the loss from an in-
creased price. 25
1.6.2 Bias by Overlooking Entry
In this subsection, to establish the accuracy gain from conducting this relatively
complicated method, I present how the evaluation results can be biased when market
structure is taken as exogenous. The results establish my belief that this framework
can be an appealing alternative for competition authorities to evaluate a great variety
of merger proposals.
In general, I redo the counterfactual analysis in Section 1.6.1 using the estimates
from the exogenous entry model, θexoge (as shown in Column 2 of Table 1.6), with the
same set of simulated markets. To make a fair comparison, I use the same without-





and then use θexoge to solve for the equilibrium prices and market shares. Then, the
differences from the results in the previous subsection would be the bias caused by
overlooking firms’ entry decisions.
Table 1.11: Bias decomposition - price changes
Marriott Starwood
M&S M only M&S S only
θendog., y0,rsm 6= y1,rsm [-0.34, 0.06] [-2.79, -0.49] [-2.36, -0.16] [-2.87, -0.59]
θexoge., y0,rsm = y
1,rs
m 7.41 6.71 11.12 10.29
[3.89, 13.08] [2.43, 12.50] [6.38, 18.74] [4.45, 18.51]
Bias in price changes Table 1.11 shows the merging parties’ price changes.
Row 1 copies the diagonal components in Panel A, Table 1.9. Notice that the exoge-
nous model is point identified; therefore, in Row 2, I report the average price as a
point, together with a range corresponding to the estimates’ 95% confidence intervals.
Across the rows, we see that fixing market structure in merger evaluation could draw
25I acknowledge that the potential extra cost of managing a gigantic loyalty program is not in
the model, otherwise the conclusion might be different.
56
the opposite conclusion on price changes. Across all types of market, Marriott and
Starwood would lift the price by $7.41 - $11.12 per room-night. Although it is hard
to disentangle this composite effect by covariate, clearly the overestimated constant
term in the demand equation and the upward bias in the coefficient on Nall contribute
to this.
Table 1.12: Bias decomposition - market level means
Price Profit Consumer surplus
Panel A: θendog., Y 0 6= Y 1
Pre-merger [71.90, 135.95] [4568.90, 65886.51] [0.19, 9.51]
Post-merger [71.39, 136.01] [5201.18, 71776.32] [0.23, 11.23]
Difference [-0.53, 0.35] [594.29, 5963.66] [0.04, 1.73]
Panel B: θexoge., Y 0 = Y 1
Pre-merger 112.13 27360.74 4.55
[105.45, 127.00] [1266.32, 36473.27] [0.01, 22.81]
Post-merger 113.66 18124.50 3.46
[107.91, 131.40] [-3240.76, 65900.53] [0.01, 21.69]
Difference 1.53 -9236.25 -1.09
[1.05, 6.37] [-33143.37, 64427.39] [-4.37, -0.01]
Similar to the previous subsection, I calculate those market level summary statis-
tics. Results are shown in Table 1.12, and the setting of each panel echos each row in
Table 1.11. Since the exogenous entry model does not have the fixed cost function,
the profits in Panel B is the variable profit from the exogenous model minus the fixed
cost predicted by the endogenous model. It is essentially the same as comparing the
variable profits only.
Again, the exogenous entry model gives very different results from the endoge-
nous model. The average price is in general upward biased: unlike the uncertain
price change direction in the endogenous entry model, the price would definitely in-
crease when entry is exogenous. More importantly, consumer surplus decreases at all
parameter values in the confidence region. Intuitively, it is because that the exoge-
nous model does not only have the upward pricing pressure from the increased market
power and the quality improvement, but also predict that the merging parties would
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suffer from extra inefficiency in marginal cost. These two aspects together induce a
higher price, which prevails the consumer surplus gain from quality improvement and
further results in a net negative effect. For the firms’ average profits, the difference
interval presents an indecisive direction. For some parameters, the difference is neg-
ative. It is mainly due to the reduction in the merging parties’ profits, for which the
with-merger inefficiency in marginal cost is the direct cause. And another reason is
that the properties that cannot make positive profit are not allowed to strategically
quit the market in this exogenous entry model.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that the market concentration increase sometimes cannot fully
summarize the social welfare implication of a merger, it should be a synthesis of
changes in markups, marginal cost, and choice availability. I provide a framework
that incorporates all these effects and is computationally tractable when the number
of competitors is high. In particular, I estimate a price competition game with en-
dogenous entry, so that the estimates are not contaminated by the self-selection issue
and the firms are allowed to respond to the merger by entry and exit.
My results provide evidence that supports the DOJ and FTC’s approval for merg-
ers at the size of Marriott’s acquisition of Starwood. I find that although the in-
creased market power and product quality improvement tend to increase the prices
of the merging parties, such an effect could be predominated by their cost synergies.
Additionally, because of the efficiency gains, Marriott and Starwood would serve the
markets that were unprofitable to enter before the merger, without much disturbance
on other incumbents in the markets. Overall, consumers get lower prices, better
quality, and better choice. But under a framework where market structure is fixed
throughout the merger, estimates’ biases could wrongly conclude a harmful merger.
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There are certain limitations in the paper. First, I employ a static model, thereby
ignoring the hotel chains’ forward-looking behaviors motivated by the franchise con-
tract’s long duration. I consider that as a reasonable simplification, because even
though in reality a franchise agreement usually has a long term, ranging from 10-30
years, the franchiser has the right to terminate it at any time for multiple reasons.
One reason for termination could be that the franchisee fails to pay the franchiser
or any of the franchiser’s affiliates any fees under their agreement, for which having
a negative profit seems to be a plausible trigger. Undeniably, the static setting is
also out of tractability concerns. Introducing that dynamics into this already com-
plicated multi-agent game with potential multiple equilibria is well beyond the scope
of this paper. Pioneer works along this strand include Ericson and Pakes (1995) and
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012).
Another caveat in the model is that cost synergy is restricted to the network effects
from an enlarged affiliation system. There could be, for instance, a with-merger
level drop in marginal cost. One way to tackle this issue is to use both without-
and with-merger data in the estimation, and add an interaction term between a
merging party indicator and a with-merger indicator. This can be the next step of this




Payment Instrument Choice with Scanner
Data: An MM algorithm for Fixed Effects
in Non-Linear Models (with Mingli Chen,
Marc Rysman and Krzysztof Wozniak)1
2.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, the U.S. payments system has seen a steady shift away
from paper payment instruments, such as cash and check, to digital instruments, such
as debit and credit cards. This is important because digital payments are typically
regarded as superior in many dimensions: they are faster and cheaper to process,
easier for customers to keep track of, and less subject to fraud. Despite this change,
however, cash and check still play a larger role in the United States than in many other
countries. Anecdotal evidence of young people adopting digital payment while older
households persist with cash and check suggests that demographics and heterogeneity
between households could be key to explaining the lingering popularity of paper
payment instruments.
This paper studies the determinants of payment choice in the short and long
1Researchers own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from Nielsen Consumer
LLC and marketing databases provided through the NielsenIQ Datasets at the Kilts Center for Mar-
keting Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The conclusions drawn
from the NielsenIQ data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect the views of NielsenIQ.
NielsenIQ is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and preparing
the results reported herein.
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term. In the short term, we focus on the transaction size as an important determinant.
Transaction size has been central to the discussion of payment choice, with households
more likely to use noncash payment instruments for larger transactions. Previous
papers, such as Klee (2008) and Wang and Wolman (2016), have studied the effect
of transaction size on payment choice by using scanner data drawn from retailers.
However, since these data sets did not allow the authors to track individuals over
time, the resulting estimates were not able to separate the within and between effects.
In particular, while previous literature has shown that consumers are more likely to
pay with card larger for larger transactions, it is also possible that households that
use cards more often tend to have higher transaction sizes on average. A central goal
of this paper is to separate these effects.
We also study the drivers of the long-term changes in payment usage. In partic-
ular, increased preference for card payments could be a key driver of the observed
increase in card usage in the United States. At the same time, it is important to dis-
entangle changes in individual consumers’ preference for card payments from other
factors could have contributed to the growing card use. These alternative explana-
tions include a shift in the composition of households towards those that prefer cards,
a growth in the number of transactions made by households that prefer cards, or an
overall growth in transaction sizes. For instance, if older households prefer cash and
check and also experience decreases in transactions, while younger households prefer
card and experience increases in transactions, we will observe an aggregate increase
in card usage although no household has experienced a change in preferences for card
relative to cash and check. Our paper aims to decompose the changes in preferences
from other factors which contributed to the long-term shift towards digital payment
instruments.
Our analysis leverages consumer scanner data from Nielsen to obtain a novel
61
transaction-level data set on payment choice. Unique among data sources used in the
payments literature, this data set can track payment choices for specific consumers
over time. The resulting panel data structure allows us to use multidimensional fixed
effects to disentangle the many factors which impact payment choice, both in the
short and the long terms. To our knowledge, no previous academic work has used
such data to study payment choice.
In order to fully capture the many factors driving payment choice, we estimate a
multinomial discrete choice model with household-quarter-choice fixed effects. How-
ever, estimating such a model using data with three payment choices, over 10,000
households, and 20 quarters of data, which in the richest specification translates into
more than 1 million fixed effects, creates a significant numerical challenge. Standard
procedures for estimating multinomial logit models fail with this many parameters.
An important contribution of our paper is to introduce a new method to address this
numerical problem. We believe our solution is applicable in a wide variety of setting
where a researcher wishes to estimate fixed effects in a non-linear model.
In particular, we estimate our model using the Minorization-Maximization (MM)
algorithm. This algorithm, which can be seen as a generalization of the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm, has been developed in the statistics literature (Hunter
and Lange, 2004; Lange, 2016). However, to date, it has seen almost no applications
in econometrics. We utilize the MM algorithm to linearize the logit model so that
we can apply linear techniques, such as demeaning, to the fixed effects estimation.
Sequential fixed effects estimation and minorization allow us to find numerically iden-
tical estimates to maximum likelihood at a tiny fraction of the computational and
memory costs that estimating dummy variables using traditional methods would en-
tail. Finally, because we estimate many fixed effects in a panel setting, we face the
incidental parameters problem. As in several previous papers, we address the inci-
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dental parameters problem with ex-post bias reduction via the jackknife following
Dhaene and Jochmans (2015).
Looking at the short-term payment decision, our results show that transaction
size is an important determinant of payment choice in the short term, which con-
firms an important finding from previous literature. In particular, we find that going
from the 1st quartile of the empirical distribution of transaction size, $11.94, to the
3rd quartile, $57.06, leads to a 20.7 percentage point increase of probability of using
a card. Notably, we find that our model specification with a full set of household-
quarter-choice fixed effects results in a lower effect on average, 16.8 percentage point.
This finding suggests the impact of transaction size on payment choice is smaller than
had been estimated by papers not able to directly account for heterogeneity in un-
observed household payment preferences, although the difference is only moderate in
magnitude. More importantly, the models with household-specific fixed effects unveil
a substantial heterogeneity in transaction size effect across households. In particular,
there are households whose probability of using card does not vary with transaction
size at all or even slightly decreases with it. In particular, that interquartile effect
of transaction size for the most responsive household is 39.9 percentage point higher
than that of the least sensitive one. Such a divergence would have been suppressed
in the specification with choice fixed effects only.
We then turn to the long term, and in particular to the almost 10 percentage point
increase in card usage over the five-year period in our data. We use our model to
decompose the factors driving this change into (a) changes in household preferences,
(b) changes in the number and value of transactions, and (c) entry and exit of house-
holds from the sample. Our results show that only about a third of the growth in
popularity of card payments is due to changes in individual households’ preferences.
This finding suggests that household preferences change relatively slowly, and that
63
public policy efforts to shift consumers to digital payments may take time to yield
substantial results.
Overall, our paper makes several contributions. We demonstrate consumer scan-
ner data can be a powerful tool for studying payment choice. We provide an attractive
new approach to estimating multinomial discrete choice models with fixed effects.
Within the MM literature, we provide a new formalization of the MM algorithm
and a new minorization for the multinomial logit model, which could be extended to
a number of linear-index likelihood models. We present new results on the impor-
tance of transaction size in determining short-term payment choice, and show that
accounting for persistent unobserved household heterogeneity reduces the magnitude
of that effect. Finally, we decompose long-term trends in payment choice and show
the relatively limited role that changes in consumer preferences have in driving these
trends.
2.2 Literature Review
There are many studies whose aim is to identify the determinants of payment choice,
with the majority focusing on the decision in the short term. However, many of
them are hampered by data constraints. In particular, it is difficult to track the
payments of individual households, especially for payments made with cash. One
method for tracking payment choice is to survey consumers retrospectively, as used
in Schuh and Stavins (2010) and Koulayev et al. (2016). These papers rely on a
survey that asks consumers about payment use over the previous month. However,
since shopping trip details are not captured alongside payment choice, data from such
surveys make it difficult to study the determinants of each individual choice, or why
choice varies across shopping trips. Another method is to ask survey participants to
fill out a diary of payment behavior, as used in Rysman (2007), Arango, Huynh
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and Sabetti (2015) and Wakamori and Welte (2017). While such diaries are an
important data source, Jonker and Kosse (2009) raises questions about their accuracy.
In particular, the authors show that the daily number of transactions in seven-day
surveys is significantly less than in one-day surveys, suggesting data from payment
diaries may suffer from “diary fatigue.” A third widely-used method is to obtain
data directly from consumer bank accounts, as do White (1975), Stango and Zinman
(2014), and Dutkowsky and Fusaro (2011). While data thus obtained does not suffer
from diary fatigue, it typically provides no information on cash usage. Moreover,
individual consumers may have multiple transaction accounts, some of which may
not show up in the available transaction record.
Consumer scanner data has important advantages over these data sources. In par-
ticular, in our data set we observe payment choice decisions for individual household
continuously over a period of five years, something that no existing diary data set can
come close to matching. At the same time, our data has certain limitations. First, the
Nielsen data does not capture every transaction a household makes. Nonetheless, the
data is probably most complete with regard to grocery trips, a significant touchpoint
for payment choice, and an important focus of the payments industry. Second, the
method that Nielsen uses to track payments does not allow us to distinguish between
debit and credit card payments, a common issue in payment literature. Importantly,
though, we are able to distinguish between the three most common retail payment
instruments: cash, check and payment card.
A paper closely related to ours is Klee (2008). Klee also uses scanner data from
grocery purchases to study payment choice. However, since her data set is drawn
from the cash register of a grocery chain, she is not able to track consumers over
time. Moreover, since the data set does not capture consumer demographics directly,
the author accounts for it by using census data for store locations. This contrasts with
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our paper, where we observe consumer demographics directly, and importantly can use
household identifiers to account for unobserved heterogeneity using panel techniques
such as fixed effects. In addition, our study covers packaged food shopping from a
wide array of retail channels, not just a single store. Like us, Klee cannot distinguish
between debit and credit, although she distinguishes between signature and PIN-based
card transactions. Wang and Wolman (2016) follows a similar approach. Ultimately,
most of the papers we discuss here rely on data sets that cover relatively short time
periods. We are not aware of another paper that attempts to decompose long-term
changes in payment instrument use the way we do.
In addition to adding to payment literature, our paper also makes a significant
contribution in the area of estimating fixed effects in non-linear models. Several other
papers precede us in this regard. A classic contribution is Chamberlain’s conditional
logit model (Chamberlain, 1980). Unfortunately, typical implementations handle only
the binary outcome case, and extending the model to multinomial outcomes creates
significant combinatoric complexities. Furthermore, the model does not naturally
deliver fixed effects estimates, which our approach does.
In contrast with Chamberlain’s approach, we combine a computational approach
to estimating the fixed effects model with a jackknife bias correction. Papers such
as Hospido (2012) and D’Haultfœuille and Iaria (2016) introduce efficient methods
for computing the dummy variables model and, like us, rely on ex-post bias correc-
tion. In particular, Hospido (2012) exploits the sparsity of the fixed effects, while
D’Haultfœuille and Iaria (2016) rely on simulation of the choice set to cheaply com-
pute the Hessian of the objective function, at the expense of introducing integration
error. Unfortunately, in our application, the Hessian is larger than can be addressed
by either of these aforementioned approaches.
The paper whose approach to estimating fixed effects in non-linear models is prob-
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ably Stammann, Heiß and McFadden (2016). In particular, the authors advocate for
both iterative demeaning to obtain estimates as well as ex-post bias correction, in
their case based on Hahn and Newey (2004). Another approach relies on concen-
trating out fixed effects and maximizing over the remaining parameters, as used in
Hinz, Hudle and Wanner (2019) and Stamann (2018). Our understanding is that the
approaches in all three papers have been developed only for binary outcomes and do
not easily expand to multinomial settings. A final approach relies on differencing out
fixed effects in a way that leads to estimation with moment inequalities, as used in
Ho and Pakes (2014b) and Shum, Song and Shi (2018). Our approach differs from
moment inequality estimation in that it generates point identification and directly
estimates fixed effects. In addition, we view our approach as computationally less
challenging than estimation with moment inequalities.
Our estimation approach uses the Minorization-Maximation (MM) algorithm (some-
times called the Majorization-Minorization algorithm). The MM algorithm has a
long history in statistics and dates back to around the time of the introduction of
the Expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm, which can be regarded as a special
case of the MM algorithm. In general, the MM algorithm expands the set of func-
tions that can be used in the E-step of the EM algorithm, and has appeared under
many names in different papers, often depending on what function was used. Böhning
and Lindsay (1988) is an important early citation, while Hunter and Lange (2004)
and Lange (2016) provide a helpful overview and history. We are aware of only one
other paper in the econometrics literature which uses the MM algorithm. In particu-
lar, James (2017) shows that the MM algorithm can be advantageous in the context
of the mixed multinomial logit model of McFadden and Train (2000), but does not
discuss the application to fixed effects or dynamic models.
Finally, our approach is similar to that of Chen (2019), who uses the EM algorithm
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in the context of the binary probit to estimate a model with interactive fixed effects.
In particular, she uses the EM algorithm to obtain a linear form of the model and then
applies known techniques for handling interactive fixed effects in the linear case. In
addition, she also uses ex-post bias correction, in her case a known analytic form. In
fact, her implementation of the EM algorithm resembles the MM algorithm. She does
not consider multinomial models. Following her ideas, our model could be extended
to handle interactive fixed effects in a multinomial logit model.
2.3 The Minorization - Maximization (MM) Estimation Pro-
cedure
The central idea in our paper is that we use the MM algorithm to estimate a nonlinear
discrete choice model in an iterative series of two steps. First, in each iteration,
we construct a simpler concave surrogate function that minorizes the complicated
log-likelihood function (that is, the surrogate function is less than the log-likelihood
function everywhere but at the current best guess of the parameters, where it is equal).
Second, we maximize the surrogate function instead of the log-likelihood function.
The ascent of the log-likelihood is guaranteed by the property of minorization. By
alternating between these steps of minorization and maximization, the MM algorithm
finds the parameters that maximize the original log-likelihood function.
Before diving into details of our multinomial logit model, we first discuss the
definition of the MM algorithm in general, and provide conditions required for con-
vergence.
2.3.1 The Transfer Minorization
Relative to the standard mathematical definition of a minorizing function, we add an
extra condition that makes the function suitable for use in a maximization problem.
We refer to our minorization as a transfer minorization. Our name is based on the
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terminology of Lange, Hunter and Yang (2000), which refers to the minorization as
the transfer function. That is, we transfer optimization from the function of interest
to the minorization of the function.
Definition 1. Suppose L is a real-valued function onRp that is twice differentiable
and S is a real-valued function onRp ⊗Rp, we say that S is a transfer minorization
of L if:
(a) S(θ;θ′) ≤ L(θ) for all θ and θ′;
(b) S(θ′;θ′) = L(θ′) for all θ′;
(c) ∇20S(θ;θ′) exists, and is negative definite at θ.
where ∇mnS(θ;θ′) is the mth order derivative w.r.t. θ and nth order derivate w.r.t to
θ′.
Analogously, S is a transfer majorization of L if −S is a transfer minorization of
−L. The first two conditions of Definition 1 are from de Leeuw and Lange (2009)
and are standard for defining a minorization. The third condition ensures that the
minorization is well-behaved around the focal point. Arguably, we could use a less
strict condition, such as that the minorization has the same sign as L in some region
around θ, but in practice, we are not aware of any implementations of the MM
algorithm that do not satisfy the third condition. As shown in de Leeuw and Lange
(2009), an implication of Definition 1 is:
Corallary 1. If S is a transfer minorization of L, then for all θ:
∇10S(θ;θ) = ∇L(θ)
This is basically the necessary condition that θ minimizes the distance between
S(·;θ) and L(·).
Intuitively, when faced with a likelihood function L that is difficult to maximize,
we instead choose to maximize another function S. The function S is chosen to be
69
Figure 2·1: MM algorithm
easy to maximize so that its maximand is always closer to a local optima than the
current guess. Figure 2·1 provides an example. In the figure, we would like to find the
optimum of L and we start with a guess θ(k). Rather than seek to optimize L directly,
we construct a transfer minorization S(θ;θ(k)). As a minorization, it is always below
L and is equal to L at S(θ(k);θ(k)). As a transfer minorization, S is well-behaved
around θ(k), i.e. it is differentiable and concave. It is optimized at the point θ(k+1).
At this point, we will construct a new transfer minorization S(θ;θ(k+1)) (not shown
in the figure). Iterative application of this process leads to the maximum of L, as
shown in the next proposition. First, we define the MM algorithm:
Definition 2. Let θ(0) be the initial guess of θ and θ(k) be the guess after k cycles
of the algorithm. The Minorization-Maximization (MM) Algorithm iteratively applies
the following two-step procedure:
1. Minorization step: Compute S(θ;θ(k)).
2. Maximization step: Choose θ(k+1) to be a value of θ ∈ Rp that maximizes
S(θ;θ(k)).
At each step, let θ(k) = θ(k+1). Repeat steps 1 and 2 until θ(k) converges.
To show convergence, we generalize the Theorem 4 in Dempster, Laird and Rubin
(1977) from the EM algorithm context to MM algorithm. In Theorem 1, we list
70
conditions for the sequence θ(k), k = 0, 1, 2, ... to converge to a point where ∇L(·) = 0
in the context of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Specifically, a likelihood
function f(x;θ) is the density of the true DGP f(x;θ0) with the true parameter
vector θ0 replaced with its hypothetic value θ.
2
Theorem 1. Suppose that L(θ) is the log likelihood function and S(θ;θ′) is a mi-
norization of L(θ) for maximization, and θ(k+1) = argmax θ S(θ;θ
(k)), k = 0, 1, 2, ...
is an instance of an MM algorithm, then:
1. θ(k) converges to a θ∗ in the closure of Ω.
2. ∇L(θ∗) = 0, ∇20S(θ∗;θ∗) is negative definite with eigenvalues bounded away
from zero.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.3
Thus, any function that satisfies Definition 1 for some function L can be used
in the MM algorithm to find an optimum to L.4 This approach allows substantial
2More formally, we consider the log likelihood function as defined in Hayashi (2000, p.448).
In particular, let {xn} be an i.i.d. sequence where the density of xn can be indexed by a finite-
dimensional vector θ0: f(xn;θ0), θ0 ∈ Ω. Because {xn} is independently distributed, the joint
density of the data (x1,x2, ...,xN ) at a hypothetical value θ is




This density, viewed as a function of θ is called the likelihood function. The maximum likelihood
(ML) estimator of θ0 is the θ that maximizes the likelihood function. Because the log transformation
is a monotone transformation, maximizing the likelihood function is equivalent to maximizing the
log likelihood function.







3We provide Theorem 1 and the rest of the formalism in this section because we could not find
the mathematical statement we required in the existing literature. But to be clear, our approach
relies heavily on the cited literature and for sure, the existing literature seems to operate as if it is
well-known that the MM algorithm converges to a local optima.
4The papers that offer the closest version of what we present in this section define a minorization
based only on parts (a) and (b) of Definition 1 and then include something like part (c) in the
supposition of the analog to Theorem 1. For example, see Böhning and Lindsay (1988). We prefer
to have all of the requirements in Definition 1 so we can simply check if a candidate function satisfies
the definition to know that it can be used in the MM algorithm. Because our definition differs in
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freedom in selecting the transfer minorization. From the perspective of the MM
algorithm, the EM algorithm is a special case and it works because the conditional
expectation of L used in the EM algorithm is a transfer minorization. If the E-step of
the EM algorithm does not deliver a function that is easy to optimize, as in our case,
the researcher is free to use some other minorizing function. Hunter and Lange (2004)
discuss several approaches. In the next section, we focus on a Taylor expansion, which
delivers a least-squares optimization problem in our context.
2.4 A Minorization for the Multinomial Logit
In this section, we first present the multinomial logit model, then develop a transfer
minorization, and finally discuss our estimation method.
2.4.1 Model
In the multinomial logit model, an agent makes a discrete choice among several op-
tions, each of which draws an Extreme Value error. The model is distinguished by a
closed-form logistic function for the probability of each choice. In our presentation,
we emphasize a fixed effect that varies by consumer, quarter and product.
We observe N consumers make a discrete choice among J products in each of
T time periods. Consumer i in period t who chooses product j obtains utility uijt.
Utility is defined as:
uijt = xitβj + ξijq(t) + εijt, (2.1)
where q(t) is the quarter of the year that t falls in where q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, xit is a
vector observable characteristics that varies by consumer and time, ξijq is a consumer-
quarter-product fixed effect and εijt is a scalar i.i.d idiosyncratic shock distributed
according to a Type I Extreme Value distribution. The variable yijt is a binary
this way from the previous research, we coin a new name for our version: the transfer minorization.
But to be clear, we rely heavily on existing contributions in our approach.
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indicator for the product that consumer i chooses in t, where:
yijt = 1[uijt ≥ uikt,∀k 6= j], ∀i, t.
The parameter vectors βj and ξijq are to be estimated. We collect these parameters





log l(xitβ + ξiq(t);yit) (2.2)
where xitβ+ξiq(t) = (xitβ1+ξi1q(t), xitβ2+ξi2q(t), . . . , xitβJ+ξiJq(t)), yit = (yi1t, yi2t, . . . , yiJt)
and:






pijt(xitβ + ξiq(t)) =
exp(xitβj + ξijq(t))∑J
k=1 exp(xitβk + ξikq(t))
.
In practice, we must normalize the mean utility of one of the choices to be zero,
as is standard in the multinomial logit.
2.4.2 The transfer minorization
This subsection derives a function S that satisfies the conditions of Definition 1 to be
a transfer minorization of L.
Theorem 2. Let L(θ) be the log likelihood function for a multinomial logit model
defined as in Eq.(2.2). Let S(θ;θ(k)) be defined as:











































then S(θ;θ(k)) is a transfer minorization of L(θ).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.
By Theorem 1, θ(k+1) = argmax θ S(θ;θ
(k)), k = 0, 1, 2, ... converges to a local, if
not global, maximum of L(θ).
Eq.(2.3) is a first-order Taylor expansion of the likelihood function. Note that the
parameters that we search over in the iterative MM algorithm, i.e. θ rather than
θ(k), appear only in the third part of the right-hand side of Eq.(2.3). Focusing on












on xjt (with separate coefficients for each
j) and ξijq(t). This is the central benefit of our MM approach to the multinomial
logit. We convert non-linear optimization to sequential linear optimization, which
is particularly attractive when there are many regressors. Rather than use OLS
directly, we use linear panel data methods to address the large number of parameters
represented by ξijq.
Thus, the functional form of hj(ψ
(k)
it ;yit) is clearly important to our technique.
For the multinomial logit, this function takes on a particularly simple form: yijt −
pijt(ψ
(k)




ijq(t) as the expectation of uijt at iteration k, our
iterative linear regression uses a dependent variable above the expectation for obser-
vations with yijt = 1 and below the expectation for observations with yijt = 0.
Our full algorithm is as follows. We begin with a guess of the parameters θ(0).
We iterate on the following sequence of steps, which updates the parameters θ(k) in
iteration k:
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where x̃ indicates demeaning at the consumer-quarter-product level.
















where Tq is the number of time periods in quarter q and Tq is the set of
these time periods.
3. Return to Step 1 for iteration k+ 1 as long as the difference between θ(k+1) and
θ(k) is above some tolerance.
2.4.3 Connection to the EM Algorithm for Binary Probit
If we could observe uijt, we could estimate our coefficients and fixed effects directly
by linear techniques rather than relying on discrete outcome methods such as the
multinomial logit. In this sense, Eq.(2.4) in Step 1 of the MM algorithm above
has the feel of data augmentation Tanner (1996). That is, we calculate vijt as an
approximation of the unobserved uijt. That is the intuition behind many applications
of the EM algorithm.
In the multinomial logit, vijt does not coincide with the expectation of uijt. That
is, v
(k)
ijt 6= E[uijt|xit, yijt, θ
(k)
j ]. Indeed, substituting v
(k)




lead to biased results because the likelihood of the expectation is not equal to the
expectation of the likelihood. Generating the expectation of the likelihood function for
the case of the multinomial logit is more complicated than our minorization approach,
so the EM algorithm is relatively unattractive in our context.
However, the MM and EM algorithm coincide in the case of the binary probit.
Indeed, Chen (2019) estimates the binary probit by the EM algorithm and derives a
functional form equivalent to our MM algorithm. See also Greene (2018).
In the case of binary Probit,
l(xitβ + ξiq(t); yit) =

Φ(xitβ + ξiq(t)) yit = 1
1− Φ(xitβ + ξiq(t)) yit = 0
,
where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, φ(·) is its PDF.5
Accordingly,
h(xitβ + ξiq(t); yit) =
∂ log
(
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Thus, we see that h(xitβ + ξiq(t); yit) corresponds to the well-known Mills ratio and,
as a result, h(xitβ + ξiq(t); yit) = E[εit|yit], where εit corresponds to the normally
distributed error from the probit model. In this sense, the MM and EM algorithms
correspond in the case of the binary probit.
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Binary probit Binary logit Multinomial logit
β̂ β̂ β̂2 β̂3
MLE 0.9697 1.0184 0.9983 0.4775
MM-algorithm 0.9697 1.0184 0.9983 0.4775
Table 2.1: Comparison of β̂ between MLE and MM-algorithm
2.4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we show that our iterative algorithm generates results for β̂ that are
numerically identical to those obtained using standard MLE techniques. We generate
data from three nonlinear models with a linear index: (1) a binary probit model, (2) a
binary logit model and (3) a multinomial logit model. For each model, we perform the
estimation using both traditional gradient-based techniques6 and our MM algorithm.
We generate simulated data using N = 10, T = 1000, J = 2 for binary choice models
and J = 3 for the multinomial logit. We assume there are consumer-level fixed effects
in all models, generated independently from the standard normal distribution. We
do not add a time element to the fixed effects in this exercise. We let xit be a scalar,
also drawn independently from the standard normal distribution. For the two binary
choice models, we set the true parameter β = 1; for the multinomial logit model, we
normalize β1 = 0 and ξi1 = 0, ∀i, and set the true parameters β2 = 1 and β3 = 0.5.
The results are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.5 Data
In our empirical investigation, we take advantage on the Nielsen Consumer Panel
Dataset, available through the Kilts Center for Marketing at the Chicago Booth
5Notation looks slightly different here because J = 2. It is no longer necessary to treat β, ξiq(t)
and yit as vectors with only two choices.
6For the two binary choice models, we use the R function “glm” in package “stats”, with its
default method iterative reweighted least square (IWLS) ; for multinomial logit, we use the R
function “mlogit” in package “mlogit”, with its default method Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno
(BFGS)
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School of Business. The data set provides detailed coverage of purchase choices at
household level, including the quantity bought and price paid for each product. The
data includes detailed information on products purchased characteristics based on
UPC codes scanned by the panelists. Crucially for our study, consumers indicate
how they paid for each shopping trip. Finally, Nielsen verifies the information using
receipts submitted by panelists.
We focus our study on three payment choices: cash, check, and card. Following the
approach adopted in most payment literature (for example, Klee, 2008), the “card”
category pools purchases categorized as either debit or credit card. This approach
reflects concerns about panelists not distinguishing accurately between the two types
of payment card.7
Our data set includes the five-year time period between 2013 and 2017, and cap-
tures over 31 million shopping trips made by 77,657 households.8 Reflecting turnover
in the data set, on average we observe a household for 2.53 years. Nonetheless, there
is a considerable number of households which remain longer than the average: 44.3%
of households say for longer than three years, 31.0% stay longer than four years, and
19.9% of households stay for the entire five years.
The average household in the data set makes 403.6 shopping trips in total. This
translates into 153.7 trips per year on average, or 36.4 trips per quarter.9 The number
of shopping trips per quarter varies between households, with households at the 25th
7Debit cards may be authorized by signature or PIN (Personal Identification Number, consisting
of 4 to 6 digits), while credit cards are typically authorized by signature. Industry studies and
previous literature suggest that many U.S. consumers do not understand the difference between
signature debit and credit cards. Past versions of the Nielsen panel appeared to give consumers
contradictory instructions on this issue, for instance, instructing consumers to indicate “credit” if
they used a signature. We found it difficult to verify the instructions for the current data set. See
Cohen, Rysman and Wozniak (2017).
8Although the Nielsen panel runs over a decade, the version of the data available through Kilts
Center for Marketing only includes payment choice information beginning in 2013.
9Among these trips, 34.6% involve grocery stores, other top types of retailers include discount
stores (15.7%), drug store (6.0%), dollar store (4.9%), warehouse club (4.9%), quick serve restaurants
(3.1%), etc.
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percentile making 18 trips on average, while those at the 75th percentile making an
average of 50 trips. As our most granular specification uses two choice fixed effects
per household-quarter in a non-linear model, the incidental parameters problem is
potentially an issue with these numbers of observations.
Over our entire data set, the market share for transactions for cash, check, and
card is 30.9%, 2.4%, and 66.8%, respectively.10 These shares vary substantially across
different types of transactions and across households. Figure 2·2 shows the steady
increase in the total number of transactions over time, as well as how the payment
choice market shares changed over time. In particular, the figure shows a substantial
increase in card use over time, as well as a falling market share for both cash and
check.
Table 2.2: Transaction size distribution ($)
Mean Std. Err. 10% [25%, 75%] 90%
46.84 65.10 5.22 [11.94, 57.06] 107.51
Following previous literature, we examine transaction size as a key driver of pay-
ment choice. Table 2.2 illustrates the distribution of transaction size in our data set.
While the average transaction size is $46.84, the variation in transaction size is large.
In particular, the 10th percentile in the distribution is just $5.22, the interquartile
range is [$11.94, $57.06], and the 90th percentile is $107.51.
Figure 2·3 illustrates how important transaction size is in determining payment
choice. In particular, the figure shows that the market share of cash falls from above
60% to below 20% as transaction size moves from $5 to $150, with most of the
remaining share absorbed by card. Similar to card, the market share for check also
increases with transaction size, although it only rises to around 4% for the largest
10Two types of payment instruments in the raw data are excluded from our estimation, they are
“Scanner does not collect Method of Payment” and “Other Payment” which accounts for 40.3% and
1.71% of the trips in the raw data.
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Figure 2·2: Transactions over time
transactions. It is important to recognize, however, that while check has a low market
share overall, 37.6% of the households in our data used check at least once.
2.6 Results
We now turn to specifying the multinomial logit model for use in our analysis of house-
holds’ payment choice. In the specification used in our paper, households are faced
with an exogenously-determined set of shopping trips with predetermined transaction
sizes, for which they must choose a payment instrument. In particular, household i
on shopping trip t where it pays with instrument j ∈ {cash, check , card}, receives
utility:
uijt = βj log(xit) + ξijq(i,t) + εijt.
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Figure 2·3: Market share in transactions by transaction size
where q(i, t) is the quarter when the shopping trip takes place, and xit, a scalar, is
the transaction size in dollars. Note that in our approach, t indexes shopping trips
rather than calendar time, so two households may be in different quarters for the
same shopping trip number. Thus, rather than write q(t) as in Eq.(2.1), we write
q(i, t). As above, εijt is distributed Extreme Value.
As is standard, we normalize the mean utility of one choice to zero. In particular,
we normalize the utility of j = cash to zero, so βcash = 0 and ξi,cash,q(i,t) = 0 for all i
and q. We interpret the rest of the coefficients as the value relative to the value for
cash.
Looking to determine the importance of accounting for unobserved consumer pref-
erences in the payment choice context, we specify an alternative version of our model
which does not account for household fixed effects. In particular, for the alternative
version of the model we specify ξijq(i,t) = ξj for all i and q. Finally, we also consider
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a model with a more limited set of household-payment choice fixed effects, where
ξijq(i,t) = ξij for all q.
Results appear in Table 2.3. Standard errors in this table are conventional max-
imum likelihood standard errors derived from the inverse of the Hessian matrix. As
the Hessian is very large, we exploit the sparsity of the matrix in order to invert it,
as presented in Appendix B.2.
Before discussing parameters, it is worth considering how long it takes to estimate
these models. For the case of only payment choice fixed effects (the first panel),
we estimate the likelihood model by both our MM algorithm and by a traditional
gradient optimization routine, BFGS. Results are numerically very close, especially
for βcard , most likely because of the considerably larger number of shopping trips paid
for with card. Moreover, our experience suggests the remaining differences could be
further reduced by lowering the tolerance levels in the optimizers. The last row of the
table shows that estimating the model using the MM algorithm takes about half the
time it takes using the BFGS algorithm. For the case with household-payment choice
fixed effects, the MM algorithm takes about 13 hours to estimate, while for the case
with household-quarter-choice fixed effects, it takes about 24 hours. In contrast, we
ran the BFGS algorithm using a dummy variable approach to implementing the fixed
effect estimation for these two cases, and never reached convergence for either case.11
We do not report BFGS results for these cases.




MM BFGS MM BFGS MM BFGS
βcheck 0.7188 0.7278 βcheck 1.0730 βcheck 1.1595
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0029)
βcard 0.7085 0.7085 βcard 1.0563 βcard 1.1570
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0011)
ξcheck -4.8441 -4.8760 ξ̄check -7.7561 ξ̄check -7.9493
[min, max] [-15.2902, 6.5288] [min, max] [-16.0147, 7.4957]
ξcard -1.4628 -1.4627 ξ̄card -2.1049 ξ̄card -2.0048
[min, max] [-15.1744, 6.6956] [min, max] [-15.9977, 8.0039]
Number of FE’s estimated N = 2 N = 155,314 N = 1,631,808
time ∼ 30 min ∼ 1 hr ∼ 13 hr > 24 hr ∼ 24 hr > 24 hr
Notes: All estimations were run on a CPU with 8 8G-memory processors
Table 2.3: Estimates & Computational Time: MM vs. BFGS
We now turn to analyzing the MM estimates for the three alternative model
specifications. First, as expected, we find in all specifications that the estimated
coefficients on transaction size are positive for both check and card. This agrees with
findings in previous papers, as well as the trends presented in Figure 2·3 – namely,
that the likelihood that consumers pay with check or card increases significantly for
larger transactions. Second, we look to compare the estimated coefficients for the
three model specifications. However, although we find that richer fixed effects in the
second and third model specifications result in higher transaction value coefficients,
the absolute values of the estimated fixed effects also grow considerably. To get a
better sense of the impact of accounting for unobserved household heterogeneity, we
turn to computing average marginal effects.
Marginal effect of transaction size: Given our multinomial logit assumption,













To summarize, we report the average marginal effect (AME) of transaction size
on each payment method by averaging Eq.(2.5) across all households i and trips t.





Figure 2·4: Marginal e↵ect of log transaction size) on card usage
⇠j ⇠ij ⇠ijq
cash check card cash check card cash check card
ˆAME -0.0107 0.0004 0.0103 -0.0101 0.0005 0.0096 -0.0100 0.0005 0.0095
˜AME -0.0099 0.0005 0.0094 -0.0097 0.0005 0.0092
Bias: ˆAME - ˜AME -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0003
Table 2.4: Average marginal e↵ects of transaction size
that the specifications with household-payment choice and household-choice-quarter
fixed e↵ects (panels 2 and 3) result in very similar AME estimates. Comparing
these results to those obtained using the specification with payment choice fixed
e↵ects only (panel 1), we find that accounting for unobserved household preferences
moves the AME towards zero, though the magnitude is under 10%. To understand
the intuition for this finding, consider how the di↵erent model specifications seek
to explain behavior of households with large transaction sizes that predominantly
use check or card. The first specification is not able to account for this household
heterogeneity, and instead seeks to explain the data by increasing the estimated e↵ect
of transaction size on likelihood of paying with check and card.
To unveil the heterogeneity across households that is masked by the relatively
small di↵erence on average, we graph how the marginal e↵ects of transaction size on
card usage vary for di↵erent fixed e↵ect specifications in Figure 2·4. In the left panel,
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Figure 2·4: Marginal e↵ect f log transact on size) on card usage
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these results to those obtained using the specification with payment choice fixed
e↵ects only (panel 1), we find that accounting for unobserved household preferences
moves the AME towards zero, though the magnitude is under 10%. To understand
the intuition for this finding, consider how the di↵erent model specifications seek
to explain behavior of households with large transacti n sizes at predominantly
us ch ck or card. The first sp cification is not able to account for his household
heterogeneity, and instead seeks to explain the dat by increasing the estimated e↵ect
of transaction size on likelihood of paying with check and card.
To unveil the heterogeneity across households that is masked by the relatively
small di↵erence on average, we graph how the marginal e↵ects of transaction size on
card usage vary for di↵erent fix d e↵ect specifications in Figur 2·4. In the lef panel,
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Figure 2·5: Distribution of difference from the product FE model in
marginal effect
we see that the household fixed effect specifications generate higher marginal effects
for moderate transaction sizes but lower marginal effects for very low and very high
transaction sizes, therefore leading to a small average difference. Additionally, the
lines with richer fixed effects have more variation than the line with only choice fixed
effect, echoing their higher coefficients on transaction size in Table 2.3.
The left panel of Figure 2·4 averages over the estimated fixed effects for any
given transaction size. In order to better understand how the model with richer
fixed effects changes the marginal effect, we hold the cash fixed effect constant at
the average value and graph the marginal effect of transaction size on card usage for
three different levels, the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles of the distributions of the
estimated household-quarter check and card fixed effects. The result is in the right
panel. The different levels of fixed effects produce parallel shifts of the marginal effect
function. Averaging these lines together over the realized fixed effects leads to the
household-quarter-choice fixed effect line in the left panel. Overall, Figure 2·4 reveals
significant heterogeneity in marginal effects under the specifications with expanded
fixed effects.
To further explore this heterogeneity, we calculate the difference in AME between
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the baseline specification (only choice fixed effects) and the two other specifications
with richer fixed effects for each household-quarter. Figure 2·5 presents the distri-
bution of this difference.12 In Figure 2·4, the marginal effects based on the baseline
specification are typically between 0.1 and 0.2, except for very high transaction sizes;
meanwhile, we see in Figure 2·5 that the differences between specifications are often at
a similar level, which indicates that a difference greater than 50% is not uncommon.
Also, the dip in the middle of the distributions suggests that there are relatively few
households for which the baseline specification is accurate. Thus, bias from leaving
out household-quarter fixed effects has a substantial impact on measured marginal
effects.
The incidental parameter problem: The parameters presented in the first row
of Table 2.3 are subject to potential bias due to the incidental parameters problem. To
correct for such potential bias, we adopt the split-panel jackknife correction developed
in Dhaene and Jochmans (2015). In particular, we divide the set of shopping trips
taken by each household into two halves, and re-estimate the model on each of the






















Here, we write ξiq(i,t)(β) to emphasize that the estimates of the fixed effects will
change in both estimations. With these results, the bias-corrected estimates are:






The effect of the bias correction on the estimated coefficients is shown in Table 2.5.
12To ease the comparison between Figure 2·4 and Figure 2·5, the AME’s in Figure 2·5 are with
respect to the log of transaction size.
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The bias correction reduces the parameter estimate of both βcheck and βcard , although
the change is relatively small in magnitude. As expected, the bias correction is larger
in the third specification with the richest fixed effects. Nonetheless, the relatively
small magnitude of the bias corrections suggests that, even in the richest specification,
the average number of trips per quarter is 36.4 is sufficiently large to significantly
mitigate the incidental parameters problem. Looking at the second row in Table 2.4,
the bias correction results in a similarly small reduction in the absolute values of the
estimated AMEs.
ξij ξijq
βcheck βcard βcheck βcard
β̂ 1.0730 1.0563 1.1595 1.1570
β̃ 1.0519 1.0319 1.1247 1.1146
Bias: β̂ − β̃ 0.0211 0.0244 0.0348 0.0425
Table 2.5: Split-panel Jackknife Correction
2.7 Long-term decomposition
Figure 2·2 illustrates the extent to which the share of card usage has grown over time.
The goal of this section is to estimate the extent to which each of the many different
potential factors contributed to this growth. In particular, one of the key factors that
could have contributed to this growth is a gradual increase in household preferences
for card payments. At the same time, changes in the composition of transactions
or transaction sizes across households, as well as entry and exit of households could
have also resulted in a shift of payments towards card. Intuitively, consider a young
household that always pays using a card and an older household that always uses
cash or check. If the young household has children, its average number of shopping
trips and average transaction size will both likely increase. Similarly, once the older
household reaches retirement age its average number of shopping trips and average
transaction size will both likely shrink. In this example, the market share of card
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would increase purely due to changes in the composition of transaction number and
size, without any changes in preferences of individual households. Similarly, the older
household leaving the sample and being replaced by a another young household which
favors card over cash/check would result in further growth in card’s market share,
this time due to changes in the composition of households in the sample.
To facilitate discussion, we introduce new notation. First, we use Iq to denote the
set of households in quarter q and Tiq to denote the set of trips household i took in














The market share sjq can change over time for a number of reasons: (a) the number
of transactions |Tiq| can change, (b) the average size for those transactions xit can
change, (c) household preferences ξijq(i,t) can change, or (d) the set of households Iq
can change, which can be further broken down into entry and exit. We proceed by
sequentially fixing each of these values at their realization in the first quarter each
household i is observed in the data, denoted as q(i), or in the case of exit the last
quarter denoted as q(i), and then computing market shares for the last quarter.
Transaction size distribution within households: For each household, we
fix the number of trips and the transaction size on each trip at the level of their first
quarter, but let their fixed effects evolve with time. We calculate the household-level
choice probabilities and then aggregate them to market shares with the number of











exp (xitβj + ξijQ)∑J
k=1 exp (xitβk + ξikQ)
. (2.6)
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Consider the case in which the set of transactions sizes realized in q(i) was the
same as in Q. That would imply that the number of transactions in each period was
the same, so |TiQ| = |Tiq(i)|, and the set of xit was the same for the first and last
period that i was in the data. In this case, sjQ = s
1
jQ. The difference sjQ − s1jQ
provides a measure of how changes in the distribution of transactions contributes to
the change in market share sjQ − sj1.
Household-quarter-choice fixed effects: We capture the change in prefer-
ences within s with our -quarter-choice fixed effects. In order to mute the effect of
preferences, we fix -quarter-choice fixed effects at the level of the first quarter the is















In this case, sjQ − s2jQ provides a measure of the contribution of changes in -
quarter-choice fixed effects, and this term equals zero only if fixed effects are the
same in the first and last period.
Number of transactions across households: As in the earlier young vs. older
household example, the growth of card usage in this case could also be due to shifts in
transactions from non-card to card users. To isolate this effect, we first calculate the
household level choice probabilities, and when aggregating them to compute market
share, we weight by the number of trips in the household’s first quarter rather than the










exp (xitβj + ξijQ)∑J
k=1 exp (xitβk + ξikQ)
. (2.8)
Entry: In this scenario, we focus on those households that remain in the data set
all the way from the first to the last quarter. They are allowed to exit as observed
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in the data, in order to be distinguished from the exit channel. Specifically, starting
with the 31,178 households in 2013 Q1, 15,477 of them stay until the last quarter
2017 Q4, which is 32.6% of all households at that time. The market share in the final






exp (xitβj + ξijQ)∑J
k=1 exp (xitβk + ξikQ)
(2.9)
Exit: We consider a counterfactual scenario where no households leave the sample.
Therefore, all households that ever show up in the sample stay until the last quarter
2017 Q4, i.e. IQ =
⋃Q
q=1 Iq, which gives 77,656 households. For those households that
leave before 2017 Q4, we assume that their number of trips, the transaction size of
each trip and fixed effects are the same as in the last quarter that they are observed
in the data, i.e. Tiq = Tiq(i),∀q > q(i). In particular, q(i) = Q for household i that is



















Then the contribution of each channel is the difference sjQ − skjQ for each k =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Note that the sum of these differences does not exactly equal sjQ− sj1,
in part because of joint effects. By isolating each effect separately, we do not capture
the role of simultaneous changes in channels, for instance because in practice, ξijq and
xit change jointly. Still, these differences give a first-order approximation of how much
each type of change contributes to the overall change. Therefore, for demonstration
purpose, we rescale these differences so that the sum of them equals to sjQ − sj1.13
The results of the decomposition are shown in Figure 2·6. In particular, the figure
13In this sense, our measure is similar to Variance Partition Coefficients, as in Goldstein, Browne
and Rasbash (2002). See also Grömping (2007).
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illustrates that while changes in household payment preferences are the single biggest
driver of long-term change in market share, on their own they account for only about
a third of the overall change. Entry of household with stronger preferences for card,
as well as exit of households with a relatively higher preference for card and check, are
the other two factors which contributed significantly to the growth in card’s market
share between 2013 and 2017. By contrast, we find that the growth in transaction sizes
within households with a stronger preference for card barely contributed to the growth
in card’s popularity over time. What’s more, we find that changes in the composition
of the number of transactions across households actually contributed against the
growth in card’s popularity, suggesting over time household with a stronger preference
for card reduced the number of trips they make relative to other households. Overall,
our results show that changes in consumer payment preferences were one of the key
factors that contributed to growing popularity of card, accounting for about a third
of the growth observed over the time period 2013-17. At the same time, we find
that the largest contribution came from a change in the composition of the Nielsen
sample. This finding suggests that changes in payments usage over time is driven in
large part by ingrained preferences of young consumers entering the economy, which
the consumers will then only slowly change over the course of their lives.
2.8 Conclusion
Although the transition to digital payments has been one of the most significant
developments in the payment industry in recent years, the continued prevalence of
cash and check raise important policy questions. This paper studies the determinants
of payment choice in the short and long term. Decomposing the drivers of long-term
payment shifts allows us to contributing significantly to payment literature, which
typically focuses only on short-term payment decisions. Key to this is our ability
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Figure 2·6: Long-term decomposition
to observe, and properly capture in our model, unobserved household preferences for
payments.
In our paper, we use a novel source of data on payment behavior: consumer panel
surveys. Although these sources are typically used to study consumer shopping be-
havior and responses to advertising, we show that these data can be usefully employed
to study payment behavior. Doing so allows us to keep track of individual households’
payment behavior over multiple year through the lens of high-frequency shopping trip
data.
Crucially for our analysis, we adapt novel statistical methods to account for unob-
served household heterogeneity using panel data techniques. Doing so allows us to es-
timate a multinomial models of payment choice with over 1 million fixed effects, which
would not have been possible using traditional techniques used to estimate non-linear
models. In particular, we present a new method for addressing fixed effects in multi-
nomial models based on the Minorization-Maximization (MM) algorithm, which can
be seen as a generalization of the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. While
the MM algorithm has a significant history in the statistics literature, we are aware
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of almost no presence in econometrics. We discuss the application of our method not
only to the multinomial logit model, but also several other well-known models.
The results of our estimation shine new light both on the short and long-term pay-
ment decisions. First, our results suggest that while transaction size is an important
determinant of payment choice in the short term, its effect is smaller than previously
estimated in papers not able to directly account for unobserved household payment
preferences. Looking to the long term, we use our model to study the key factors
driving the increase in card usage observed in our data. In particular, we decompose
the changes in payment instruments’ market shares into those (a) driven directly by
changes in household preferences, (b) driven by changes in the number and average
value of transactions made by individual households, and (c) driven indirectly by
entry of younger households into and exit of older households. Our results suggest
that while changes in household payment preferences are an important factor, they
explain only about a third of the observed growth in card usage. Instead, the model
suggests that the primary driver of long-term changes in payments has been the entry
of young households with stronger preferences for card payments, as well as exit of
older households with stronger preferences for cash and check payments.
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Chapter 3
Spatial Competition and Missing Data:
an Application to Cloud Computing
3.1 Introduction
For a variety of reasons, firms historically care about physical location when making
decisions about where to invest in physical capital.1 Because the internet lowers costs
of communication over space, it was reasonable to suspect internet adoption could
mitigate the importance of physical location for investment decisions. According to
this theory, the internet allows rural firms to have access to similar resources as urban
firms without moving to urban locations, allows faster rural growth and ameliorates
incidence issues of agglomeration economies (Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein, 2008;
Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009).
Evidence of the internet leading to the “death of distance” is scant, however, for
regional economic outcomes. At the regional level, Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein
(2012) shows that advanced internet is not sufficient, in and of itself, to enable wage
growth in a city. Rather, they find advanced internet is a complement to a city’s
existing human capital and stock of firms. At the firm level, Giroud (2013) shows that
between 1977-2005, decreased travel times to plants through new plane routes or roads
led to increased investment and productivity. Hence, traditional investment decisions
1Monitoring and information acquisition is one explanation (Giroud, 2013). Transportation
costs, despite long run declines, are another (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). Agglomeration economies
are a third (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009).
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vary positively with proximity. A sharp test for the death of distance hypothesis, then,
is how the internet impacts the affinity for proximity in firm investment decisions.
In this paper, we ask whether firm investment decisions enabled solely by the
internet, cloud computing, systematically shows a predilection for proximity. Cloud
computing providers, like Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft’s Azure, rent
compute resources called “virtual machines” to customers who connect to them via
the internet. Once connected to a virtual machine (VM) via the internet, cloud users
can perform functions previously required to be hosted by on-premise servers like
compute operations, read and write data operations or web application hosting.2
There is a large and growing demand for cloud computing: according to Gartner,
the worldwide public cloud services market is projected to grow 17.3 percent in 2019
to total $206.2 billion, up from a $175.8 billion forecast in 2018.3 Cloud computing is
also important for general economic growth and productivity because renting cloud
compute resources lowers fixed hardware capital costs for start-up firms and turns
them into marginal operating expenses. Despite this fast growth and economic im-
portance, there is very little empirical work on understanding the cloud computing
market and welfare derived from it.
When a firm deploys a cloud computing instance, they must choose a physical
location where to deploy it. Cloud providers have multiple data center locations and
prices vary by location. Working with a far-away data center can impact latency.
Latency is the time between a task request and task execution. As a rule of thumb,
distance related latency is on the order of one millisecond per 100 miles.4 To put
2What was formally a fixed investment costs of server ownership into variable costs. With some
configurations or “stacks” cloud users can outsource IT personnel to experts employed by the cloud
providers.
3See “Gartner Forecasts Worldwide Public Cloud Revenue to Grow 17.3 Percent in 2019”, ac-
cessed on 09/30/2018, https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2018-09-12-
gartner-forecasts-worldwide-public-cloud-revenue-to-grow-17-percent-in-2019
4See https://www.365datacenters.com/portfolio-items/beyond-bandwidth-distance-
matters-choosing-data-center/. Data packets travel at the speed of light in a vacuum but in
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that in context, a 2017 research by Google finds that “average time to first byte” (a
measure of web server responsiveness) was roughly 2,000 milliseconds when averaged
across all websites in the U.S.5 Thus, an increase of roughly 1,500 miles of distance
between a VM user and the data center location corresponds to a latency increase of
∼15 milliseconds (less than a 1% increase in time to first byte for the average U.S. web
server). Hence, over relatively small distances like those faced by customers in our
dataset (e.g., choosing between a data center 1,000 versus 1,500 miles away) latency
might not always be the sole disutility of selecting far away data centers outside of
niche use cases like high frequency trading.
We test two hypotheses for how distance impacts firm investment decisions in
this paper. First, we investigate the strength of firm preferences for proximity when
investing in the cloud. Whereas some firms, such as high frequency traders, care a
great deal about 5 milliseconds of latency, many users do not. As a result, we view this
as a strong test for the importance of distance and firm investment decisions: if firms
are willing to pay more to use the nearest data center when only marginally closer
than another data center, it is evidence against the “death of distance” hypothesis.
Second, we estimate how competition impacts the “death of distance” hypothesis.
Public cloud providers like AWS, Azure and Google Cloud Platform (GCP) are fiercely
competing in the rapidly growing cloud computing market. Market competition can
impact both which cloud provider customers choose and, for their chosen provider,
which specific data center location customers choose. We develop and estimate a
structural model of cloud demand to investigate how strategic firm level decisions
interact with preferences for proximity.
actual fiber which powers the internet, the speed is a bit less. Further, bends in fiber cables can
slow down data speeds. Lastly, there are other factors not related to distance which can increase




Having the type of data we have, detailed data for a single firm and aggregate
data for another, is a common problem with both developing business strategy and
in competition policy. We introduce a novel mixed logit demand model of spatial
competition that is estimable with detailed data of a single firm but only aggregate
sales data of a second and apply it to the cloud computing industry. The model lets
us perform counterfactual analysis over 1) how spatial competition between cloud
providers impacts optimal price setting behavior and 2) optimal data center locating
decisions. We can thereby show how firms’ cloud investment patterns change with
competition upstream in the cloud computing provider industry.
We use a proprietary dataset with anonymized customer level zip codes linked to
the location of data centers they choose. The dataset consists of all customers who
deployed one popular type of VM on Microsoft’s Azure in 2016. At the time, Azure
was the second largest public cloud provider in the world behind AWS. We restrict
the dataset to focus on location decisions of US and Canadian firms to locate in US
and Canadian data centers. We leverage the rollout of new data centers in the U.S.
and Canada over our time period to provide variation in the choice set of data centers
and identify key demand parameters, allowing a subset of demand parameters to vary
by a cloud user’s industry. Due to large lead times in data center construction and
2016 being early in the public cloud sector, we argue data center location is plausibly
exogenous.6
We have detailed data of a single firm, Azure, but only aggregate sales data of a
second, AWS. Specifically, we use quarterly cloud revenue data from AWS available
in their 10-Ks. We treat absent customer level data from the AWS as a missing
data problem and leverage the structural model, detailed Azure data and Expecta-
6We argue below that over the planning period for these data centers, reliability for servicing
internal workloads was the primary reason for data center construction. For example, a two year
lead time for data center construction implies that 2014 was the planning period. In 2014, share
prices for Microsoft hadn’t yet responded to increased cloud revenue reported in 10-Ks.
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tion Maximization (EM) algorithm to back out AWS customer location. The EM
algorithm addresses the missing data problem iteratively: we first construct an ex-
pectation of the likelihood by integrating over the latent consumer locations based on
their posterior distribution, and then maximize the likelihood function over demand
parameters.
Identifying key demand parameters relies on the rollout of new data centers by
both AWS and Azure and 2016 price changes. By observing the rate at which new
customers begin purchasing Azure when new AWS or Azure data centers open and
how those rates vary over space, we can identify preferences for proximity to data
centers. We argue that using data from early days of the cloud computing market
and the long lead times to construct new data centers as a source of identification is
adequate to identify preference parameters. We project demand parameters identi-
fied from the granular Azure data to the observed AWS data center characteristics
and sum across AWS data centers. The gap between the projection and the observed
AWS market share is attributed to the fixed effects of cloud providers. Lastly, the
population distribution of consumers can be inferred by the choice probabilities cal-
culated from the identified demand model and the observed market shares of Azure,
accounting for the presence of an outside good (on-premise servers). We show via
simulation that the model successfully recovers the demand parameters and unob-
served consumer spatial distribution then take the model to the data given Azure’s
market share.
Our core empirical finding is that cloud users have a preference for nearby data
centers. As a result, the spatial layout of DCs relative to customer location induces
a significant variation in local market power. We have no identifying variation to
test whether this preference for proximity is driven by latency concerns or other
factors like a secular preference for proximity. It is hard to imagine latency is driving
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the magnitude of preference for proximity we find in the data. Our data covers
North America and Canada only. Introduction of new data centers in our sample
often change distance to nearest data center by only a few hundred miles or latency
decreases of a few milliseconds. However, we find that cloud customers are willing
to pay roughly 60% premiums for a reduction in distance of roughly 600 miles (i.e.,
1000 kilometers).
We use estimated parameters to perform counterfactual exercises to determine
how market structure would change if new data centers are introduced in different
locations. Among the six possible counterfactual Microsoft Azure data center loca-
tions, the most profitable one could generate a market share gain roughly 25% higher
than the least. Thus, the revenue reductions to cloud providers of placing a data cen-
ter sub-optimally are large. The model lets us decompose increases in market share
across customers purchasing the outside good (on-premise servers) versus purchasing
from a competitor and we find that much of the increase in market share is from the
outside good although a meaningful share is from the competitor.
We also perform a counterfactual where we decrease price of all Azure data centers
by 15% and assess changes on market shares. Consistent with economic theory of
spatial competition, we find that the benefits of price competition are greatest where
both Azure and AWS have a data center. Thus, our results provide evidence that
spatial competition is important in the early stages of the cloud computing industry.
Comparing the two counterfactuals, opening a new data center increases consumer
surplus by roughly 75% of the consumer surplus from the price decrease. This is
large since the new data center would impact only ∼10% of all Azure customers (e.g.,
surplus increases only for cloud users that deploy there) but it is plausible given the
implied willingness to pay for proximity.7
7As a back of the envelope calculation if all customers receive a 15% price decrease their customer
surplus increases by 15%. A new data center impacts those customers that deploy in it and there
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There are three main lessons from this research. First, we find evidence that
cloud customers display a material preference for proximity in deploying VMs that is
hard to explain with latency issues. Indeed, we show that a large fraction of cloud
users do not deploy in the nearest DC implying that latency is often not a major
hurdle to cloud deployments. Data center age, for example, correlates with where
cloud customers deploy. By focusing on the North American market, we ignore data
sovereignty issues but highlight that those are likely to also be important. We view
a preference for proximity as being inconsistent with internet enabling the “death
of distance” at least over our sample in the early stages of cloud adoption. We
acknowledge that latency could be an important issue for some cloud applications,
but the magnitude and scale over which preferences for proximity manifest and the
observed distances in our dataset (we observe only North American customers) makes
it difficult for latency to be plausibly responsible.
Second, our findings imply that market competition could help mitigate incidence
issues from spatial allocation of capital. The “death of distance” narrative promised
increase growth in rural areas attributable to better access to information and freer
flow of goods and services. Our results imply that increased strategic spatial compe-
tition as the cloud market matures would reduce equilibrium prices and also increase
incentives to invest in additional data centers. Although we don’t endogenous DC
location decisions in this paper to address it formally, intense competition among the
major cloud providers (e.g., AWS, Azure and Google Cloud Platform, Alibaba, etc.)
is likely increasing access and surplus to the cloud for all potential cloud customers
were 10 DCs at the end of our sample so roughly 10% of customers benefit from the new DC. Recall
that aggregate consumer surplus from the new DC is 75% of the welfare increase from a 15% price
decrease for all newly deploying customers. If N are the total number of cloud customers then
.1 ∗N ∗∆CSnewDC = .75 ∗N∆CSPriceChange = .75 ∗N ∗ .15 and solving for ∆CSnewDC yields the
increase in consumer surplus for customers deploying in the new DC in our counterfactual. Hence
we must observe an increase in consumer surplus of (.15/.1)*.75 = 112.5%. This is plausible: a new
proximate DC could be worth roughly twice as much to cloud users as distant DC based on our
parameter estimates.
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across both the price and distance margins.
Third, more generally our results show that product managers for goods charac-
terized by spatial competition can effectively estimate demand for their goods using
detailed data of only a single firm so long as market data for the competitor firm ex-
ists and there is variation in the number of stores over time. In addition to benefits to
managers, we highlight how this technique can also be used by economists to perform
welfare analysis. While our use case is cloud computing, the technique could be useful
for managers and researchers interested in questions regarding the impacts of opening
and closing of brick and mortar stores faced with increasing online competition.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, understanding the
economic geography of the internet has important incidence implications. Despite
higher adoption rates for early internet in rural areas (Forman, Goldfarb and Green-
stein, 2005), it appears that the benefits enabled by the internet accrue in only a
subset of cities (Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein, 2012, 2008). Further, recent re-
search suggests that proximity to data centers could cause increased growth (Jin and
McElheran, 2019). Our work pushes these findings by investigating how spatial com-
petition could impact the economic geography of internet enabled economic gains.
Second, in the field of discrete choice modeling, applications of EM algorithm
date back at least to Bhat (1997), Train (2007) and Train (2008). Many of these
applications use EM to address missing data on consumer attributes. In what might
be the most closely related EM based approach to ours, Conlon and Mortimer (2013)
addresses missing data on product availability. At a high level, competitor sales
are similar to missing data regarding any product generally. Unlike these previous
papers, though, the data structure in our case has two problems: the aggregate level
competitors’ data makes both their consumer’s attributes and disaggregated (e.g.,
store level) sales unobservable. Because this is a spatial model of competition, the
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consumer-store level attributes of AWS are of added importance.
While we view the EM algorithm as the most appropriate remedy for our miss-
ing data problem for both efficiency and computational feasibility, there are other
related techniques in the literature. Other demand frameworks for a similar data
structure include those in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004), a Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) inspired model leveraging micro moments of consumer characteris-
tics. However, these “Micro-BLP” models are less efficient than maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) by attenuating the information on choices at individual level. The
marketing literature often uses Bayesian techniques in the sense that demand param-
eters are also treated as latent variables. Examples include but are not restricted
to Chen and Yang (2007), Musalem, Bradlow and Raju (2008), Jiang, Manchanda
and Rossi (2009), Musalem et al. (2010) and Zheng, Fader and Padmanabhan (2012).
Specifically, Feit et al. (2013) is probably the most related work to ours. They use
a mixture of individual level usage data for digital platforms and aggregate data on
usage for traditional platforms to estimate the multi-platform media consumption,
albeit in a context of a multivariate model and computationally more burdensome
because of the inevitable Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation.
Third, this paper expands the existing literature on spatial competition broadly
in addition to our application regarding the cloud computing industry. In terms of
data structure, previous works on spatial competition usually use either aggregate
or disaggregate data only. For instance, Davis (2006) estimated a model of spatial
competition in the movie theater industry with market share data. Davis (2006) ag-
gregates consumer heterogeneity with an observed geographic consumer distribution
from census data and then focuses on identifying the functional form of travel cost.
Smith (2004) estimates a two-stage discrete-continuous model for the supermarket
industry, and the complexity of unobserved consumer attributes is circumvented by
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consumer level data from a survey. While spatial competition and firm entry deci-
sions are important economic questions (Seim, 2006), our novel demand estimation
approach to combine micro and macro data can be applied to estimating demand
elasticities as well.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 and 3, we give a brief
introduction of the IaaS public cloud industry and describe the general framework
of the model. Section 4 describes the model, describes how EM algorithm can be
employed to address the missing data problem, and identification. Section 5 shows
the performance of a Monte Carlo experiment. In Section 6, gives the estimation
results from the data. Section 7 performs two counterfactual exercises highlighting
the spatial competition aspects of cloud implied by estimated preference parameters.
We conclude this paper in Section 8.
3.2 Industrial Background
According to the beginner’s guide on the website of Microsoft Azure,
“Cloud computing is the delivery of computing services–servers, storage, databases,
networking, software, analytics, and more–over the Internet (‘the cloud’). Companies
offering these computing services are called cloud providers and typically charge for
cloud computing services based on usage, similar to how you are billed for water or
electricity at home.”
Most cloud computing services fall into one of three broad categories: infrastruc-
ture as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS).
In this paper, we focus on IaaS and model consumer’s problem as a discrete choice
among data centers. Focusing on IaaS over PaaS and SaaS is ideal in our setting
because the user must specify a specific DC to deploy their cloud resources. Alterna-
tive PaaS and SaaS offerings often have a more curated experience in which the firm
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Figure 3·1: 2016 IaaS Public Cloud Computing Market Share from
Gartner. Gartner data from survey results of firms. Market shares
materially changed over the past five years so that Azure and Google’s
GCP now have much larger shares.
makes deployment decisions.
DCs are facilities that house computer systems and associated components, such
as telecommunications and storage systems. Consumers rent virtual machines (VMs)
at DCs as complements to local machines on a pay-as-you-go basis. The value propo-
sition to customers is driven capacity management, cloud providers’ economies of
scale and management of hardware and security. Put another way, replacing lumpy
capital expenditures on wholly-owned servers with smoother operating expenses in
the cloud, being able to scale up and down demand for compute resources but not
always provision for max demand as with own servers, and outsourcing hardware secu-
rity concerns all are valuable. Some use cases include housing large datasets, serving
website, web App or Application content and performing period machine learning
model training.
Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure are the two firms that have the
largest market shares in global IaaS public cloud market. In 2016, the year our data
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spans, the total value of this market reached $22 billion U.S. dollars, of which AWS
had 44%, followed by Microsoft Azure at 7.1% 8, as shown in Figure 3·1. Total cloud
demand has increased significantly since 2016 to $44.4 Billion in 2019 with AWS’s
market share staying roughly constant but Azure’s growing to 18%.9
(a) Jan 2016 (b) Dec 2016
Figure 3·2: North American Data Center (DC) layout in 2016. During
the calendar year both AWS and Azure added DCs in different parts of
the U.S. and Canada. We leverage how new DC introduction differen-
tially impacts customers in different locations to estimate preferences
fro DC proximity.
The core distinction between on-premise servers and cloud computing is that cloud
customers rent compute resources from a public cloud provider. When purchasing an
on-premise server, a firm puts the server in their compute facility, normally in their
office building. When a customer decides to rent compute resources and configure a
VM, they select a physical location for that VM to be located. Figure 3·2 shows the
location for all U.S. and Canadian data centers of both AWS and Azure. A shorter
physical distance between a VM and its users is correlated with lower latency (e.g.,
shorter wait times for webpages to load). Each firm had a footprint in Canada by the
end of 2016. We estimate demand of a single popular SKU for all U.S. and Canadian
8See “Gartner Says Worldwide IaaS Public Cloud Services Market Grew 31 Percent in 2016”, ac-





consumers with workloads in any DC in either the U.S. or Canada.
Spatial proximity is likely an important aspect of DC differentiation for speed-
sensitive users. Data transfer takes time, and the resulted latency could be further
amplified due to security protocols. For example, this is likely to be a real concern
when considering leverage cloud servers across on the other side of the globe. Our
dataset, though, includes only US and Canadian customer demand for VMs within US
data center locations. It is plausibly less likely to be an issue for domestic data center
location decisions where the U.S. is roughly 3000 miles across and as a rule of thumb,
distance related latency is on the order of 100 miles per millisecond. Observing a
preference for proximity could be related to latency preferences or non-performance
related preferences to be physically close to data centers (sometimes called “server
hugging”).
Spatial proximity is determined by both DC location and consumer location and
consumer heterogeneity along this margin could play a critical role in this demand
system. Therefore, the estimation for demand parameters overlooking consumer het-
erogeneity in location could miss an important consumer preference. This motivates
our mixed logit framework. Although consumer location is observable only for Mi-
crosoft customers, the EM algorithm we detail below enables a simultaneous estima-
tion of both demand parameters and consumer spatial distribution, which is needed
for any policy analysis respecting spatial demand preferences.
3.3 Data
We merge several datasets together for our analysis. These datasets include actual
purchase data from Azure customers including customer locations for a single popular
general-purpose product or shop keeping unit (SKU), aggregate sales for AWS, data
center locations, pricing data for AWS and Azure, census data on business locations
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Table 3.1: Comparison between Microsoft basic A1 and AWS t2.small
Name Brand vCPUs RAM(GiB)
basic A1 Mircosoft 1 1.75
t2.small Amazon 1 2
Note: We compare demand for customers’ first deployment of basic A1 for Microsoft
and estimate first deployments of AWS’ t2.small. These products are similar in terms of
performance. Differences in product fixed effects will be covered by AWS fixed effects in
the empirical model.
for the U.S. and the analog for Canadian businesses.
The most novel attribute of our data is a random subset of Microsoft customer
level choice data for the a general-purpose cloud computing SKU: basic A1 SKU. The
analog of the basic A1 SKU for AWS we consider is the t2.small SKU. A detailed
technical comparison between basic A1 and t2.small can be found in Table 3.1. The
VMs are similar across CPU and RAM. One difference between the virtual machines
SKUs is across product quality: whereas basic A1 is a dedicated core, t2.small is a
burstable VM. That means scaling up t2.small cores due to a “burst” in compute
demand might not always be available if deployed whereas a dedicated core would be.
This will be picked up in the brand/product fixed effects we estimate in the empirical
model.10
There was modest price variation in our sample period. Figure 3·3 shows region
level prices across DCs for Azure’s basic A1 and AWS’s t2.small in 2016. Prices are
quoted in the hourly price of deploying a one core Azure basic A1 or AWS t2.small
VM. To put these prices into context, at $0.08/hour a one core VM would cost $700.80
if deployed for 24 hours a day for all 365 days in a year, which is more than a one core
personal computer would have cost in 2016. The premium accounts for the ability to
only pay for what is used (e.g., used the VM for 20 hours then shut it off), in addition
to outsourcing security and IT.
Figure 3·3 shows when the first Canadian DCs of Microsoft and AWS were in-
10Because we only evaluate one product from both AWS and Azure, brand and product fixed
effects are operationally identical in this paper.
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Figure 3·3: Prices of Microsoft basic A1 and AWS t2.small Across
Regions.
Note: Figure shows price dispersion for AWS and Azure over time and space. One large
price drop for Azure and one small drop for AWS is responsible for identifying price
coefficients. New region prices are shown as appearing midway through the year.
troduced in April, 2016 and Dec, 2016, those prices were slightly higher than prices
in other regions for Azure. The price drop in Microsoft DCs in October 2016 and
price decrease in December 2016 from AWS helps us identify price coefficients. Finally,
prices were higher for Azures basic A1 SKU relative to AWS’s t2.small reflecting some
time invariant differences in attributes which will be picked up by the brand/product
fixed effects. Generally speaking, cloud providers tended to have a few large data cen-
ters at low prices then smaller data centers more geographically dispersed at slightly
higher prices over our sample period.
Related to pricing, we focus on the location of initial VM deployment decision of
customers in the paper. When a cloud user deploys a VM they pick a DC where the
VM will be deployed. One advantage of the cloud relative to wholly owned servers is
cloud user can turn off their VM at any time and stop paying in a “pay as you go”
cloud computing business model. Usage decisions are second order for our question
of willingness to pay for proximity for the cloud. In order for usage decisions to
matter, there would need to be a substitution margin along which cloud users choose
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a location as a function of both their physical location and the expected duration of
the deployment. We view this as unlikely although we discuss how adding a usage
decision could impact the model and findings below. Also, by focusing on the initial
deployment, we circumvent the complications of multiple DC users.
The Azure customer purchase data includes date of initial purchase, the specific
DC location where the basic A1 VM is deployed, the zip code for the customer and the
industry of the customer when available. Table 3.2 shows a summary of observables
for both the anonymized Azure data and the pricing data for both AWS and Azure.
Table 3.2 also highlights the increase in data centers across both Azure (four to ten)
and AWS (three to five) in 2016. The table also shows explicitly that we only observe
the location of Azure customers. For this reason we leverage the EM algorithm to
infer the location of AWS customers.
Most customers do not have an industry associated with them so we classify them
as “unknown”. Roughly 25% of customers, however, do have an industry noted in
our data. Observing industries is very likely non-random so the industry composition
in Table 3.2 likely isn’t representative of the overall customer industry of Azure.
Based upon conversations with Microsoft employees, industry is often reported when
a cloud user leverages an intermediary to deploy their cloud workloads (e.g., when the
end customer uses a vendor cloud service provider to manage their cloud resources).
Hence observing a reported industry could be a proxy for leveraging a vendor to
operate cloud IT.
We use variation in the number of DCs over time to identify taste parameters
for proximity to data centers. The intuition is as follows: consider two sets of cloud
users all from Ohio. Azure has no DC in Ohio over our sample but AWS opens a DC
in mid-2016. The first set of customers need to deploy in January 2016 before AWS
opened a DC in Ohio. Hence, we would observe some customers with Ohio zip codes
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Consumer Characteristics






Hospitality & Transportation 1.0%
Insurance 0.6%
Media / Telecome and Utilities 1.3%
Nonprofit 0.5%
Professional Services 13.2%
Choice DC level Brand level
Panel B: DC Characteristics
DC Characteristics Microsoft Azure AWS
Locations observable observbale
Changes in number of DCs in 2016 4→ 10 3→ 5
Start date of Canadian DC Apr, 2016 Dec, 2016
Average hourly price basic A1 t2.small
$0.0708 (0.0120) $0.0381 (0.0040)
Note: Table summarizes data used in the analysis. Industry only reported for roughly
30% of observations in our data and professional services and discrete manufacturing
appear overly represented for those observations reporting industry. Both AWS and
Azure saw and increase in the number of DCs over the time period.
as signing up in Azure DCs in January 2016. AWS then opens a DC in Ohio. Assume
the second set of customers, also from Ohio, want to deploy in December 2016. If
Ohio cloud customers value proximity then we would observe few Ohio customers
deploying in Azure DCs in December. The same logic applies to opening new Azure
DCs for the spatial distribution of customers in other Azure DCs.
Figure 3·4 shows average distance between the zip codes of customers making new
deployments and the zip codes of the DCs they deploy to in the Azure data by month.
Vertical lines indicate the dates would new DCs are available to customers. If the
new DCs had no impact on deployment decisions the lines would be flat over time.
The line shows some month on month variation in addition to a decreasing trend over
time. Hence, there is some reduced form evidence in the Azure data for a preference
for proximity.
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Figure 3·4: Average distance of deployments to customer zip code
Note: Figure shows drop in average distance between a deploying customer’s billing zip
code and their choice of data center over time. Sharpest one month drop occurs in same
time period as new Azure DC locations.
Figure 3·5 shows a density of customer location relative to deployed DC for cus-
tomers that choose the closest DC relative to those that do not choose the closest DC
at the time of deployment. The green shaded density shows the location in kilome-
ters for customers that choose the nearest and the grey density customers who do not
choose the nearest. The Figure is meant to highlight that when customers choose the
nearest DC location they are often moving from something like 1000 to 4000 kilome-
ters to being within 1000 kilometers. The average distance distance is roughly 1000
kilometers (vertical dashed lines). If 100 miles maps to one millisecond of latency
then the gain in latency between the two densities is roughly six milliseconds. Aside
from niche use cases like high frequency traders, six milliseconds is not likely to be
material for most cloud VMs.
Our method relies on having detailed customer sales for a single firm (Azure)
and aggregate customer sales for the second (AWS). While we have very good data
on Azure customers, we have no customer level data for AWS customers. However,
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Figure 3·5: Average distance conditional on proximity decision
Note: Figure plots smoothed distance distribution for customers choosing the closest DC
to them at time of deployment (shaded dark green) versus those not choosing the closest
DC at time of deployment (shaded light grey). Average distance difference across each
group is on the over of 600 kilometers and supports broadly overlap.
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we observe aggregate global cloud sales from AWS from 10-K SEC filings in 2016.11
SEC reported sales are worldwide, not restricted to North American market, but we
observe U.S. sales as a percent of worldwide sales for Azure.
We make three strong but plausible assumptions to back out US AWS sales for
t2.small in 2016 from their 10-K leveraging insights from Azure data. First, we apply
the global revenue share of North America for Azure to AWS. While this is likely to
be imperfect, it is hard to imagine that geographical revenue shares are significantly
different across the providers. Second, we calculate the revenue share of the Azure
SKU, basic A1, within North America relative to all other cloud products. We then
apply that product revenue share to AWS. Third, we calculate the average sales of
basic A1 customers and apply it to the inferred AWS t2.small customers to get a
customer count for t2.small for AWS customers.
This inferred approach is appealing because it permits us to get a plausible cus-
tomer base for AWS customers. A simpler version in the same spirit would be to
multiply the number of observed Azure customers in our sample by the market share
ratio of AWS to Azure show in Figure 3·1. In practice the two approaches give quali-
tatively similar customer count numbers, which we don’t report due to confidentiality
clauses in our data sharing agreements since it would provide customer count data
for Azure customers. We discuss in our results section how results could be impacted
by getting inferred AWS customer counts wrong.
Having both detailed data for Azure and aggregate data for AWS, the final piece of
data is aggregate market size data for the cloud computing market in North America
by state or province. The vast majority of cloud computing resources are used by firms
as opposed to sold directly to consumers and the cloud is a substitute for on-premise
compute resources. We thus assume the market for cloud computing is defined by the
11More details can be found on http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=
irol-reportsother
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total number of private sector firms in the U.S. and Canada. For the U.S. market we
take the total number of businesses by state from Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation
(KFF).12 KFF tracks data on number of private sector firms by size.
For the Canadian market, we take data from Statistics Canada, a Canadian gov-
ernment agency which can be considered as the counterpart of the U.S. Census Bu-
reau13. The data is from the Business Register (BR), a continuously-maintained
central repository of baseline information on businesses and institutions operating in
Canada. The variable is referred as “Canadian Business Counts” in the repository,
including all active Canadian locations with employees. The number we use was
collected in December, 2016.
We trim the market level data in two ways. First, because the data is at yearly
level we take the numbers in 2015 and 2016 as they were collected at the end of each
year, and then extrapolate them into each month in 2016 based on a constant growth
rate assumption for both US and Canada data. Furthermore, we only consider firms
with more than 50 employees as potential cloud users, they are 24.43% of all private
firms in the U.S. in 2016 and 4.7% for Canada. We only look at larger firms since in
2016 cloud computing was more likely to be utilized by larger, tech savvy firms.14
3.4 Model
This section introduces our structural demand model for cloud deployments. We
model all Canadian and U.S. consumers’ utility to take the standard random utility
model (RUM) form. In addition to allowing price and firm fixed effects to impact
12See https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/number-of-firms-by-size.
13More detailed information can be found on the following website:https://www150.statcan.
gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3310003401.
14Of course, many smaller tech savvy start-ups also leverage the cloud. We discuss robustness
around this trimming decision in the results section. We make a final technical assumption to
multiply the market size by basic A1 ’s demand share within Azure, so that the patterns in market
shares are kept consistent with basic A1 and t2.small demand. As we discuss below, this final
resizing only changes the magnitude of the outside option relative to shares for AWS and Azure.
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utility, we explicitly include distance between a consumer and data center and a
shifter for if the data center is domestic. Finally, we leverage the EM algorithm to
get around the missing data problem of unobserved AWS customer locations.
Cloud computing is a classic discrete-continuous good because consumers first
decide to rent cloud computing resources, then decide how much to rent (Hanemann
(1984)). For simplicity in what is already a non-trivial problem, we focus only on the
initial purchase decision for two of the most popular general compute cloud products
during this time: t2.small for AWS and basic A1 for Azure. We do not model
continued deployment decisions in this paper and focus on the location of new VM
deployments.
We assume the utility of customer i choosing DC j in period t is
uijt = γmi × d(li, lj) + β × pricejt + ψ × 1ij{domestic}
+ξ ×DCAgejt + ζ × 1AWSj + εijt,∀j ∈ Ft
(3.1)
where
• i = 1, 2, ..., I is the index for customers, j = 1, 2, ..., J is the index for DCs and
t = 1, 2, ..., T is the time index.
• l is a 2-dimensional vector indicating locations, with the first component as
longitude and the second as latitude.
• d(li, lj) is a function returning the distance between consumer i and DC j, i.e.
d(lj, li) = ||li− lj||, where || · || is the great-circle distance. We allow preferences
for proximity to vary based on consumer i’s industry.
• mi indictes consumer i’s industry, we allow industry-specific distance coefficient
to reflect the fact that different industries may have distinguished degrees of
latency aversion.
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• pricejt is the price of DC j in period t.
• 1ij{domestic} is an indicator variable for if customer i is in the same country
as the data center j.
• DCAgejt is the age of DC j in period t.
• 1AWSj is an indicator for AWS DCs.
• εijt is a type I extreme value that is i.i.d across ∀i, j, t.
Equation (3.1) has a standard form but a couple of attributes merit discussion.
First is the distance metric. We determine a customer’s location based upon their
observed billing address zip code and the approximate location of different data cen-
ters (nearest city). This introduces some measurement error: cloud customers care
about latency between their deployment and the user of that deployment. For exam-
ple, Netflix, a streaming video on demand provider, might prefer to put their cloud
workloads close to their customers’ locations rather than their corporate headquar-
ters. While there is correlation between cloud customer’s location and the location of
their customers, that correlation is not perfect. This introduces measurement error
and thus attenuation bias. As a result, the impacts of distance we estimate are likely
a lower bound. Also, by including an indicator for domestic DCs, 1ij{domestic},
we allow a general preference for domestic DCs due to concerns about information
security or logistic convenience.
Second, since consumers’ utility of different DCs vary with their locations, it
is possible in principle to model utility function in a “random coefficient” fashion.
Specifically, whereas we can calculate distance explicitly for Azure consumers, dis-
tances for AWS or non-cloud users are unknown. Consumers’ heterogeneous tastes
across DCs could be thought of as determined by their unobserved attributes, there-
fore similar to a “random coefficient” model. We put more structure on the problem
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by making assumptions about the spatial distribution of all possible cloud consumers
because the counterfactual exercise we want to perform are the welfare implications
of changing the location of DCs. Thus our modeling assumptions are driven by the
nature of problem we seek to solve.
Third, we allow for the utility of data centers to vary by the age of the data
center measured in months. This allows for cloud customers to learn about new data
centers over time. It also allows for growth in complementary services: our analysis
examines only a single cloud computing product but there are complementarities
between products (e.g., VMs and data storage). Allowing for DC age to impact
utility is a reduced form way of allowing complementarities to manifest.
We model the outside option as on-premise IT infrastructure. We assume that all
consumers have one such option in their choice set, denoted as j = O with charac-
teristics d(li, lO) = 0,∀i, priceOt = 0,∀t, 1ij{domestic} = 1,∀i. Since all consumers
had been using in-house infrastructure before cloud, it is unnecessary to model learn-
ing effects with a time-variant variable such as DCAgejt, thus ξ × DCAgeO can be
normalized up to a constant. Instead, we assume there is a time-variant fixed effect
for the outside option, α+ τ ln(t), which can be interpreted as the general time trend
of cloud computing. A negative coefficient on τ would reflect the general increase
in market share of cloud computing relative to on-premise offerings. Therefore, the
utility of the on-premise option available to all possible cloud customers is:
uiOt = α + τ × ln(t) + εiOt (3.2)
where α includes the domestic effect as well as the constant term in time trend.
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3.4.1 The Likelihood Function
Since we assume εijt are from type I extreme value distribution, the probability for
customer i to choose DC j in period t takes the familiar logit form15:








• v denotes the deterministic part of the utility function, i.e. vijt = uijt − εijt;
viOt = uiOt − εiOt
• yijt is a 0-1 binary variable indicates whether consumer i signs up for DC j in
period t.
• Ft is the product set in period t, including the product set of Microsoft’s Azure,
FMt , and that of Amazon’s AWS, F
A
t , i.e. Ft = F
M
t ∪ FAt
• lDCt = {lj,∀j ∈ Ft} is the set collecting the locations of all available DCs in
period t
• zjt = (pricejt, DCAgejt, 1AWSj ) is the product characteristics vector, and zt =
{zjt,∀j ∈ Ft} collects zjt across all DC’s.
• θ1 = (γm, β, ψ, ξ, ζ, α, τ) is the set of utility parameters.
The probability of not signing up for Microsoft Azure or AWS is







15In our Azure data, consumers are from different purchase channels. In this estimation, we focus
on two of them, web direct and volumn license. The reason is that consumers from other channels
such as ”Benefits” may have a different pricing scheme.
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Unobserved AWS demand Although we can directly use Eq.(3.3) to denote
the probability that a Azure customer chooses any specific DC, the industries and
locations AWS customers as well as their DC-level choices are unobservable in our
dataset. We leverage our inferred AWS product revenue, conditional probabilities
and the EM algorithm to get around this problem.
First, we write the likelihood as the probability of choosing AWS as a brand,
which is the sum of probabilities of choosing any of their DCs:









where yiAt indicates whether consumer i chooses AWS in period t.
Missing consumer locations The industries and locations of non-Microsoft
customers are unobservable in our data which makes the calculation of the conditional
choice probabilities infeasible. To circumvent this problem, we will take consumer’s
industry and location as two random variables, get the joint probability of industry,
location and choice, then integrate out its uncertainty in industry and location for
AWS and the outside option consumers. Particularly, the likelihood function in period


















P (yiOt = 1|mi, li, lDC , z·t,θ1)ft(mi, li|θ2)dmidli
(3.6)
where Cft , f = M,A,O are the sets of consumers for Microsoft’s Azure, Amazon’s
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AWS and non-cloud users respectively. The key attribute of equation (3.6) is the dis-
tribution of location for AWS and outside option purchasers on the second and third
lines. The density f(mi, li|θ2) can be viewed as a industry-specific spatial distribution
of consumers of all options in the market. Although we observe the industries and
locations of Azure customers, we write their joint probabilities of industry, location
and choice separately to keep the format consistent across brands. This will also
enable us to infer ft(mi, li|θ2) based on the observed Azure customer locations. More
details can be found in Section 6. In practice we take the industry-specific spatial
distribution of consumers in the market to be the that of medium and large firms
across U.S. states and Canadian provinces as described in the Data section above.
























POit (θ1)f(mi, li|θ2)dmidli)) (3.7)
where P jit(θ1), P
A
it (θ1) and P
O
it (θ1) simplifies P (yijt = 1|mi, li, lDCt , z·t,θ1), P (yiAt =
1|mi, li ∈ Cb, lDCt , z·t,θ1) and P (yijt = 1|mi, li, lDCt , z·t,θ1) correspondingly. Since we
take expectation over the unknown consumer’s industry and location, the expected
choice probability is same for every AWS consumer or any potential cloud consumer.




16Recall we make some assumptions on AWS revenue composition to get QAt and the market size
broadly to get QOt .
120
3.4.2 EM Algorithm
Maximizing the log likelihood function above with the usual Newton or quasi-Newton
routines can be numerically difficult and computationally unstable. This is a key
motivation for leveraging the EM algorithm. The EM algorithm is a two-stage itera-
tive method which involves calculating an expectation of the log likelihood function
weighted by the Bayes’ probabilities at some initial values and then updating the
parameters by maximization.
Following Bhat (1997), it can be shown that with a given distribution of firms
in North American and a set of preference parameters (θ1), maximizing Eq.(3.7) is
mathematically equivalent to maximizing the alternative log likelihood function in
Eq.(3.8), where f(mi, li|θ2) are replaced by its Bayesian posterior counterparts, i.e.
the probabilities that an AWS customer or a non-cloud user is from industry mi and


























Then this maximization problem can be solved iteratively: starting from some
initial values θs, we first update the Bayesian posterior probabilities, and then maxi-
mize Eq.(3.8) for θs+1 conditional on the Bayesian posteriors. Details of the approach
are carefully described in the Appendix.
Lastly, due to the property of log operation, θ1 and θ2 can be separately updated.










































In practice, instead of assuming a parametric distribution for f(mi, li|θ2), we
assume a discrete distribution of consumer’s industry and location, or say a discrete
industry-specific spatial distribution. The discrete distribution can approximate any
arbitrary distribution when discretization is fine enough. Specifically, we take each
U.S. state and Canadian province as a bin b, and then the probability that a consumer
(including non-cloud users) from industry m belongs to a certain bin b in period t
is qmbt, and these qmbt’s are treated as parameters to estimate. Using states and
provinces is both convenient and appropriate since data on market size (medium and
large firms) is available at the state level and provides good variation in distance from
newly introduced DCs. Details of this approach are again in the Appendix.
In sum there are a few departures from normal log likelihood maximization we
make in our approach. First, we replace location probabilities with Bayesian pos-
teriors. Second, we iteratively solve for parameters governing the distribution of
consumers for each product and preference for the product. Third, we discretize the
spatial distribution of North America. This final step is an advantage for us since
variation in Azure demand in geographical bins over time in response to new Azure
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and AWS DCs help us identify the model’s parameters. The iterative maximization
process across geographical and preference parameters continues until convergence as
we describe in detail in the next section.
3.4.3 Identification
In this section, we show that the parameters can be identified in the following order:
(1) θ1,1 = (γm, β, ψ, ρ, ξ) ; (2) θ1,2 = (ζ, α, τ); (3) θ2 = {qmbt}mb, t = 1, 2, ..., T .
First, (γm, β, ψ, ξ) are identified from the substitution pattern of Microsoft cus-
tomers among Microsoft DCs. Since our Microsoft data is at individual level, includ-
ing the industry and location of each customer, mi, d(li, lj)’s and 1ij{domestic}’s are
deterministic, i.e. there is no unknown interaction between individual attributes and
product characteristics. Therefore, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property of logit model makes it possible to focus on only a subset of products (Train
(2009)).
Next, if we consider ζ and {vOt}t 17 as the general preference for all AWS DCs and
the outside option over Microsoft, with the product characteristics and θ1,1 as given,
the unexplained part of market share ratios should be attributed to that “general
preference”, which gives the identification of θ1,2 = (ζ, α, τ).
Specifically, for ∀j ∈ Ft, we write the AWS fixed effect separately from other
components in the utility index, i.e.






17With a slight abuse of notation, we suppress the subscription i in viOt since the deterministic
utility from the outside option is individual-invariant.
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z1jt = (pricejt, DCAgejt)
µi(lj, z
1
jt,θ1,1) = βpricejt + γmid(li, lj) + ψ1ij{domestic}+ ξDCAgejt
Note that µi is individual-specific due to the consumer’s heterogeneous industry
and location.
Then, within each combination of m and b, the model gives the market share ratio























Here with a little abuse of notation, we use subscript m, b to emphasize that
function µi(·) is the same for consumers from the same industry m and located in bin
b. Also, for Azure consumers, even though li is observed, we lower the granularity to
bin b level in this section just to illustrate the concept.












































Then α and τ are identified by the linear relation vOt = α + τ ln(t).
Finally, given θ1, the model could infer the local market size based on the observed



























where Mt is the market size in period t.
3.5 Monte Carlo Experiment
To test the model’s identification, we performed a Monte Carlo experiment. It is
important to assess whether the model’s parameters are recoverable with only de-
tailed Azure data because Azure had only a 7% market share over our sample. Ac-
cordingly, the basic structure of the simulated data sets used in the Monte Carlo
borrows from the true data in two ways.18 First, the number of consumers in each
industry-state/province is generated based on the distribution (e.g., {qmbt}m,b,t) that
we recover from estimation. Second, the taste parameters that we use to generate
each consumer’s DC choices are the same as the estimates from the actual data.
18Of course, the DC layout as well as their prices are also consistent with our observed data in
each period.
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The main variation across these simulated data sets are the idiosyncratic random
utility shocks εijt. We simulated 100 data sets. For each data set, we let each consumer
chooses the DC that gives the highest utility. We then keep the individual choices of
Azure customers while aggregating AWS customers and those who choose the outside
option up to market shares at period level. With the spatial distribution of consumers
masked so that they must be estimated as when we estimate the model with our actual
data, we estimate each simulated data set with the EM-algorithm described above.
The results of the Monte Carlo are shown in Appendix Table C.1. The model per-
forms reasonably well. For all 18 parameters except one the true simulated parameter
is within the 95% confidence interval of the parameters estimated from the simulated
data. The one parameter that is outside of the 95% confidence interval is the indicator
variable for a DC being domestic. The domestic indicator is only marginally outside
the confidence interval (CI): true value 1.58 and 95% CI of [1.415,1.516]. Thus, there
is some evidence we estimate a domestic indicator that makes cloud customers look
slightly less interested (less than 10%) in deploying their VM in country.
That the coefficient on the domestic indicator variable is somewhat imprecise
is not surprising given the nature of our data. It is identified almost entirely by
Canadian customers choosing to deploy VMs in the Canadian Azure DCs after they
open halfway through 2016. However, the number of unique Canadian firms in our
sample is an order of magnitude lower than the number of U.S. firms in the sample.
As a result, the indicator variable is likely to be measured imprecisely and, perhaps,
modestly downward biased. The downward bias could be due in part to the domestic
preference loading onto the estimated distance preference for Canadian customers.
That said, the Monte Carlo shows the true value of the distance coefficient (γ for
unknown industries) is exactly in the center of the 95% CI.
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3.6 Estimation Results
Table 3.3 shows results from estimating the model with the data. We performed esti-
mation in R and convergence times on a single PC were on the order of 10 hours. We
do not report the number of observations so as to not reveal information on the num-
ber of unique customers for this Azure SKU over our sample, per the confidentiality
agreement with Microsoft.
Table 3.3 shows that all parameters are precisely estimated and have the expected
sign. The price coefficient is negative. The coefficients on DC age, the domestic
indicator, AWS fixed effect, outside option (OO) fixed effects are all positive. The
positive AWS and OO fixed effects reflect market share sizes over the sample (e.g.,




Discrete Manufacturing −1.439∗∗∗ 0.012
Education −1.439∗∗∗ 0.013
Health −1.430∗∗∗ 0.015
Hospitality & Transportation −1.439∗∗∗ 0.013
Insurance −1.439∗∗∗ 0.014
Media / Telecom and Utilities −1.750∗∗∗ 0.015
Nonprofit −1.442∗∗∗ 0.016




DC Age 0.905∗∗∗ 0.026
AWS FE 2.162∗∗∗ 0.017
OO FE 1.461∗∗∗ 0.009
OO trend 2.295∗∗∗ 0.001
Note: All parameters statistically significant. All coefficients have expected sign with
distance and price both negative and highly significant. The model includes AWS and OO
fixed effects in the first and seventh month of our data where there was some backfilled
reporting from previous months due to a Microsoft reporting delays. Those coefficients
are statistically significant and an order of magnitude lower than AWS and OO FEs; we
consider them as nuisance parameters therefore do not report them here. We normalized
DC age so that DC age is measured with respect to the oldest DC in the sample.
19The model includes AWS and OO fixed effects in the first and seventh month of our data where
there was some backfilled reporting from previous months due to a Microsoft reporting delays. Those
coefficients are statistically significant and an order of magnitude lower than AWS and OO FEs; we
don’t report them as consider them nuisance parameters. Due to this reporting issue in the timing
of some of the Azure data, we don’t put much stock in the sign of the coefficient on the logarithmic
time trend of the outside good.
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The key coefficient of interest is the coefficient on distance where we take the base-
line to be preference for distance in unknown industries. The coefficient is negative
and highly significant. Coefficients for other industries don’t exhibit much variation
and are roughly twice the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of distance for ob-
servations without a recorded industry. Thus, there is first order correlation between
observing industry and preference for proximity. As mentioned above, based upon
internal conversations it could be that observing industry is correlated with using a
vendor to operate cloud resources. Because we don’t fully observe the data generat-
ing process for that field in the data, we instead focus on cloud users with unknown
industries, which make up the vast majority of the sample.
It is more informative to evaluate the ratio of the coefficient on distance to the
coefficient on price rather than each coefficient in isolation. The ratio of distance to
price is the willingness to pay for one kilometer. Hence, the willingness to pay to
be 1,000 kilometers closer to a data center in our sample is 4.2 cents (per hour) for
unknown industries (the majority of the sample). Recall that the average price over
the sample for Azure’s basic A1 product is 7.1 cents (per hour). Hence we estimate
a price premium of roughly 60% of the average Azure hourly price. As a point of
comparison DC level prices often varied by 20-50% within a public cloud provider
over our sample. Hence, the implied point estimate for unknown industries seems
modestly large but not out of the question where are the point estimate for cloud
users that reported their industry seems larger than we expect. For customers in
known industries, the estimated disutility of distance is stronger but, as mentioned
above, we don’t view those point estimates as reliable due to how industry data is
recorded in our sample: many of those customers go through a third party to deploy
their workloads.
There are two important caveats worth noting relating the negative and significant
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impact of distance on utility. First, the positive coefficient on DC age reflects that
old DCs tend attract more deployments than newer DCs all else being equal. This
could reflect some amount of inertia: as a customer deploys a new type of VM they
are likely to put it in the same DC as where they might have older deployments. If
so, this would reduce the likelihood of finding a strong negative utility for distance:
identification of the distance parameter is driven by new DCs opening and evaluating
how many customers proximate to its location start deploying workloads there. If
older DCs have a stronger attraction, the likelihood of deploying in a new, proximate
DC would be lower.
Second, the coefficient on domestic is strong and positive. We believe this could
cause some modest downward bias (e.g., more negative) in the distance parameter so
that we estimate a stronger dis-utility of distance than the true effect. The reason
is that Azure opened two data centers in Canada which are both more proximate
to many Canadians and also domestic. Hence, some preference for deploying in
a domestic DC could be loaded on to the distance parameter. That said, there
is significant variation in proximity for nearby but not domestic data centers for
Canadians since the Canadian DCs are located in or east of Ontario. Thus, when
Canadian DCs are opened halfway through our sample, cloud users in Vancouver,
British Columbia can choose between a nearby DC in Washington state that is not
domestic and a far away Canadian DC that is domestic. Therefore, any downward
bias on the distance parameter is likely modest.
It is somewhat surprising that the data doesn’t show any modest variation at the
industry level. 2016 was still the early days of cloud usage. Some industries like
health and education could have been later adopters and are now displaying similar
distance preferences as discrete manufacturing and professional services did over our
sample. For example, it might have been that more sophisticated cloud users display
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Figure 3·6: AWS vs Azure Market Share Distribution
Note: Market share distributions show material variation over states and provinces.
Although not clear from this figure, it should be unsurprising that market shares also
compliment each other: where AWS has a larger share Azure tends to have smaller share
and vice versa.
weaker preferences for proximity meaning that we estimate a “short run” effect in
this paper. As noted above, though, it is possible that observing industry is really
a proxy for using a third party to deploy and manage virtual machines. As a result,
any underlying differences in preference for proximity could be second order to using
third parties for IT management.
Figure 3·6 takes the estimates and aggregates consumers from all industries in
a “bin” (e.g., U.S. state or Canadian province) to display heterogeneity in market
shares over space for Azure and AWS. Figure 3·6 gives the densities of each firm’s
estimated market shares. The scale of the market share distribution on the left (AWS)
is higher than that of the distribution on the right (Azure) but both are market shares
accounting for the outside good. Hence a “bin” with 10% share for AWS and 2% share
for Azure implies an 88% share for the outside good where the outside good is the
number of firms with more than 50 employees in the geography.
The important aspect of Figure 3·6 is the non-trivial heterogeneity in market
share across locations. Both firms exhibit bimodal market shares over space: they
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Figure 3·7: Microsoft vs AWS Market Share by Market Size
Note: Consistent with Figure 6, market shares vary across states. This is true for both
large and small states where Azure market share can range from up to 19% of AWS
market share down to less than 10%. Recall this figure does not report market share of
the outside option nor other cloud providers so it is not directly comparable to Figure 1.
have some regions above the firm-specific mean market share and some regions below,
and the distribution is not single-peaked. Even though AWS was the market leader
during 2016, there are some areas where Azure has a market share in the low single
digit percents and some nearly 20% of AWS’s share.
Microsoft had more data centers than AWS during this time period, possibly
earning higher market share in the regions where AWS did not have a data center.
This finding is consistent with cloud customers having preferences for proximity in
our sample. It is also consistent with competition being important for welfare in this
market insofar as competition leads to more DCs being built in different locations.
While Figure 3·6 shows estimated aggregate variation in market share within
firms over space, Figure 3·7 shows estimated variation in market share across Azure
(blue) and AWS (orange) at the state/province level. We only select six regions for
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clarity and don’t report precise locations associated with each state/province per our
data sharing agreement. We instead show variation in the minimum, median and
maximum Azure market share across markets sized below the median (bottom-sized
markets) and those sized above (top-sized markets). Note that Figure 3·7 represents
a relatively small level of aggregate market penetration relative to the outside option
for both AWS and Azure which highlights that the cloud computing industry is still
young and rapidly growing.
Figure 3·7 shows that we estimate changes in market share across regions of more
than 100% for relatively small markets (8% to 18%) and roughly 100% for relatively
large markets (10% to 19%). The model estimates a right tail as well: median Azure
market share was slight less than half of the difference between the minimum and
maximum market share. Qualitatively, we do estimate relatively larger market shares
in some states where Azure has a DC but AWS does not, and vice versa. Finally, these
market shares are from 2016 data and since then Azure has grown in market share.
Thus these numbers do not reflect current market shares nor do they necessarily
represent what would happen if new DCs were built today since more DCs have been
constructed between 2016 and 2020.
3.7 Counterfactuals
With the estimated taste parameters, we move on to counterfactual analysis. The
strength of this modeling approach is the ability to estimate heterogeneous market
shares over space using disaggregate data for one firm but aggregate data for another.
Our counterfactuals focus on using the model to optimize data center location and
examine the interplay of price competition and spatial competition in the cloud in-
dustry. All the data used in counterfactual analysis is the December 2016 data so
that the counterfactuals reflect the most recent view of the data we observe.
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First, we propose six states in southern U.S. where Microsoft currently has no
DC, and ask which one would bring the most market share increase if Microsoft put
one more DC there. These examples are chosen for their relevance. Microsoft Azure
introduced four new DCs in North America in 2016 which increased its total number
to ten, twice that of AWS. Therefore, it is reasonable to quantify the impact of a
denser product space.
Second, we condition on the current DC layout in North America, and predict the
market share responses to a counterfactual 15% price change for all Azure DCs. We
then investigate how counterfactual changes in market shares vary based upon how
vigorous spatial competition is. Put another way, we simulate a price decrease and
evaluate how it impacts market shares in locations where both Azure and AWS have
a DC, where only Azure has a DC and where neither Azure nor AWS have a DC.
Lastly, while we calculate changes in consumer surplus, fully capturing strategic
supply side equilibrium responses is beyond the scope of these exercises. Neither
AWS nor Azure alters DC layout or adjust prices of existing DCs in response to our
counterfactual exercises. Accounting for equilibrium competition best responses is
beyond the scope of our paper as our contribution highlights spatial competition for
cloud computing rather than equilibrium competitive behavior.
3.7.1 New DC Location
The six proposed states for which we simulate Azure building a DC are spread evenly
in southern U.S. where there was no DC in 2016 from Arizona to Florida. We assume
the price for the newly constructed DC is set at the average Azure price level in
December 2016 so that the different demand responses could be attributed to the
differences in local market size and DC layout. All changes in Azure market share
are normalized to changes from introducing a DC in Arizona, which Azure actually
did enter in 2018. We decompose increases in market share by the “market stealing”
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Figure 3·8: Introducing a New DC
Note: Figure reports the change in Azure market share from new customers in the
counterfactual where Azure builds a new DC in one of six states. The increase in
market share is reported relative to the percentage change in market share of a new
DC introduced in Arizona. The Figure also reports where the increase in Azure market
share comes from: the outside option over AWS. The southeast U.S. seem to indicate
the largest percentage increase in share for AWS due in part due to a relatively large
increase in share from acquired from AWS.
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effect of taking share from AWS and the cloud “market growing” effect of moving
customers off their own premise and onto the cloud.
Figure 3·8 shows the results from the new DC counterfactual measured in per-
centage increase in market share relative to Arizona. There are a couple of important
findings. First, it shows that introducing a new DC in Missouri generates highest
market share gains for Microsoft Azure, which is around 25% higher than the “nu-
meraire” state of Arizona. This result is consistent with estimation results since
during this time period the DC density in Missouri is comparatively lower than the
others. Therefore, a newly-introduced DC would provide greater utility increase rel-
ative to the outside good and AWS by reducing distance.20
It is useful to put the 25% number into perspective of the overall costs of running
a DC to assess whether something like differences in wholesale electricity costs could
drive location decisions. According to a report from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
roughly annual operating expenses are less than 10% of the capital costs of a data
center and roughly 50-75% of operating expenses are electricity.21 Hence electricity
is on the order of 5-7.5% of annualized amortized DC costs. According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, in 2016 average wholesale electricity prices in low
cost Texas were $27.16/MWh versus $34.54 in high cost PJM for a 25% difference22
The implication is that electricity cost differences on the order of 2% of annualized
costs could explain DC location decisions that results in a 25% difference in market
share changes. This seems unlikely.
Second, there is some modest variation in the size of the “market stealing” versus
the “market growing”. Building a DC in Georgia, Missouri and Arkansas leads to
20Of course, because we measure changes in within state market shares this says nothing of the





a larger market share increase than Arizona, Florida and New Mexico. In Georgia,
Missouri and Arkansas there is a larger proportional increase in the “market steal-
ing” versus the “market growing” effect driving the increase in market share. The
implication is that appropriately siting DCs can lead to increased local market shares
driven disproportionately by the market stealing effect. It is perhaps for this reason
that all public cloud providers have dramatically increased their geographical foot-
print in the last five years, all roughly doubling the number of unique DC locations
globally. This clearly is beneficial to consumers who, based on our estimates, appear
to non-trivially value proximity. However, this strategic effect seems second order to
the market growing effect based upon our sample.
Finally, we calculate the consumer surplus gain generated by a new Azure DCs.
We define consumer surplus as the expected maximum money metric utility for new
customers registered in Dec 2016, i.e. t = T . Put another way, we don’t account
for gains to existing customers since we only model the initial deployment decision.
Because we don’t account for the differences in usage intensity among consumers,
consumer surplus estimates measured in dollars should be thought of as gains in the
first hour of a single deployment of a one core VM. Since the lifespan of a VM is often
many cores and many hours, the level of the surplus gains reported here are extreme
lower bounds and as such we focus on percentage changes across counterfactuals.
Specifically, for cloud users in industry m at location b at time T ,











(exp(umbjT ))) + C
The subscripts m and b emphasize that utility depends on the hetergeneous cloud
user industry m and location b. C is a constant term which is negligible when calcu-
lating the surplus differences.
The expectation value is defined relative the set of available data centers (FT )
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plus the outside option whose utility is normalized to 0. Thus when a new Azure
DC j′ opens, there will be one more element in the choice set thus makes the joint
set FT ∪ j′, and the exception is supposed to increase since maximization function
weakly increases with the number of choices. The strength of this approach is com-
paring by how much consumer surplus increases when DCs are placed in better versus
worse locations. Finally, we aggregate this individual level expectation to the North




E(CSmbT )qmbT ×MT ,
where MT is the market size, i.e. the total number of firms with 50 or more
employees in North America. As in the exercise above we compare the percentage
increase in consumer surplus to a single baseline state, Arizona.
Table 3.4: Consumer surplus effects of new DC locations (AZ baseline)
Location Arizona Arkansas Florida Georgia Missouri New Mexico
% ∆E(CST ) 100% 117.9% 98.9% 119.6% 124.1% 103.1%
The consumer surplus effect of each new DC location are summarized in the Table
3.4. Table 3.4 shows that percentage changes in consumer surplus by state are almost
identical to changes in market share for Azure. This is not surprising: increases in
market share indicate increases in consumer surplus as more cloud users begin to
consume Azure.
3.7.2 Price Drop
Figure 3·9 provides demand responses to an overall 15% price drop of Microsoft Azure
across all regions. We show results of the price impact in three representative U.S.
states with different market structures: both a AWS and Azure DC (Virginia), neither
a AWS nor an Azure DC (Georgia) or only an Azure DC (Texas). Each bar shows
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Figure 3·9: Price Competiton
Note: Figure reports the change in Azure market share from new customers in the
counterfactual where Azure decreases the price of all Azure DCs by 15%. The increase
in market share is reported relative to the percentage change in market share in Georgia.
The Figure highlights that increases in market share from the price drop will vary based
upon how much spatial competition there is in region. For example, both AWS and
Azure have DCs in Virginia and we observe larger market share changes there due to a
price decrease.
the percentage of switchers from AWS to Azure. All market share changes are pegged
to Georgia in this counterfactual.
Figure 3·9 shows that the incremental change in market share varies by local mar-
ket structure. Intuitively, in areas where both AWS and Microsoft DCs are available
like Virginia, we estimate that price plays a relatively more important competitive
role and that price cuts have a significant impact on market shares. On the contrary,
the potential gain is less pronounced in states like Texas where Microsoft is the only
cloud provider. In other words, the loss from a price rise would also be limited, a
straightforward implication of local market power.
Another implication from this counterfactual is the amount of switchers across
AWS and Azure are generally small in all three scenarios of price competition. Recall
that during this time period AWS was both the early market leader and much larger
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in publicly reported revenue numbers. Put another way, this doesn’t appear to be a
Bertrand, winner take all market. This is consistent with AWS’s early leadership in
the cloud market but also spatial competition as being a material driver of increase
Azure market share over this sample. It contradicts the idea of fully location agnos-
tic demand in the cloud computing industry and the internet being the “death of
distance”.
3.7.3 Counterfactual Comparison
We calculate changes in consumer surplus effect in the same way for the price drop
counterfactual as for the new DC location counterfactual. Thus we can compare the
change in consumer surplus from building a single new DC and compare it to the
change in consumer surplus from a 15% price decrease from all Azure DCs. This
serves as a sanity check for our estimates and the counterfactuals built upon them.
We find that the increase in consumer surplus from building a new DC in the six
states from our counterfactual was 77% of the increase in consumer surplus from a
15% across the board price decrease. Recall that the 15% price decrease impacts all
new customers in North America in a single month (the entire set of new customers in
a month) whereas the new DC will cause a change in behavior of only a fraction of the
monthly extensive margin (e.g., just the customers induced to move to Azure based
upon the new DC). Assessing orders of magnitude, this makes sense at a high level:
assume roughly 10% of total new customers deploy in the new DC in any given month
(i.e., there were 10 Azure DCs at the end of the sample) those customers have a large
reduction in distance between the previously closest DC and the new proximate one.
Recalling that the implied willingness to pay for 1000kms (∼600 miles) in proximity
was 60% of the average price of Azure, those 10% of new cloud customers’ benefit
implies an average decrease in distance of roughly 750 miles, which seems plausible
since not every Azure customer deploys in the closest DC (see Figures 4 and 5 above).
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There is another intuitive way to perform a back of the envelope calculation:
all customers receiving a 15% price decrease in the price counterfactual have a 15%
increase in their customer surplus to a first order approximation. Alternatively, in
the new DC counterfactual, only those customers deploying in the new DC have their
consumer surplus are impacted by it. There were 10 DCs at the end of our sample
so roughly 10% of customers benefit from a new DC. Recall that aggregate consumer
surplus from the new DC is 75% of the welfare increase from a 15% price decrease
for all newly deploying customers. Hence, for customers deploying in the new DC in
our counterfactual, we must observe an increase in consumer surplus of (.15/.1)*.75
= 112.5%.23 This is again plausible: a new proximate DC could be worth roughly
twice as much to cloud users as distant DC based on our parameter estimates.
Given the staggering growth in cloud adoption in the last five years by firms, it is
hard to imagine latency concerns being the sole driver of this barrier. For example,
the distance decrease of a customer in Atlanta, Georgia to the nearest Azure DC
at the time of our study was around 600 miles, or about 6 milliseconds of latency.
While we cannot rule out latency as a driver with our data, these results indicate
the presence of a secular preference for proximity consistent with “server hugging”.
If preference based server hugging does explain this result, our evidence suggests an
alternative preference based rationale for why the internet may not lead to the “death
of distance” in the case of cloud computing.
3.8 Conclusion
We find that cloud compute customers care about proximity to a surprising degree
even within the US where latency difference across data centers are often separated in
the single digit milliseconds. Our result is consistent with a growing body of work that
23If N are the total number of cloud customers then .1∗N∗∆CSnewDC = .75∗N∆CSPriceChange =
.75 ∗N ∗ .15 and solve for ∆CSnewDC .
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finds that the internet has not in fact been the “death of distance” although we can’t
fully rule out strong preferences for reduced latency with our data. Because customers
do care about distance, vigorous spatial competition of public cloud providers like
AWS, Azure, GCP and Alibaba in the quickly maturing cloud market are likely to
benefit cloud users a great deal and more quickly move firms from wholly owned
on-premise servers to remote rented cloud based compute resources. The number of
data centers of each cloud provider has roughly doubled in the past five years.
While we do not model an equilibrium entry decision in this paper, there is clear
room to expand this line of research in that dimension. Such work could have partic-
ular importance given that cloud computing resources lower barriers to entry of new
firms and therein enable more productivity from the global labor force. Such models
could be used by policy makers to encourage more competition in industries where
spatial competition is important and enables aggregate productivity of the economy.
Our methodology could also be useful to other economists. We estimate our
demand system when the dataset contains disaggregate consumer level choice data
of one firm and aggregate market share data of another. We show that both the
taste parameters and a discrete distribution of unobserved consumer attributes can
be recovered with EM algorithm under the framework of mixed logit. It enables the
identification of demand parameters up to brand level fixed effects which could be
further pinned down by the observed market shares. Given demand parameters, the
consumer spatial distribution, i.e. the local market sizes, is identified by the inverse
of model-predicted local Microsoft market share. A Monte Carlo exercise supports
identification.
Finally, our data is from 2016 which are the early days of the cloud computing
industry. In 2016 and even in 2020 cloud revenue is growing rapidly. Cloud computing
is not a product in long run equilibrium and preferences for cloud attributes are likely
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to change as cloud users learn and experiment with cloud resources. Hence, our results
might not be externally valid in a fully mature cloud computing market.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Market size
Using the subsample of served markets, I regress the number of upscale hotel rooms
(monthly) on population/m2, number of employees and median income level. They
are from or constructed using the following variables in the ACS.
Population/m2: B01003 Total Population gives the population in each census
tract. The U.S. Gazetteer files, also from the Census Bureau, provides the area
measure of each census. With these two variables, I calculate Population/m2, which
is effectively the population density.
Number of employees: C24050 Industry by Occupation for the civilian em-
ployed population 16 years and over. In particular, I use the category Arts entertain-
ment and recreation and accommodation and food services, which is the finest one
that is related to the lodging industry.
Median income level: B19013: Median Household Income.
The U.S. Gazetteer files also have the representative latitude and longitude coor-
dinates of each census tract, which is defined as inner point, with which I calculate
the distance between the neighborhoods and census tracts. For each census tract, I
pick the geographically closest census tract, and consider the demographics of that
census tract as the proxies for the demographics of the neighborhood. I use yearly










Table A.1: OLS regression of market size on demographics
Next, I use these estimates to predict the ”number of upscale hotel rooms” of
the potential markets. Then I divide this number by the ratio of hotel rooms to all
lodging rooms in the corresponding year for all markets, and consider the results as
the market size. These ratios are nation-wide. Its original source is Second Measure,
and I found them in an article by Rani Molla published on vox.com.1 Except for
hotels room, other lodging options include Airbnb and HomeAway.
A.2 Estimation procedure
A.2.1 Estimation
Evaluate the objective function at a given θ
1. To calculate empirical probability P̂ r(xum ≤ tx,wum ≤ tw, zu(ym)|Om ∈ Og; θ),
(a) Pick thresholds (tx, tw). Specifically, I use the median and maximum
of each unobserved shock’s empirical distribution. For example, txj =
{tx,1j , t
x,2
j } = {median(xujm),max(xujm)} is a two-component sequence. These
thresholds will group (xum,w
u
m) into difference cells. Consider a simpler















2m ∈ (−∞, t
w,1
j ]. I denote each cell of the grid by O
g;
(b) Categorize each market m into a grid Og based on Om;
1https://www.vox.com/2019/3/25/18276296/airbnb-hotels-hilton-marriott-us-spending
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the market share function Eq.(1.3) and the pricing rule Eq.(1.4), i.e., for
∀j,m such that yjm = 1,
xujm = ln(sjm)− ln(s0m)− xo
′
jmβ − α









m ≤ tx,wum ≤ tw,ym,Om ∈ Og; θ]∑
m 1[Om ∈ Og]
2. Simulate the probability bounds LB(xum ≤ tx,wum ≤ tw, zu(ym)|Om ∈ Og; θ)
and UB(xum ≤ tx,wum ≤ tw, zu(ym)|Om ∈ Og; θ)
(a) take RS = 100 random draws from a bi-variate standard normal N(0, I2)
where I2 is a 2 × 2 identity matrix, multiply each draw by Ω1:2,1:2 and




(b) For each market m ,





the following market structures for each bound:
A. upper bound: ym and ym + 1
j;
B. lower bound: 1 and 1j .
ii. calculate the mean Ω1:2,3Ω
−1
3,3 and the variance Ω1:2,1:2−Ω1:2,3Ω−13,3Ω3,1:2










Φ̃(πj(1)− zojmδ)yjm (1− Φ̃(πj(1j)− zojmδ))1−yjm
)
1[xu,rm ≤ tx,wu,rm ≤ tw,Om; θ]
R
2Ωa:b,c:d is the subset of Ω including a
th−bth rows and cth−dth columns. Given the joint normal









Φ̃(πj(ym)− zojmδ))yjm (1− Φ̃(πj(ym + 1j)− zojmδ)1−yjm
)
1[xu,rm ≤ tx,wu,rm ≤ tw,Om; θ]
R
(c) summarize over all markets





m ≤ tx,wum ≤ tw, zu(ym)|Om; θ)1[Om ≤ Og]∑
m 1[Om ≤ Og]





m ≤ tx,wum ≤ tw, zu(ym)|Om; θ)1[Om ≤ Og]∑
m 1[Om ≤ Og]
3. calculate the objective function in Eq.(1.10).
Search for θ that minimizes the objective function I follow the MCMC pro-
cedure in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) to search for the θ that minimizes the
objective function. Notably, moment inequality estimation may result in a identified
set instead of a point, which is referred as partial identification. So in theory, there
could be multiple θ’s such that Q(θ) = 0, but in practice there could be misspeci-
fication and therefore the objective function may have a unique minimizer or even
minθQ(θ) ≥ 0. Following Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007), I address this
issue in the inference stage. Given this potential for misspecification, finding the op-
timum(s) is not the only goal of this search, I am also looking for candidate values
that should be included in the confidence set. Therefore, I keep track of all the θ’s
that are evaluated during the search. The main steps of this procedure includes
1. Find good start values.
(a) Construct a range for start values using the estimates and standard errors
from the exogenous entry model (Column 2, Table 1.6). For example, the
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estimate for price coefficient α̂ = −0.232, and the standard error is 0.027,
so I consider the interval −0.232± 0.027 as a reasonable range to start the
search.
(b) Take RS = 5000 random draws from the constructed ranges, each denoted
as θr. For the parameters in the fixed cost function, I first infer each firm’s
variable profit πjm using the point estimates in Column2, and then take
logs and run an OLS by regressing πjm on the fixed cost covariates, then
use the estimates and standard errors from the OLS to construct the range.
(c) Evaluate the objective function Q(θ) at each θr, r = 1, 2, ..., 500.
(d) Pick 10 θr’s that gives the least objective function, each denoted as θs, s =
1, 2, ..., 10.
2. Do the search separately for each θs. For each strand of search, I update the
each parameter in θs iterative via a Gibbs-Hastings procedure.
(a) Dropping the subscript for start value s for ease of notation, for each
component in θ, say the price coefficient α, take a draw ψ from the
univariate normal density N(α(j), σ
(j)
α ), where (j) denotes the j -th iter-





(b) Let θ[ψ,α] denote the parameter vector θ with the component α replaced
by ψ, calculate Q(θ
(j)
[ψ,α]).
(c) Update α(j+1) from α(j) using
α(j+1) =

ψ with probability ρ(θ(j), ψ)
α(j) with probability 1− ρ(θ(j), ψ)
where
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With the collection of θ’s given by the MCMC search, I use the methodology of
Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007) to construct the confidence set, same as in
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Ciliberto, Murry and Tamer (2018).
A.3 Identification details
This section closely follows Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Ciliberto, Murry and
Tamer (2018).
In CMT, the point identification of the fixed cost function parameters relies on a
firm heterogeneous covariate that is excluded from the variable profit function and
has a wide range, say zojm ∈ (−∞,+∞). Intuitively, the inter-dependence among
firms’ entry decisions is the main threat to identification. If zojm affects a firm’s entry
decision in a positive way, suppose that in some markets it goes to infinity for ∀j 6= 1,
then yjm = 1,∀j 6= 1 for sure. In that case, the parameters in the entry equation
can be identified by how firm 1’s entry probability varies with each covariates in
these markets. In my fixed cost function, even though rentm is not firm-specific,
there is a fixed effect for each top 3 firm, and estimates indicate that Marriott has a
significant higher average fixed cost. Therefore, if in some low rent markets all firms
would definitely enter except for Marriott, the rent coefficient can be identified by
how Marriott’s entry choices vary with rent across these markets.
Furthermore, when yjm = 1 almost for sure, there will be no selection based on
the demand shock xujm and the marginal cost shock w
u
jm. Therefore the identification
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of the parameters in the price competition stage follows that for a classical demand
system, which requires at least 2×J instruments for both the endogenous prices and
the endogenous market shares (Berry and Haile, 2016). As argued in Section 4.2 of
Ciliberto, Murry and Tamer (2018), the instruments here are similar to the ”BLP
instruments” (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995), only that since the moments are
conditional on the exogenous variables of each potential entrant, I essentially use each
firm’s exogenous variable separately as instruments instead of summing or averaging
them within a market. Notably, all potential entrants, not only the actual incumbents,
are included in the condition, otherwise the instruments themselves would have the
selection problem.
In particular, consider the simultaneous equation system formed by the inverse
market share function and pricing rule

ln(sjm)− ln(s0m) = βNucjm + αpjm + xujm
pjm = mcjm +
1
α(1− sjm)






The pricing rule indicates that pjm is correlated with x
u
jm through the markup,
more specifically through the market share function. In that sense, the excluded
variable in the marginal cost function Nalljm can be a valid instrument, since it alters
price but is not correlated with xujm. Once the demand side is identified, the role
of aff uckm and aff allkm, ∀k 6= j as instruments in identifying the supply side can
been seen by first recalling that the sjm is a function of the utility indices of all firms
3,
therefore aff uckm, ∀k 6= j shifts sjm directly and aff allkm, ∀k 6= j does it through
pkm, ∀k 6= j. However, it is unlikely that firm j’s unobserved marginal cost shock in
neighborhood m, wujm, would be correlated with the scale of firm k’s loyalty program
in the entire MSA.
3Non-entrants’ exogenous variables affect sjm by determining the identities of the actual incum-
bents.
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The identification theorems in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Ciliberto, Murry
and Tamer (2018) are required for point identification. Since the inference method
I use is robust to partial identification, slight looseness in the condition that the
exogenous variables have infinite ranges is not catastrophic.
A.4 Simulation
I use simulation to show that compared to using unique equilibrium lower bound,
using DSE lower bound can dramatically reduce the computation time and at the same
time keep the confidence interval similarly tight. The model I use in this simulation
exercise follows the structure of the two-player example in Section 1.4.1. I generalize
it so that more players are involved, and impose a distributional assumption on the
cost shock to facilitate simulation. Specifically,
yjm = 1[α−
∑
k βkmykm − ckm ≥ 0]
cjm ∼ U [0, 1], i.i.d ∀j,m.
Similar to the model in Section 1.3, j, k = 1, 2, ..., J is the index for firms, and
m = 1, 2, ...,M indicates markets. For each J , I estimate the model using the DSE
lower bound (DSE hereafter) and the unique equilibrium. In particular, since there
is no structural price competition stage, the estimation using the unique equilibrium
follows the procedure in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). Thus I refer it as CT hereafter.
I compare the performance of DS and CT for J = 2, 3, ..., 10. Throughout all
J ’s, I specify the true parameter values α = 0.75, βj = 0.75/J . And I simulate
M = 10, 000 markets for each J The objective function is the same as Eq.(1.10), and
the probability bounds are constructed as follows.
DS In this simple example, the upper bound has a closed-form formula, so does
the lower bound when it is based on the DS. Specifically,
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Table A.2: Computation Time Comparison - 95% Confidence Set
Number of firms 2 3 4 5
α = 0.75
CT [2009] [0.748, 0.759] [0.749, 0.764] [0.735, 0.804] [0.750, 0.786]
DS [0.747, 0.753] [0.747, 0.755] [0.739, 0.762] [0.726, 0.772]
β1 = 0.375 0.25 0.1875 0.15
CT [2009] [0.328, 0.468] [0.220, 0.284] [0.164, 0.235] [0.149, 0.182]
DS [0.337, 0.438] [0.231, 0.285] [0.166, 0.240] [0.120, 0.178]
Computation time
CT [2009] 5.08 hrs 12.13 hrs 21.78 hrs 55.46 hrs
DS 0.61 mins 1.29 mins 3.59 mins 7.85 mins
















CT When using the unique equilibrium lower bound, there is no closed-form. So
following Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), I use Monte Carlo simulation to approximate
both of the probability bounds.4. The estimation procedure has been briefly discussed
in the two-player example in Section 1.4.1, for more details, the interested readers are
referred to the supplementary materials of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). In particular,
I let RS = 10, 000.
The rest of the procedure is essentially the same as described in Appendix A.2.
A slight difference is that I use the R-package GenSA (Yang Xiang et al. (2013))
to search for the optimum θ, therefore the search algorithm is simulated annealing
instead of MCMC.
The results are shown in Table A.2. All the jobs were run on 4-core CPU’s, and
parallel computation is used whenever applicable.
4Note that even though the upper bound has a closed-form, it is more convenient to use simu-
lation in practice because the equilibrium ym has been solved for the lower bound anyways.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
(1) Given that θ(k+1) = argmax θ S(θ;θ
(k)) and by definition of minorization for
maximization,
L(θ(k+1)) ≥ S(θ(k+1);θ(k)) ≥ S(θ(k);θ(k)) = L(θ(k)) (B.1)
Because L(θ) is a log likelihood function, we have that L(θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ. Then the
fact that L(θ(k)) is an increasing sequence bounded above implies its convergence to
some L∗ ≤ 0. Hence for any δ > 0, there exists a p(δ) such that for all p ≥ p(δ) and
all r ≥ 1,
r∑
s=1
{L(θ(p+s))− L(θ(p+s−1))} = L(θ(p+r))− L(θ(p)) < δ (B.2)
From Eq.(B.1), we have
S(θ(p+s);θ(p+s−1))− S(θ(p+s−1);θ(p+s−1)) ≤ L(θ(p+s))− L(θ(p+s−1)), ∀s ≥ 1, (B.3)
and by Taylor expansion,
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S(θ(p+s);θ(p+s−1))− S(θ(p+s−1);θ(p+s−1))
= −(θ(p+s−1) − θ(p+s))′∇10S(θ(p+s);θ(p+s−1))
−(θ(p+s−1) − θ(p+s))′∇20S(θ(p+s)0 ;θ(p+s−1))(θ(p+s−1) − θ(p+s))




0 is some point on the line segment joining θ
(p+s−1) and θ(p+s). The
second equality holds because∇10S(θ(p+s);θ(p+s−1)) = 0 is the necessary condition for
θ(p+s) = argmax θ S(θ;θ
(p+s−1)) given that S(θ;θ′) is twice differentiable by definition.
Furthermore, Definition 1 (2) indicates that ∇20S(θ(p+s)0 ;θ(p+s−1)) is negative def-
inite, i.e.. −∇20S(θ(p+s)0 ;θ(p+s−1)) is positive definite. Therefore, let I be an identity




λI is positive definite.
Then Eq.(B.4) can be rewritten as
S(θ(p+s);θ(p+s−1))−S(θ(p+s−1);θ(p+s−1)) > λ(θ(p+s−1)−θ(p+s))′(θ(p+s−1)−θ(p+s)),∀s ≥ 1
(B.5)











for all p ≥ p(δ) and all r ≥ 1, which proves θ(k) converges to some θ∗ in the
closure of Ω.
(2) Since θ(k), k = 0, 1, 2, ... converges to θ∗,
θ∗ = argmax S(θ,θ∗)
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Then by Corollary 1,
L(θ∗) = ∇10S(θ∗;θ∗) = 0
Similarly, ∇20S(θ∗;θ∗) is negative definite. Q.E.D
B.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We show that S(θ;θ(k)) is a minorization of L(θ(k)) at θ(k) for maximization by
checking the three requirements in Definition 1.
(1) S(θ;θ(k)) ≤ L(θ(k))
We start from a representative consumer i. Recall that φit = xitβ + ξiq(t). Then,


















−pijk(1− pikt), j = k
pijtpikt, j 6= k
The Taylor expansion of log l(φit) at φ̃it is ,





































−p1(1− p1) p1p2 ... p1pJ




pJp1 p1p2 ... −pJ(1− pJ)
 ,
(B.8)
we have ∇2 log l(φ∗it;yit) ≥ −I, i.e. ∇2 log l(φ∗it;yit) + I is semi-positive definite
matrix.
Therefore,
log l(φit;yit) ≥ log l(φ̃it;yit) + (φit − φ̃it)′∇ log l(φ̃it;yit)−
1
2
(φit − φ̃it)′(φit − φ̃it)



















(φ̃ijt − hj(φ̃it;yit)− φijt)2
(B.9)
Recall that l(φit;yit) is the individual log-likelihood, the log-likelihood function is




iq(t) respectively. It gives
















iq(t);yit)− xitβ − ξiq(t))
2
(B.10)
where the RHS of the above inequality as S(θ;θ(k)).




















































(3) r20S(✓;✓(k)) exists, and r20S(✓(k+1);✓(k)) is negative definite
To ease notation, we consider ⇠
iq(t)
as coe cients on indicator variables, combine
these indicator variables with xit and denote the combined vector as zijt. Then by
the definition of S(✓;✓(k)) in Eq.(B.10),
r20S(✓;✓(k)) =  2Z 0Z, 8✓
where Z is the matrix with zijt, 8i, j, t stacked by rows.
Q.E.D
B.2 Computing Standard Errors
We rewrite the likelihood function as l(xit  + ⇠iq(i,t);yit) = l( it(✓);yit). For each




























is a J ⇥ (J + J ⇥ I ⇥Q) matrix.
Let diag
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while the other elements are zero because ξhq(h,t) is not in l(φit(θ);yit) if h 6= i.
Therefore, Equation B.11 can be rewritten as:








it, 0, · · · , 0 Hφitxit 0, · · · , 0









0 0, · · · , 0 0 0, · · · , 0
Hφitxit 0, · · · , 0 Hφit 0, · · · , 0









0 0, · · · , 0 0 0, · · · , 0

where Hφit is as defined in Eq.(B.8)









Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Detailed treatment of the EM algorithm
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it (θ1)f(li|θ2))dli with hAli,t(θ) as given.
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Bayesian posterior probabilities that an AWS customer or a non-cloud user is lo-












Equation (3.8) can be maximized iteratively: starting from some initial values θs,

























θs+1 = argmaxθ ε(θ|θs)
(C.3)
Furthermore, due to the property of log operation, θ1 and θ2 can be separately










































C.1.2 A Discrete Spatial Distribution
Instead of assuming a parametric distribution for f(li|θ2), we assume a discrete spatial
distribution of consumer locations, so in theory it can approximate any arbitrary
distribution when the discretization is fine enough. Specifically, we take each U.S.
state and Canadian province as a bin B, and then the probability that a consumer
(including non-cloud users) belongs to a certain bin b in period t is qbt, and these qbt’s


































The third equation holds because these Microsoft customers must choose one of the Microsoft
DCs. And QMt is the demand for Microsoft in period t, and q
M
bt is the spatial distribution specific
for Microsoft consumers. Therefore QMt q
M
bt is the number of Microsoft customers in bin Bb, which







































































Intuitively, ε1(θ1|θs) can be considered as a variant of an ordinary multinomial
logit model: since AWS customers in bin b share the same log likelihood logPAbt (θ1),
it is multiplied by QAt h
A
bt(θ
s), the “posterior” number of AWS customers in bin b.
Parallely, logPObt (θ1) is multiplied by the “posterior” number of people who choose
the outside option, QOt h
O
bt(θ
s). Therefore, we are essentially matching the predicted
choice probabilities, or say market shares, with the “observed” ones given by θs.

















it can be interpreted as pairing each qbt with the “observed” total probability that






















t is used to denote the market size in period t. This
closed-form solution would significantly ease the computation.
Henceforth, we repeat the procedure in Eq.(C.3) until parameters converge.
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C.2 Monte Carlo Results
Table C.1: Monte Carlo Experiment
Mean Median 95%
True value absolute error absolute error confidence interval
Panel A: Taste Parameters
γ (Distance in 1000km)
Discrete Manufacturing −0.920 0.028 0.023 [−0.985, −0.872]
Education −1.920 0.065 0.054 [−2.082, −1.783]
Health −1.593 0.049 0.036 [−1.752, −1.523]
Hospitality & Transportation −2.265 0.073 0.059 [−2.480, −2.148]
Insurance −4.550 0.120 0.083 [−4.758, −4.184]
Media / Telecome and Utilities −1.749 0.053 0.038 [−1.887, −1.621]
Nonprofit −4.438 0.133 0.106 [−4.475, −4.084]
Professional Services −0.709 0.016 0.014 [−0.751, −0.675]
Unknwon −0.490 0.011 0.008 [−0.522, −0.466]
β −0.018 0.039 0.039 [−0.216, −0.090]
ψ 1.584 0.086 0.086 [1.415, 1.561]
ξ 1.068 0.044 0.036 [0.950,1.123]
ζ 2.229 0.037 0.035 [2.194, 2.328]
ζ7 −0.001 0.001 0.003 [−0.001, −0.001]
α 6.327 0.074 0.064 [6.127, 6.458]
α7 −0.897 0.012 0.010 [−0.912, −0.866]
τ 0.221 0.005 0.005 [0.199, 0.222]
Panel B: Consumer Spatial Distribution Parameters
Std Err. qmbt 4.342× 10−3 1.4870× 10−5 1.5021× 10−5 [4.120× 10−3, 4.315× 10−3]
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This Figure shows implied cloud market size by industry for different regions in
the US with dark colors being large market sizes. Put another way, this Figure shows
the total demand by industry of AWS plus Azure for different regions. It recovers
sensible patterns such as discrete manufacturing is prominent in the upper midwest
and west coast and professional services being largest on the east coast and and west
coast. We take this as evidence the model is recovering sensible market level patterns.
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Figure C·1: Market size map
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